221
of the Award with respect to the said request. In the meanwhile, in furtherance of its
sovereignty claim, Mauritius has seemingly attributed marginal importance to the
Award in the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, including the United
Kingdom commitment to return the Chagos Archipelago. At the General Assembly
meeting dealing with the request for the ICJ advisory opinion, Mauritius abstained
from referring at all to the Award.
130
Indeed, the characterisation of the Lancaster House Undertakings as an international agreement risks being detrimental to the interests of Mauritius. Such an association could well be deemed to imply that Mauritius agreed to the detachment of
the Chagos Archipelago and thus is now prevented from claiming immediate
sovereignty over the islands.
131
It is consequently little wonder that, in the aforementioned meeting on the adoption of the draft resolution concerning the request
for an ICJ advisory opinion, the United Kingdom eventually admitted the binding
nature of its commitment to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius
when it is no longer needed for defence purposes.
132
Mauritius contends that there
was no agreement on the separation of the Chagos Archipelago since its consent had
not been given freely. In the Award in the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration,
though, the Tribunal abstained from addressing the problem of Mauritius’ consent
(sic!) in finding that the Lancaster House Undertakings had been transformed into
an international agreement
133
: the United Kingdom’s repetition of its commitments
was said to have rendered the relevant issue superfluous.
134
The binding nature of the United Kingdom’s commitment to return the Chagos
Archipelago to Mauritius has so far had slight influence also on the issue of the
United States military base on Diego Garcia. As mentioned before, by December
2016 the United Kingdom and the United States had to decide on the extension of
the BIOT Agreement for a further 20 years. Although the Tribunal issued the Award
130 Instead, Mauritius alleged that the detachment of the Archipelago and the removal of the inhabitants thereof amounted to a breach of the principle of self-determination, fundamental principles
of human rights, and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as interpreted and applied
by the General Assembly in the relevant resolutions. See the meeting record A/71/PV.88, p. 7.
131 See also Appleby (2015), pp. 533–534. The said implication is seemingly disregarded by the
authors deeming the determination of the legally binding nature of the Lancaster House
Undertakings to be of value to Mauritius’ interests. In this connection, see for instance Colson and
Vohrer (2015), p. 850, and Weckel (2015).
132 Meeting record A/71/PV.88, p. 11.
133 For some remarks on Mauritius’ consent see Robertson (2012), pp. 10–14. From a broader perspective, the Tribunal abstained from addressing any grounds of invalidity plausibly coming into
consideration once the Lancaster House Undertakings were characterised as an international
agreement. As mentioned above (supra, footnote 41), the question would have arisen about the
compatibility of the Lancaster House Undertakings as an international agreement with the selfdetermination principle as a peremptory norm. On other alleged grounds of invalidity of the
Lancaster House Undertakings as an international agreement see Abraham (2011), pp. 90–91, and
Oraison (2004), pp. 149–163. Indeed, with respect to the Lancaster House Undertakings as an
international agreement, the awkward question of the validity of unequal treaties may also come
into consideration, as suggested by Biad and Edynak (2016), p. 75.
134 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, para. 428.
The Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea…
of the Award with respect to the said request. In the meanwhile, in furtherance of its
sovereignty claim, Mauritius has seemingly attributed marginal importance to the
Award in the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, including the United
Kingdom commitment to return the Chagos Archipelago. At the General Assembly
meeting dealing with the request for the ICJ advisory opinion, Mauritius abstained
from referring at all to the Award.
130
Indeed, the characterisation of the Lancaster House Undertakings as an international agreement risks being detrimental to the interests of Mauritius. Such an association could well be deemed to imply that Mauritius agreed to the detachment of
the Chagos Archipelago and thus is now prevented from claiming immediate
sovereignty over the islands.
131
It is consequently little wonder that, in the aforementioned meeting on the adoption of the draft resolution concerning the request
for an ICJ advisory opinion, the United Kingdom eventually admitted the binding
nature of its commitment to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius
when it is no longer needed for defence purposes.
132
Mauritius contends that there
was no agreement on the separation of the Chagos Archipelago since its consent had
not been given freely. In the Award in the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration,
though, the Tribunal abstained from addressing the problem of Mauritius’ consent
(sic!) in finding that the Lancaster House Undertakings had been transformed into
an international agreement
133
: the United Kingdom’s repetition of its commitments
was said to have rendered the relevant issue superfluous.
134
The binding nature of the United Kingdom’s commitment to return the Chagos
Archipelago to Mauritius has so far had slight influence also on the issue of the
United States military base on Diego Garcia. As mentioned before, by December
2016 the United Kingdom and the United States had to decide on the extension of
the BIOT Agreement for a further 20 years. Although the Tribunal issued the Award
130 Instead, Mauritius alleged that the detachment of the Archipelago and the removal of the inhabitants thereof amounted to a breach of the principle of self-determination, fundamental principles
of human rights, and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as interpreted and applied
by the General Assembly in the relevant resolutions. See the meeting record A/71/PV.88, p. 7.
131 See also Appleby (2015), pp. 533–534. The said implication is seemingly disregarded by the
authors deeming the determination of the legally binding nature of the Lancaster House
Undertakings to be of value to Mauritius’ interests. In this connection, see for instance Colson and
Vohrer (2015), p. 850, and Weckel (2015).
132 Meeting record A/71/PV.88, p. 11.
133 For some remarks on Mauritius’ consent see Robertson (2012), pp. 10–14. From a broader perspective, the Tribunal abstained from addressing any grounds of invalidity plausibly coming into
consideration once the Lancaster House Undertakings were characterised as an international
agreement. As mentioned above (supra, footnote 41), the question would have arisen about the
compatibility of the Lancaster House Undertakings as an international agreement with the selfdetermination principle as a peremptory norm. On other alleged grounds of invalidity of the
Lancaster House Undertakings as an international agreement see Abraham (2011), pp. 90–91, and
Oraison (2004), pp. 149–163. Indeed, with respect to the Lancaster House Undertakings as an
international agreement, the awkward question of the validity of unequal treaties may also come
into consideration, as suggested by Biad and Edynak (2016), p. 75.
134 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, para. 428.
The Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea…