342
of the obligation, provided under art. 62 UNCLOS, for coastal States lacking the
capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch in their EEZ to grant other States
access to their surplus on the basis of access agreements. Under these agreements—
most of which are concluded between Western distant-water fishing States and
developing coastal States—the coastal State authorizes the vessels from the other
State party to fish in its EEZ in return for a financial compensation. This compensation usually corresponds only to a small percentage of the value of the catch. In this
way, the fleets of the distant-water State gain a clear advantage over their competitors. For this reason, there are concerns that these agreements may provide implicit
subsidies for the fishing sector of the foreign State.
86
Although progress in the Doha Round has long been stalled, fishing subsidies
appear to be one of the issues over which WTO Member States have been most
proactive.
87
The original mandate on this issue was further elaborated in 2005 at the
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, with a specific call for prohibition of certain
forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.
88
The
adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 has given a
renewed impetus to the talks on this issue by establishing the deadline of 2020 for
abolishing subsidies contributing to IUU fishing.
89
In July 2017, the Chair of the
WTO Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR) circulated a compilation matrix of seven
proposals to limit harmful fisheries subsidies,
90
which were further refined in
October and November.
91
In December 2017, at the Buenos Aires Ministerial
Conference, WTO members expressed their firm commitment to progress in this
area of negotiations with a view to adopting, by the Ministerial Conference in 2019
(1 year before the deadline set in the SDGs) an “agreement on comprehensive and
effective disciplines that prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute
to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to
IUU-fishing”.
92
In conclusion, while recent developments have generally increased the potential
for conflict between international trade law and the law of the sea, fisheries subsidies talks may represent a unique opportunity for WTO and UNCLOS to realise a
joint and mutually supportive contribution to sustainable development.
86 See Stone (1997), p. 525.
87 See on this issue Dostal (2005), Young (2009), and Chen (2010).
88 Ministerial Declaration adopted on 18 December 2005, Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session
Hong Kong, 13-18 December 2005, 22 December 2005, Annex D, para. 9.
89 See Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, 21 October 2015.
90 See WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/273, 28 July 2017.
91 See www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fish_03nov17_e.htm.
92 See Fisheries Subsidies. Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017, 18 December 2017.
M. I. Papa
of the obligation, provided under art. 62 UNCLOS, for coastal States lacking the
capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch in their EEZ to grant other States
access to their surplus on the basis of access agreements. Under these agreements—
most of which are concluded between Western distant-water fishing States and
developing coastal States—the coastal State authorizes the vessels from the other
State party to fish in its EEZ in return for a financial compensation. This compensation usually corresponds only to a small percentage of the value of the catch. In this
way, the fleets of the distant-water State gain a clear advantage over their competitors. For this reason, there are concerns that these agreements may provide implicit
subsidies for the fishing sector of the foreign State.
86
Although progress in the Doha Round has long been stalled, fishing subsidies
appear to be one of the issues over which WTO Member States have been most
proactive.
87
The original mandate on this issue was further elaborated in 2005 at the
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, with a specific call for prohibition of certain
forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.
88
The
adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 has given a
renewed impetus to the talks on this issue by establishing the deadline of 2020 for
abolishing subsidies contributing to IUU fishing.
89
In July 2017, the Chair of the
WTO Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR) circulated a compilation matrix of seven
proposals to limit harmful fisheries subsidies,
90
which were further refined in
October and November.
91
In December 2017, at the Buenos Aires Ministerial
Conference, WTO members expressed their firm commitment to progress in this
area of negotiations with a view to adopting, by the Ministerial Conference in 2019
(1 year before the deadline set in the SDGs) an “agreement on comprehensive and
effective disciplines that prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute
to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to
IUU-fishing”.
92
In conclusion, while recent developments have generally increased the potential
for conflict between international trade law and the law of the sea, fisheries subsidies talks may represent a unique opportunity for WTO and UNCLOS to realise a
joint and mutually supportive contribution to sustainable development.
86 See Stone (1997), p. 525.
87 See on this issue Dostal (2005), Young (2009), and Chen (2010).
88 Ministerial Declaration adopted on 18 December 2005, Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session
Hong Kong, 13-18 December 2005, 22 December 2005, Annex D, para. 9.
89 See Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, 21 October 2015.
90 See WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/273, 28 July 2017.
91 See www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fish_03nov17_e.htm.
92 See Fisheries Subsidies. Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017, 18 December 2017.
M. I. Papa