Between Profession and Politics 77
and take the right scientific position. When we saw the blood indicators fall to lower levels, we immediately began to worry: ‘There were
6,000 white blood cells, only 4,000 were left, a whole third less’, and he
said that it was no big deal: ‘Well, you know, 2,000 less. Sometimes it
happens. After a while, everything will recover by itself.’ And even made
ironic notes in the margins of our notes: ‘It’s a passion for boys and girls. 55
Tareev ironically compared Gusʹkova and Baisogolov here with a little girl
and boy, although they were both already practicing doctors at the time. They
were indeed younger than he was, but his irony was intended to emphasize
the superiority of his own research, as his scientific approaches differed in
methods and results from those of Gusʹkova and Baisogolov.
Many years later, already having won the Lenin Prize and having authored
a “secret” monograph on radiation sickness, Baisogolov and Gusʹkova once
again indicate this problem in the first public edition of their book: “In the
specialized literature, including in recent years, the gap between radiologists,
clinicians and experimenters has not yet been bridged. Summarizing the
accumulated clinical experience and taking into account the experimental
data, from our point of view, should be one of the main sources of building a
general theory of the effects of radiation on the body…” 56
The significant amount of empirical material compiled by the physicians
of the Plant No. 817 became the basis for the first scientific classifications of
human radiation injuries and methods of combating the effects of radiation
exposure. The secrecy regime strictly observed by the Moscow leadership,
however, became an obstacle not only on the way of spreading this knowledge, but also on the experts’ way of achieving international recognition.
Baisogolov recalled that he and Gusʹkova were asked to prepare a report on
acute radiation sickness for the Geneva Conference in 1955: “The report
was prepared, but neither Angelina Konstantinovna nor I were asked to go
there. The report was read by M.P. Domshlak.” Baisogolov believes that one
of the reasons for the replacement of the speaker was also his disagreement
with the Deputy Director of the Institute of Biophysics, N.A. Kraevskii, 57
on scientific issues. 58
As leading experts in radiation medicine, Gusʹkova and Baisogolov have
long been in the shadow of Moscow academics. Their colleagues from the
Second Therapy mentioned in their memoirs 59 that it was secrecy that became
a barrier to international recognition and scientific status. Angelina Gusʹkova
managed to break the “curse of secrecy” after the Chernobyl disaster, when
she became an expert on radiation exposure with international status. Grigorii
Baisogolov, however, is still considered by many colleagues to be a specialist,
whose merits are not sufficiently appreciated in science.
Gus’kova seeks to problematize their “invisibility” and lack of acceptance
them as experts and, at the same time, argues that it was unreasonable classification of their findings that resulted with the mess during the Chernobyl
accident when medical personnel proved unable to provide quality aid to the
and take the right scientific position. When we saw the blood indicators fall to lower levels, we immediately began to worry: ‘There were
6,000 white blood cells, only 4,000 were left, a whole third less’, and he
said that it was no big deal: ‘Well, you know, 2,000 less. Sometimes it
happens. After a while, everything will recover by itself.’ And even made
ironic notes in the margins of our notes: ‘It’s a passion for boys and girls. 55
Tareev ironically compared Gusʹkova and Baisogolov here with a little girl
and boy, although they were both already practicing doctors at the time. They
were indeed younger than he was, but his irony was intended to emphasize
the superiority of his own research, as his scientific approaches differed in
methods and results from those of Gusʹkova and Baisogolov.
Many years later, already having won the Lenin Prize and having authored
a “secret” monograph on radiation sickness, Baisogolov and Gusʹkova once
again indicate this problem in the first public edition of their book: “In the
specialized literature, including in recent years, the gap between radiologists,
clinicians and experimenters has not yet been bridged. Summarizing the
accumulated clinical experience and taking into account the experimental
data, from our point of view, should be one of the main sources of building a
general theory of the effects of radiation on the body…” 56
The significant amount of empirical material compiled by the physicians
of the Plant No. 817 became the basis for the first scientific classifications of
human radiation injuries and methods of combating the effects of radiation
exposure. The secrecy regime strictly observed by the Moscow leadership,
however, became an obstacle not only on the way of spreading this knowledge, but also on the experts’ way of achieving international recognition.
Baisogolov recalled that he and Gusʹkova were asked to prepare a report on
acute radiation sickness for the Geneva Conference in 1955: “The report
was prepared, but neither Angelina Konstantinovna nor I were asked to go
there. The report was read by M.P. Domshlak.” Baisogolov believes that one
of the reasons for the replacement of the speaker was also his disagreement
with the Deputy Director of the Institute of Biophysics, N.A. Kraevskii, 57
on scientific issues. 58
As leading experts in radiation medicine, Gusʹkova and Baisogolov have
long been in the shadow of Moscow academics. Their colleagues from the
Second Therapy mentioned in their memoirs 59 that it was secrecy that became
a barrier to international recognition and scientific status. Angelina Gusʹkova
managed to break the “curse of secrecy” after the Chernobyl disaster, when
she became an expert on radiation exposure with international status. Grigorii
Baisogolov, however, is still considered by many colleagues to be a specialist,
whose merits are not sufficiently appreciated in science.
Gus’kova seeks to problematize their “invisibility” and lack of acceptance
them as experts and, at the same time, argues that it was unreasonable classification of their findings that resulted with the mess during the Chernobyl
accident when medical personnel proved unable to provide quality aid to the