The extension of the extended mind 129
5 Remarkably, this link between teleosemantics and extended cognition was first
highlighted by one of the main critics of the latter: Rupert (2004, 401, n22).
6 For its emphasis on the nature of functions as, paradigmatically naturally, selected
effects, and for its reliance on the positive selection for some trait, the teleofunctional
account should be partly subsumable under the adaptationist rubric (these commitments are quite clearly stated in Millikan 2004, Chs. 1–2).
7 At the end of (2008), Clark asks for a “mental flip” explicitly styled after the one suggested by Dawkins (1999), whereas much of the preceding text is an attempt at providing concrete evidence for the explanatory value of extended cognition.
8 Among the few non-primate tool-using species, individuals of the New Caledonian
crow (Corvus moneduloides) were observed to alternate between tool-guided and toolless techniques of extracting food in the wild (Bluff et al. 2010). A recent example of
allegedly innovative tool use and its social transmission in captive Goffin cockatoos
(Cacatua goffini) is to be found in Auersperg et al. (2014). For an authoritative account
of the varieties and complexities of animal tool use, see Shumaker et al. (2011).
9 The distinction between waves of arguments for extended cognition has been made
by Sutton (2010). Defences of extended functionalism include Clark (2008) and Clark
(2010b) and Wheeler (2010), while second wave views have been introduced by
Menary (2010a, integrationism); Sutton (2010) and Kiverstein and Farina (2011, complementarity); and Rowlands (2010, amalgamationism). It was Clark (1997) himself
who anticipated complementarity views.
10 For extended-mind-based accounts of language, see Clark (1998, 2006), and Wheeler
(2004).
11 See Christiansen and Kirby (2003) for a collection of positions on the evolutionary
roots of language and the possibility of brain/language co-evolution. For a classic,
anti-Chomskyan account of the evolution of the human faculty of language, see Pinker
and Bloom (1990), and for the position under attack here Chomsky (2006).
12 Studies focusing on the importance of tool use, typically in conjunction with other factors, have been assembled in Gibson and Ingold (1993), Matsuzawa (2001), and Sanz
et al. (2013). Arguments for a primacy of cultural or “Machiavellian” intelligence over
the use of linguistic and other artefacts are to be found in Byrne and Whiten (1988),
Herrmann et al. (2007), Humphrey (1976), and Tomasello (2014); see also Sterelny
(2003, Chapter 4).
13 For historical and systematic considerations of the Spencer-Dewey axis, see GodfreySmith (1996a; 1996b), Pearce (2014). Notably, Dawkins’s extended phenotype theory
may be considered playing the Spencerian part in this context.
5 Remarkably, this link between teleosemantics and extended cognition was first
highlighted by one of the main critics of the latter: Rupert (2004, 401, n22).
6 For its emphasis on the nature of functions as, paradigmatically naturally, selected
effects, and for its reliance on the positive selection for some trait, the teleofunctional
account should be partly subsumable under the adaptationist rubric (these commitments are quite clearly stated in Millikan 2004, Chs. 1–2).
7 At the end of (2008), Clark asks for a “mental flip” explicitly styled after the one suggested by Dawkins (1999), whereas much of the preceding text is an attempt at providing concrete evidence for the explanatory value of extended cognition.
8 Among the few non-primate tool-using species, individuals of the New Caledonian
crow (Corvus moneduloides) were observed to alternate between tool-guided and toolless techniques of extracting food in the wild (Bluff et al. 2010). A recent example of
allegedly innovative tool use and its social transmission in captive Goffin cockatoos
(Cacatua goffini) is to be found in Auersperg et al. (2014). For an authoritative account
of the varieties and complexities of animal tool use, see Shumaker et al. (2011).
9 The distinction between waves of arguments for extended cognition has been made
by Sutton (2010). Defences of extended functionalism include Clark (2008) and Clark
(2010b) and Wheeler (2010), while second wave views have been introduced by
Menary (2010a, integrationism); Sutton (2010) and Kiverstein and Farina (2011, complementarity); and Rowlands (2010, amalgamationism). It was Clark (1997) himself
who anticipated complementarity views.
10 For extended-mind-based accounts of language, see Clark (1998, 2006), and Wheeler
(2004).
11 See Christiansen and Kirby (2003) for a collection of positions on the evolutionary
roots of language and the possibility of brain/language co-evolution. For a classic,
anti-Chomskyan account of the evolution of the human faculty of language, see Pinker
and Bloom (1990), and for the position under attack here Chomsky (2006).
12 Studies focusing on the importance of tool use, typically in conjunction with other factors, have been assembled in Gibson and Ingold (1993), Matsuzawa (2001), and Sanz
et al. (2013). Arguments for a primacy of cultural or “Machiavellian” intelligence over
the use of linguistic and other artefacts are to be found in Byrne and Whiten (1988),
Herrmann et al. (2007), Humphrey (1976), and Tomasello (2014); see also Sterelny
(2003, Chapter 4).
13 For historical and systematic considerations of the Spencer-Dewey axis, see GodfreySmith (1996a; 1996b), Pearce (2014). Notably, Dawkins’s extended phenotype theory
may be considered playing the Spencerian part in this context.