106
8 Transboundary Water Governance in the European Union
Besides, not only is cooperation reduced mainly to procedures, compliance with
such cooperation procedures is not supported by robust sanctions. In fact, as described
above, if member states fail to come to terms in the preparation of joint international
river basin or flood risk management plans, their failure to cooperate triggers no legal
consequences whatsoever. Similarly, the basic cooperation procedures are not broken
down to distinct procedural steps (timetables, milestones), nor are they supported by
established platforms for consultation (although the European Commission may be
invited to help). While basin organisations play an important role in coordinating the
planning processes of riparian states, they have neither the powers, nor the ambition
to vigorously coordinate or to compel countries to participate in the process. Not
surprisingly, in view of the lack of common procedural guidelines and the absence
of sanctions the coordination of transboundary river basin management plans shows
a very mixed picture (Baranyai 2016).
Another shortcoming of EU transboundary water law is the fact that it has long
been dominated by quality (pollution) and ecological considerations. At the outset
this one-sided focus could have been justified by the abundance of freshwater in northwestern European countries—the core states of European integration—as well as by
the dominance of cross-border pollution issues in the first decades of EU water policy.
The fact, however, that this approach was subsequently ossified in the EU’s founding
treaty seems to create the single biggest drag on adaptation to changing hydrological
conditions in Europe, which will likely to be dominated by sharp fluctuations in
river flow rather than intense point source pollution (see Sect. 10.1.4). Some critics
also underline that even where the EU fixes ecological objectives, these are not
as progressive as they appear to outside observers for their implementation can be
deferred almost ad infinitum (Van Risjwick et al. 2010).
8.4 The Interplay Among the Various Layers of European
Transboundary Water Governance: Cross-Fertilisation
or Cannibalisation?
The remarkable intensity of actual transboundary water cooperation, colourfully
illustrated in Fig. 8.1, as well as the recent lack of noisy inter-state water disputes
indeed suggest that the European Union and its member states have managed to
develop a stable legal and institutional framework to manage cross-border hydrological issues. This fact has, indeed, been repeatedly confirmed by various comparative studies that place Europe among the best performing regions when it comes to
hydropolitical resilience worldwide (see Sect. 6.4.3). This—as Reichert rightly concludes—“is itself a major achievement not to be underestimated in a conflict-ridden
world” (Reichert 2016). Some even argue that the common planning requirements
imposed collectively on basin states may help balance the fundamental upstreamdownstream dichotomy as the WFD lifts downstream states onto the same level as
other basin states. Such shift of positions is expected to materialise not only out of the
8 Transboundary Water Governance in the European Union
Besides, not only is cooperation reduced mainly to procedures, compliance with
such cooperation procedures is not supported by robust sanctions. In fact, as described
above, if member states fail to come to terms in the preparation of joint international
river basin or flood risk management plans, their failure to cooperate triggers no legal
consequences whatsoever. Similarly, the basic cooperation procedures are not broken
down to distinct procedural steps (timetables, milestones), nor are they supported by
established platforms for consultation (although the European Commission may be
invited to help). While basin organisations play an important role in coordinating the
planning processes of riparian states, they have neither the powers, nor the ambition
to vigorously coordinate or to compel countries to participate in the process. Not
surprisingly, in view of the lack of common procedural guidelines and the absence
of sanctions the coordination of transboundary river basin management plans shows
a very mixed picture (Baranyai 2016).
Another shortcoming of EU transboundary water law is the fact that it has long
been dominated by quality (pollution) and ecological considerations. At the outset
this one-sided focus could have been justified by the abundance of freshwater in northwestern European countries—the core states of European integration—as well as by
the dominance of cross-border pollution issues in the first decades of EU water policy.
The fact, however, that this approach was subsequently ossified in the EU’s founding
treaty seems to create the single biggest drag on adaptation to changing hydrological
conditions in Europe, which will likely to be dominated by sharp fluctuations in
river flow rather than intense point source pollution (see Sect. 10.1.4). Some critics
also underline that even where the EU fixes ecological objectives, these are not
as progressive as they appear to outside observers for their implementation can be
deferred almost ad infinitum (Van Risjwick et al. 2010).
8.4 The Interplay Among the Various Layers of European
Transboundary Water Governance: Cross-Fertilisation
or Cannibalisation?
The remarkable intensity of actual transboundary water cooperation, colourfully
illustrated in Fig. 8.1, as well as the recent lack of noisy inter-state water disputes
indeed suggest that the European Union and its member states have managed to
develop a stable legal and institutional framework to manage cross-border hydrological issues. This fact has, indeed, been repeatedly confirmed by various comparative studies that place Europe among the best performing regions when it comes to
hydropolitical resilience worldwide (see Sect. 6.4.3). This—as Reichert rightly concludes—“is itself a major achievement not to be underestimated in a conflict-ridden
world” (Reichert 2016). Some even argue that the common planning requirements
imposed collectively on basin states may help balance the fundamental upstreamdownstream dichotomy as the WFD lifts downstream states onto the same level as
other basin states. Such shift of positions is expected to materialise not only out of the