88 Informational environments
A somewhat more abstract but equally important relation is established when
organisms constitute elements of their environments: “Features of the environment
which were not physically put there by the organism are nonetheless dependent
upon the organism’s faculties for their existence, individual identity or structure”
(Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 145). An organism who brings himself into a relation to
some environmental variable so that it suits his needs, by moving or otherwise
behaving towards that variable, will be the paradigm of constitutive relations.
On the physical side, the effects may well be negligible but, as in the case of a
herd’s territory, much in the life of the population depends on treating or perceiving certain features of the external environment in certain ways. A herd’s territory, which, although having a spatio-temporal extension and sometimes being
bounded by topographical features, too, will be sufficiently defined only by the
herd’s population dynamics, patterns of spatial movement, interaction with other
populations and so forth, and the extension of that territory will alter in accordance with changes in these factors. A slice of space-time becomes an animal’s or
population’s territory only by virtue of the animals behaving towards objects and
organisms within that slice in a certain way while behaving differently, or not at
all, towards objects outside that slice. The territorial animal acts upon the relation
between the nature of an object or of another organism he encounters and their
relative placement inside vs. outside the slice of space-time that is treated by the
animal as his territory. The territorial animal hence deals with domain-specific
regularities as outlined in NI-5 in the previous chapter, and doing so will be part
of creating and maintaining his ecological niche.
The common denominator of constituted features of the environment, which
include a variety of other ecological relations, such as being a mate or a competitor or a specific microhabitat, is that they can only be relationally defined.
The physical nature of the objects and organisms inside and outside the slice of
space-time that an animal treats as his territory does not make the difference in
terms of relevance to the organism, apart from their relative placement inside vs.
outside of that slice. Their being placed inside vs. outside the territory is not an
intrinsic property of those objects and organisms but a relational property that
exists only in view of the behaviours of the territorial animal. Where a beaver dam
is a material structure with a function to the organism, a territory, mate or competitor exists only in relation to the organisms involved in treating other things
and beings under that relation.
2
Similarly, a microhabitat, such as the crevices
in the case of the arid-environment Drosophila pseudoobscura, although defined
by local variance in physical conditions, does exist as that microhabitat only by
virtue of being treated by the organism in a certain way, namely by virtue of his
activity of tracking the variance and invariance in local conditions and moving
where conditions are suitable.
In the light of these observations, it might seem that at least some elements
of environments are indeed subjectively defined. As for natural information, this
would be a premature conclusion though. That the existence and shape of territories have the presence and the behaviours of organisms as their necessary precondition does not make these entities restricted, ontologically, as it were, to the
A somewhat more abstract but equally important relation is established when
organisms constitute elements of their environments: “Features of the environment
which were not physically put there by the organism are nonetheless dependent
upon the organism’s faculties for their existence, individual identity or structure”
(Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 145). An organism who brings himself into a relation to
some environmental variable so that it suits his needs, by moving or otherwise
behaving towards that variable, will be the paradigm of constitutive relations.
On the physical side, the effects may well be negligible but, as in the case of a
herd’s territory, much in the life of the population depends on treating or perceiving certain features of the external environment in certain ways. A herd’s territory, which, although having a spatio-temporal extension and sometimes being
bounded by topographical features, too, will be sufficiently defined only by the
herd’s population dynamics, patterns of spatial movement, interaction with other
populations and so forth, and the extension of that territory will alter in accordance with changes in these factors. A slice of space-time becomes an animal’s or
population’s territory only by virtue of the animals behaving towards objects and
organisms within that slice in a certain way while behaving differently, or not at
all, towards objects outside that slice. The territorial animal acts upon the relation
between the nature of an object or of another organism he encounters and their
relative placement inside vs. outside the slice of space-time that is treated by the
animal as his territory. The territorial animal hence deals with domain-specific
regularities as outlined in NI-5 in the previous chapter, and doing so will be part
of creating and maintaining his ecological niche.
The common denominator of constituted features of the environment, which
include a variety of other ecological relations, such as being a mate or a competitor or a specific microhabitat, is that they can only be relationally defined.
The physical nature of the objects and organisms inside and outside the slice of
space-time that an animal treats as his territory does not make the difference in
terms of relevance to the organism, apart from their relative placement inside vs.
outside of that slice. Their being placed inside vs. outside the territory is not an
intrinsic property of those objects and organisms but a relational property that
exists only in view of the behaviours of the territorial animal. Where a beaver dam
is a material structure with a function to the organism, a territory, mate or competitor exists only in relation to the organisms involved in treating other things
and beings under that relation.
2
Similarly, a microhabitat, such as the crevices
in the case of the arid-environment Drosophila pseudoobscura, although defined
by local variance in physical conditions, does exist as that microhabitat only by
virtue of being treated by the organism in a certain way, namely by virtue of his
activity of tracking the variance and invariance in local conditions and moving
where conditions are suitable.
In the light of these observations, it might seem that at least some elements
of environments are indeed subjectively defined. As for natural information, this
would be a premature conclusion though. That the existence and shape of territories have the presence and the behaviours of organisms as their necessary precondition does not make these entities restricted, ontologically, as it were, to the