Making an environment 87
context, however important, to the content of the genetic code, environmental and
other non-genetic factors are placed on equal explanatory footing with respect to
informing biological development. Some developmental systems theorists even
reject the notion of genetic information altogether, and speak of genetic and nongenetic inheritance of developmental resources instead (Griffiths and Gray 2001).
One may prefer, but will not need, to adopt this latter view in order to appreciate
how complex, dynamic and bi-directional the relation between organismic and
environmental factors in development and evolution is. One may actually wish
to retain the notion of genetic information in order to appreciate the interplay
between information as specification and the specificity of organism-environment
relations that often makes the former appear as underspecifying.
Construction and constitution
The ambiguity in Lewontin’s argument among activities of construction in a literal sense, general modification of conditions by organisms, and the tracking of
local conditions may have a very interesting upshot for my general argument. So
it may be worthwhile to spell out the nature of construction involved here in some
more detail. A critical inquiry of this kind has been undertaken by Godfrey-Smith
(1996a, Chapter 5) in his account of the function of cognition as a means of coping
with environmental complexity. He managed to distinguish between no fewer than
five notions of construction in Lewontin’s work. Construction may simply refer to
modification of conditions in the external environment, where these changes are
observable and measurable. It may, however, also involve the creation of properties of the environment that would not exist, sensu strictu, in absence of an organism’s behaviours, where some of the properties are not observable and measurable
in the same sense as changes to the external environment. Hence, organisms may
be involved in activities in which properties of the environment are either constructed or constituted by their behaviours (see Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 144f ).
In Godfrey-Smith’s terms, “construction of the environment exists whenever an organism intervenes in formerly autonomous physical processes in the
external world, changing their course and upshot” (Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 145).
A formicary, a fox earth or, most paradigmatically perhaps, a beaver dam are
features causally and materially constructed by organisms in a quite straightforward sense, and will be relevant to the respective animals’ reproduction.
Godfrey-Smith’s take on construction, however, does not account for one sort
of case of direct physical modification that Lewontin had in mind, namely situations where organisms overpopulate or pollute their environments, or otherwise causally undermine their livelihood and hence end up constructing their
environments with reverse signs, as it were, in ecological and selective terms.
Only physical changes that do have or may acquire an adaptive function for the
organism and that may hence be subsumed under an evolutionary strategy for
the organism are counted in by Godfrey-Smith, and only modifications that add
structures to the external environment or alter its overall shape in relevant ways
will count as construction proper.
context, however important, to the content of the genetic code, environmental and
other non-genetic factors are placed on equal explanatory footing with respect to
informing biological development. Some developmental systems theorists even
reject the notion of genetic information altogether, and speak of genetic and nongenetic inheritance of developmental resources instead (Griffiths and Gray 2001).
One may prefer, but will not need, to adopt this latter view in order to appreciate
how complex, dynamic and bi-directional the relation between organismic and
environmental factors in development and evolution is. One may actually wish
to retain the notion of genetic information in order to appreciate the interplay
between information as specification and the specificity of organism-environment
relations that often makes the former appear as underspecifying.
Construction and constitution
The ambiguity in Lewontin’s argument among activities of construction in a literal sense, general modification of conditions by organisms, and the tracking of
local conditions may have a very interesting upshot for my general argument. So
it may be worthwhile to spell out the nature of construction involved here in some
more detail. A critical inquiry of this kind has been undertaken by Godfrey-Smith
(1996a, Chapter 5) in his account of the function of cognition as a means of coping
with environmental complexity. He managed to distinguish between no fewer than
five notions of construction in Lewontin’s work. Construction may simply refer to
modification of conditions in the external environment, where these changes are
observable and measurable. It may, however, also involve the creation of properties of the environment that would not exist, sensu strictu, in absence of an organism’s behaviours, where some of the properties are not observable and measurable
in the same sense as changes to the external environment. Hence, organisms may
be involved in activities in which properties of the environment are either constructed or constituted by their behaviours (see Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 144f ).
In Godfrey-Smith’s terms, “construction of the environment exists whenever an organism intervenes in formerly autonomous physical processes in the
external world, changing their course and upshot” (Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 145).
A formicary, a fox earth or, most paradigmatically perhaps, a beaver dam are
features causally and materially constructed by organisms in a quite straightforward sense, and will be relevant to the respective animals’ reproduction.
Godfrey-Smith’s take on construction, however, does not account for one sort
of case of direct physical modification that Lewontin had in mind, namely situations where organisms overpopulate or pollute their environments, or otherwise causally undermine their livelihood and hence end up constructing their
environments with reverse signs, as it were, in ecological and selective terms.
Only physical changes that do have or may acquire an adaptive function for the
organism and that may hence be subsumed under an evolutionary strategy for
the organism are counted in by Godfrey-Smith, and only modifications that add
structures to the external environment or alter its overall shape in relevant ways
will count as construction proper.