8
failing to take action to protect people from activities that are known to be dangerous on the basis of scientific uncertainty is not a legally acceptable justification for
preventing the harm. In fact the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change contains the precautionary principle which states:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious
or reversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible
cost. (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 3.3)
The duty to be careful to not harm others even in cases where the proof of harm
is uncertain is widely accepted around the world by such international law principles as the “No Harm Principle.” Under the No Harm Principle, nations are expected
to prevent potential harm to other nations once they have reason to believe that
activities in their countries are putting others at risk, they may not wait until absolute proof has been established to cease dangerous behavior (Brown 2019).
Given that climate change actually threatens life on Earth including billions of
people who have not consented to put at risk, and given that waiting to reduce ghg
emissions makes the problem more threatening, ethics would shift the burden of
proof to those who are most responsible for raising ghg emissions to prove with
very high levels of proof that human emissions of ghg are safe even if there is some
uncertainty about the amount of warming that different levels of ghg emissions will
cause. For this reason, the problem created by IPCC’s underestimation of climate
change impacts may not be exclusively the fault of IPCC. The problem may also be
the fault of policymakers who fail to respond to the enormous potential harms
entailed by human-induced warming by demanding that opponents of climate
change policies shoulder the burden of proof by demonstrating with high levels of
proof that ghg emissions will not cause serious harms.
Yet, policymakers have a vital need for scientists to explain all scientifically
plausible harms that may result from human activities even if the magnitude and
creation of potential harms are uncertain. In fulfilling these responsibilities, scientists may not ignore potential harms because they are unable to determine probabilities about the likelihood of their occurrence based on empirical observations. Yet
because scientists often follow the epistemic norms of their science when engaged
in scientific research which norms usually require adequate levels of proof before
making causal claims, policymakers need to be clear when interacting with scientists that their policymaking responsibilities require that they, the policymakers,
protect citizens from all plausible harms. Therefore policymakers need scientists to
identify all scientifically plausible harms.
Because IPCC’s mission is to synthesize the existing peer-reviewed climate science, which usually does not include scientific conclusions about plausible harms
derived from speculation, IPCC cannot fulfill the role of science that policymakers
need when policymakers are seeking to protect citizens from all plausible harms and
to inform humanity about all plausible climate change impacts. Thus, there is a
basic conflict between IPCC’s mission of synthesizing peer-reviewed climate
D. A. Brown
failing to take action to protect people from activities that are known to be dangerous on the basis of scientific uncertainty is not a legally acceptable justification for
preventing the harm. In fact the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change contains the precautionary principle which states:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious
or reversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible
cost. (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 3.3)
The duty to be careful to not harm others even in cases where the proof of harm
is uncertain is widely accepted around the world by such international law principles as the “No Harm Principle.” Under the No Harm Principle, nations are expected
to prevent potential harm to other nations once they have reason to believe that
activities in their countries are putting others at risk, they may not wait until absolute proof has been established to cease dangerous behavior (Brown 2019).
Given that climate change actually threatens life on Earth including billions of
people who have not consented to put at risk, and given that waiting to reduce ghg
emissions makes the problem more threatening, ethics would shift the burden of
proof to those who are most responsible for raising ghg emissions to prove with
very high levels of proof that human emissions of ghg are safe even if there is some
uncertainty about the amount of warming that different levels of ghg emissions will
cause. For this reason, the problem created by IPCC’s underestimation of climate
change impacts may not be exclusively the fault of IPCC. The problem may also be
the fault of policymakers who fail to respond to the enormous potential harms
entailed by human-induced warming by demanding that opponents of climate
change policies shoulder the burden of proof by demonstrating with high levels of
proof that ghg emissions will not cause serious harms.
Yet, policymakers have a vital need for scientists to explain all scientifically
plausible harms that may result from human activities even if the magnitude and
creation of potential harms are uncertain. In fulfilling these responsibilities, scientists may not ignore potential harms because they are unable to determine probabilities about the likelihood of their occurrence based on empirical observations. Yet
because scientists often follow the epistemic norms of their science when engaged
in scientific research which norms usually require adequate levels of proof before
making causal claims, policymakers need to be clear when interacting with scientists that their policymaking responsibilities require that they, the policymakers,
protect citizens from all plausible harms. Therefore policymakers need scientists to
identify all scientifically plausible harms.
Because IPCC’s mission is to synthesize the existing peer-reviewed climate science, which usually does not include scientific conclusions about plausible harms
derived from speculation, IPCC cannot fulfill the role of science that policymakers
need when policymakers are seeking to protect citizens from all plausible harms and
to inform humanity about all plausible climate change impacts. Thus, there is a
basic conflict between IPCC’s mission of synthesizing peer-reviewed climate
D. A. Brown