Chapter 3
Theories of Conflict and Cooperation
Over Transboundary River Basins
3.1 The Context: Collective Action Problems
and the Hydropolitical Cooperation Dilemma
While geography defines the possibilities for where, how and when water can be
developed and used, political boundaries impose serious constraints on the actual
water management choices available to national governments (Elhance 1999). The
disconnect between political and geographical scale—often coined as “spatial misfit”—gives rise to complicated cooperation dilemmas among the riparian states of
international river basins.
At the core of such cooperation problems lies the natural asymmetry between
upper and lower basin states created by the downstream motion of water that creates
externalities that are mainly of negative and unidirectional character. Alternations
in water quantity and/or flow timing, water quality, river morphology, etc. by an
upper riparian can trigger widespread consequences on fluvial ecology, irrigation,
agriculture, fisheries, energy production or navigation in downstream states. Thus,
upstream and downstream basin states are likely to have divergent interests, especially
when reaping the benefits of the river is perceived as a zero-sum game.
Externalities however do not always unfold in an upstream-to-downstream direction, neither are they necessarily negative in terms of impact (Moellenkamp 2007).
Measures taken by upstream countries to improve water quality (e.g. pollution prevention or flood control) have beneficial effects on downstream states too (without
having paid for it). A downstream riparian can also influence the use of water by
upstream parties in a significant manner. The most evident domains of such action
include navigation (e.g. control of access to the recipient sea) and ecology (e.g.
blocking fish migration).
In summary: transboundary river basins are necessarily characterised by so-called
collective action problems, i.e. situations where all concerned players (basin states)
would benefit from cooperation, but the magnitude and/or the difference in the associated costs to be borne by the parties can create an impediment to joint action.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
G. Baranyai, European Water Law and Hydropolitics, Water Governance - Concepts,
Methods, and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22541-4_3
15
Theories of Conflict and Cooperation
Over Transboundary River Basins
3.1 The Context: Collective Action Problems
and the Hydropolitical Cooperation Dilemma
While geography defines the possibilities for where, how and when water can be
developed and used, political boundaries impose serious constraints on the actual
water management choices available to national governments (Elhance 1999). The
disconnect between political and geographical scale—often coined as “spatial misfit”—gives rise to complicated cooperation dilemmas among the riparian states of
international river basins.
At the core of such cooperation problems lies the natural asymmetry between
upper and lower basin states created by the downstream motion of water that creates
externalities that are mainly of negative and unidirectional character. Alternations
in water quantity and/or flow timing, water quality, river morphology, etc. by an
upper riparian can trigger widespread consequences on fluvial ecology, irrigation,
agriculture, fisheries, energy production or navigation in downstream states. Thus,
upstream and downstream basin states are likely to have divergent interests, especially
when reaping the benefits of the river is perceived as a zero-sum game.
Externalities however do not always unfold in an upstream-to-downstream direction, neither are they necessarily negative in terms of impact (Moellenkamp 2007).
Measures taken by upstream countries to improve water quality (e.g. pollution prevention or flood control) have beneficial effects on downstream states too (without
having paid for it). A downstream riparian can also influence the use of water by
upstream parties in a significant manner. The most evident domains of such action
include navigation (e.g. control of access to the recipient sea) and ecology (e.g.
blocking fish migration).
In summary: transboundary river basins are necessarily characterised by so-called
collective action problems, i.e. situations where all concerned players (basin states)
would benefit from cooperation, but the magnitude and/or the difference in the associated costs to be borne by the parties can create an impediment to joint action.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
G. Baranyai, European Water Law and Hydropolitics, Water Governance - Concepts,
Methods, and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22541-4_3
15