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3 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over …
What are the typical collective action problems relative to shared rivers?
Susanne Schmeier, a monographer of transboundary water cooperation, identifies
the following 12 broad categories of collective action problems:
(a) water quantity and allocation problems relating to the use of and the competition
over water resources;
(b) water quality and pollution problems stemming from the intrusion of pollutants;
(c) hydropower and dam construction affecting the watercourse as a consequence
of electricity generation;
(d) infrastructure development and its environmental consequences (other than d);
(e) (other) environmental problems;
(f) climate change consequences;
(g) fishery problems (overfishing, competition for fishing grounds, etc.);
(h) economic development and the exploitation of river basin resources;
(i) invasive species;
(j) flood effects;
(k) biodiversity protection issues;
(l) navigation and transport-related problems (Schmeier 2013).
1
Naturally, these collective action problems appear at different frequencies and
represent very different levels of political complexity. Based on the study of 116
international river basins Schmeier concludes that issues related to water quantity
and allocation clearly stand out both in terms of frequency and complexity. This is
followed by concerns related to water quality/pollution. Other collective problems
such as hydropower development or fisheries emerge in much smaller numbers (see
Fig. 3.1) (Schmeier 2013).
Moreover, different collective action problems influence the prospects of conflict
or cooperation in very different ways. Certain issues may touch upon vital national
interests (e.g. the presence or lack of water downstream), while others, such as
navigation or fisheries, usually represent a much lower level of conflict potential
(Schmeier 2013).
The hydro-political cooperation dilemma, i.e. why some countries cooperate over
shared watercourses while others do not, is therefore very much influenced by a
number of variables relating to the underlying hydrological conditions of the basin
at issue as well as the nature of the collective action problems prevailing in given
co-riparian relations.
1 Although such categorisation displays some inherent inconsistencies (e.g. how to distinguish
between environment protection, invasive species, biodiversity etc.), it nonetheless does provide
a representative collection of the main issues riparian states regularly face in shared river basins.
3 Theories of Conflict and Cooperation Over …
What are the typical collective action problems relative to shared rivers?
Susanne Schmeier, a monographer of transboundary water cooperation, identifies
the following 12 broad categories of collective action problems:
(a) water quantity and allocation problems relating to the use of and the competition
over water resources;
(b) water quality and pollution problems stemming from the intrusion of pollutants;
(c) hydropower and dam construction affecting the watercourse as a consequence
of electricity generation;
(d) infrastructure development and its environmental consequences (other than d);
(e) (other) environmental problems;
(f) climate change consequences;
(g) fishery problems (overfishing, competition for fishing grounds, etc.);
(h) economic development and the exploitation of river basin resources;
(i) invasive species;
(j) flood effects;
(k) biodiversity protection issues;
(l) navigation and transport-related problems (Schmeier 2013).
1
Naturally, these collective action problems appear at different frequencies and
represent very different levels of political complexity. Based on the study of 116
international river basins Schmeier concludes that issues related to water quantity
and allocation clearly stand out both in terms of frequency and complexity. This is
followed by concerns related to water quality/pollution. Other collective problems
such as hydropower development or fisheries emerge in much smaller numbers (see
Fig. 3.1) (Schmeier 2013).
Moreover, different collective action problems influence the prospects of conflict
or cooperation in very different ways. Certain issues may touch upon vital national
interests (e.g. the presence or lack of water downstream), while others, such as
navigation or fisheries, usually represent a much lower level of conflict potential
(Schmeier 2013).
The hydro-political cooperation dilemma, i.e. why some countries cooperate over
shared watercourses while others do not, is therefore very much influenced by a
number of variables relating to the underlying hydrological conditions of the basin
at issue as well as the nature of the collective action problems prevailing in given
co-riparian relations.
1 Although such categorisation displays some inherent inconsistencies (e.g. how to distinguish
between environment protection, invasive species, biodiversity etc.), it nonetheless does provide
a representative collection of the main issues riparian states regularly face in shared river basins.