8.3 The Water Law and Policy of the European Union
105
on the evolution of EU water policy. Examples include the interpretation of the EU’s
powers to regulate water quantity issues in the context of the Danube Convention
65 or
the legal force of the environmental objectives of the Water Framework Directive.
66
8.3.5.3 European Environment Agency
While not formally engaged in policy-making and implementation, the European
Environment Agency (EEA)—a sublet of the European Commission headquartered
in Copenhagen, Denmark—nonetheless plays an important role shaping EU water
governance by way of providing robust monitoring data and analyses. The EEA collects and evaluates information on a very wide range of water-related subjects, such
water quality, water quantity, water stress indicators, etc. not only for EU member
states, but also for neighbouring and candidate countries.
67
8.3.6 Evaluation
The EU model of transboundary water governance, especially the Water Framework
Directive, has been universally praised as the most sophisticated and progressive
transnational water regime in the world. For its courageous innovations with respect
to river basin planning, holistic coverage of all waters and uses, internalisation of
cost considerations, public participation, etc. the WFD unquestionably represents a
very high level of political and policy ambition that can serve as a model for the rest
of the world (Dellapenna and Gupta 2008).
Yet, a closer look at some of the constituent features of the EU’s water transboundary cooperation regime reveals a number of important shortcomings. First,
most of the relevant requirements are purely procedural in nature. This reflects a
widely shared regulatory philosophy in EU bureaucracy that assumes that the right
procedures lead to good decisions (Krämer 2002). Yet, the procedures that are supposed to provide the backbone of basin cooperation cover only a small segment of
possible interactions among riparian states. E.g. while EU countries are required
to develop joint river basin management plans and programmes of measures, this
obligation does not extend to the joint implementation of the plans. Where, exceptionally, EU water law imposes substantive obligations on fellow basin states these
do not go beyond a context-specific adaptation of the “no-harm” rule laid down by
the UNECE Water Convention and the UN Watercourses Convention.
65 C-36/98, Spain v. Council, ECR 2001, I-00779. Also see Sect. 10.1.3.
66 C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. v. Federal Republic of Germany,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:433. Also see Sect. 8.3.3.
67 http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/dm#c1=Data&c1=Graph&c1=Indicator&c1=
Interactive+data&c1=Interactive+map&c1=Map&c0=10&b_start=0 (accessed 12 February 2019).
105
on the evolution of EU water policy. Examples include the interpretation of the EU’s
powers to regulate water quantity issues in the context of the Danube Convention
65 or
the legal force of the environmental objectives of the Water Framework Directive.
66
8.3.5.3 European Environment Agency
While not formally engaged in policy-making and implementation, the European
Environment Agency (EEA)—a sublet of the European Commission headquartered
in Copenhagen, Denmark—nonetheless plays an important role shaping EU water
governance by way of providing robust monitoring data and analyses. The EEA collects and evaluates information on a very wide range of water-related subjects, such
water quality, water quantity, water stress indicators, etc. not only for EU member
states, but also for neighbouring and candidate countries.
67
8.3.6 Evaluation
The EU model of transboundary water governance, especially the Water Framework
Directive, has been universally praised as the most sophisticated and progressive
transnational water regime in the world. For its courageous innovations with respect
to river basin planning, holistic coverage of all waters and uses, internalisation of
cost considerations, public participation, etc. the WFD unquestionably represents a
very high level of political and policy ambition that can serve as a model for the rest
of the world (Dellapenna and Gupta 2008).
Yet, a closer look at some of the constituent features of the EU’s water transboundary cooperation regime reveals a number of important shortcomings. First,
most of the relevant requirements are purely procedural in nature. This reflects a
widely shared regulatory philosophy in EU bureaucracy that assumes that the right
procedures lead to good decisions (Krämer 2002). Yet, the procedures that are supposed to provide the backbone of basin cooperation cover only a small segment of
possible interactions among riparian states. E.g. while EU countries are required
to develop joint river basin management plans and programmes of measures, this
obligation does not extend to the joint implementation of the plans. Where, exceptionally, EU water law imposes substantive obligations on fellow basin states these
do not go beyond a context-specific adaptation of the “no-harm” rule laid down by
the UNECE Water Convention and the UN Watercourses Convention.
65 C-36/98, Spain v. Council, ECR 2001, I-00779. Also see Sect. 10.1.3.
66 C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. v. Federal Republic of Germany,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:433. Also see Sect. 8.3.3.
67 http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/dm#c1=Data&c1=Graph&c1=Indicator&c1=
Interactive+data&c1=Interactive+map&c1=Map&c0=10&b_start=0 (accessed 12 February 2019).