corporations in Canada.
32 Currently, these corporations include significant global
players like Seaspan Corporation and the Teekay group of companies, each of whom
own and operate substantial fleets.
33 Currently, Canada and Vancouver, in particular,
is now meaningfully included in the discussion of global maritime centres. In this
regard, a recent report on the leading maritime capitals of the world described
Vancouver and Canada’s tax regime in the following terms:
Apart from Singapore, no city has a more attractive policy framework than Vancouver,
according to the experts’ assessments of their own cities. This is not by coincidence.
Vancouver, with a strategic location on the Pacific rim of Canada, has a clear aspiration to
become a global maritime HQ/management center through broad tax incentives for shipping
and auxiliary services. Favorable policy framework, supportive government, and attractive
living conditions, are attractiveness factors that probably will lead Vancouver to climb on the
rankings of maritime cities in the years to come.
34
In similar terms, a recent study commissioned European Community Shipowners’ Association included the following commentary:
Singapore, Hong Kong, Dubai, Shanghai and Vancouver are the centres selected for a
benchmarking of the attractiveness to shipping activities. While most of them are still
minor centres in terms of global market shares, compared to the EU member states as a
whole, they experience high growth rates and are named the main competitors to the EU for
location of strategic, commercial and operational shipping activities.
. . .
The EU and its member states are competing against Singapore and Hong Kong on most
accounts (flagging, operations and ownership), whereas the competitiveness pressure from
Vancouver is focused mostly on location of management activities related to ownership.
35
One can imagine that, given the relatively modest role played by Canada in
international shipping in the mid-1980s when changes to Canada’s fiscal and tax
regime were under consideration, the prospect that a Canadian city some 30 years
later would be described as among the world’s leading maritime centres exerting
competitive pressure on others might have seemed a far-fetched but welcome
aspiration.
From a tax revenue perspective, conclusions regarding the success of Canada’s
initiative are necessarily speculative. If tax exemptions are considered “lost” revenue, such losses can be offset by tax revenue from taxes on personal income arising
from newly-created Canadian jobs created by international shipping corporations
and taxes on non-international shipping corporations involved in the increased
economic activity generated in Canada by international shipping corporations.
Data relating to these matters does not appear to exist. Nonetheless, at an intuitive
level, it would seem more than reasonable to assume that Canada’s approach to the
32 Hodgson and Brooks (2003), p. 93.
33 See Seaspan Corporation, Operating Fleet - https://www.seaspancorp.com/fleet-summary/operat
ing-fleet/ and Teekay, Fleet – https://www.teekay.com/about-us/fleet/. Both accessed on
30 December 2018.
34 Jakobsen et al. (2017), p. 35.
35 Monitor Deloitte (2017), p. 13.
468
F. M. Manolis and R. L. Bozzer
32 Currently, these corporations include significant global
players like Seaspan Corporation and the Teekay group of companies, each of whom
own and operate substantial fleets.
33 Currently, Canada and Vancouver, in particular,
is now meaningfully included in the discussion of global maritime centres. In this
regard, a recent report on the leading maritime capitals of the world described
Vancouver and Canada’s tax regime in the following terms:
Apart from Singapore, no city has a more attractive policy framework than Vancouver,
according to the experts’ assessments of their own cities. This is not by coincidence.
Vancouver, with a strategic location on the Pacific rim of Canada, has a clear aspiration to
become a global maritime HQ/management center through broad tax incentives for shipping
and auxiliary services. Favorable policy framework, supportive government, and attractive
living conditions, are attractiveness factors that probably will lead Vancouver to climb on the
rankings of maritime cities in the years to come.
34
In similar terms, a recent study commissioned European Community Shipowners’ Association included the following commentary:
Singapore, Hong Kong, Dubai, Shanghai and Vancouver are the centres selected for a
benchmarking of the attractiveness to shipping activities. While most of them are still
minor centres in terms of global market shares, compared to the EU member states as a
whole, they experience high growth rates and are named the main competitors to the EU for
location of strategic, commercial and operational shipping activities.
. . .
The EU and its member states are competing against Singapore and Hong Kong on most
accounts (flagging, operations and ownership), whereas the competitiveness pressure from
Vancouver is focused mostly on location of management activities related to ownership.
35
One can imagine that, given the relatively modest role played by Canada in
international shipping in the mid-1980s when changes to Canada’s fiscal and tax
regime were under consideration, the prospect that a Canadian city some 30 years
later would be described as among the world’s leading maritime centres exerting
competitive pressure on others might have seemed a far-fetched but welcome
aspiration.
From a tax revenue perspective, conclusions regarding the success of Canada’s
initiative are necessarily speculative. If tax exemptions are considered “lost” revenue, such losses can be offset by tax revenue from taxes on personal income arising
from newly-created Canadian jobs created by international shipping corporations
and taxes on non-international shipping corporations involved in the increased
economic activity generated in Canada by international shipping corporations.
Data relating to these matters does not appear to exist. Nonetheless, at an intuitive
level, it would seem more than reasonable to assume that Canada’s approach to the
32 Hodgson and Brooks (2003), p. 93.
33 See Seaspan Corporation, Operating Fleet - https://www.seaspancorp.com/fleet-summary/operat
ing-fleet/ and Teekay, Fleet – https://www.teekay.com/about-us/fleet/. Both accessed on
30 December 2018.
34 Jakobsen et al. (2017), p. 35.
35 Monitor Deloitte (2017), p. 13.
468
F. M. Manolis and R. L. Bozzer