76 Olga Nikonova
who arbitrarily gave one of her employees a labor ballot that allowed them
to work only in “clean” conditions, was summoned to her boss. There she
was told that “we don’t need doctors like that, who interfere with production” 50 and then lost her factory pass. The authors of the analyzed memories
do not deny that they often had to compromise but always emphasize that
they were on the side of the patients. Firm moral and ethical principles and
professionalism are the subject of special attention in the texts of the protagonists. “More than 50 years passed, and I still remember our first occupational
patients, whose lives we could not save,” recalled Emanova. She continued
that, “of the five shift supervisors of the 25th plant, only one, who received a
total of more than 1000 X-rays, lived to 2001. It is not only the destiny of our
patients, but ours too, because we literally put our souls into each of them,
felt sorry for them, even arranged their personal affairs.” 51
The main specialized diseases that physicians faced during the construction and beginning of operation of the nuclear plant were acute and chronic
radiation diseases, as well as various diseases caused by the accumulation of
radiation in the body, such as plutonium pneumosclerosis. Gusʹkova revealed,
with regard to the first years of operation of the plant, that the most dangerous radiochemical plant (plant B) in the period of 1949–1953 diagnosed
more than 1500 cases of chronic and 11 cases of acute radiation diseases. 52
According to the doctor of the Second Therapy, N.A. Koshurnikova, there
was no chronic radiation sickness before the establishment of the atomic
industry in the USSR, and it was not known about at the American nuclear
enterprises, because workers were not allowed to stay for a long time in
the conditions of increased radiation. 53 This “purely Soviet acquisition” was
related to the specifics of the Soviet nuclear project, which was carried out
in an extremely short period of time, using mobilization technologies and
forced labor. A clear clinical picture of the effects of radiation on humans did
not yet exist, and a diagnosis proved difficult and often provoked controversy
among experts. The diagnosis of plutonium pneumosclerosis could not be
sustained until the number of deaths had reached four. South Ural physicians
successfully managed to convince their colleagues from Moscow that the
disease had nothing to do with tuberculosis. 54
Angelina Gusʹkova notes that in order to solve complex medical problems
in atomic cities, they often invited “scientists, founders, and hoped that this
task would not present a great deal of difficulty for them.” However, the
approaches of radiographers and radiologists, who dealt with local exposures,
were not suitable for physicians at a closed plant, as the exposure there was
total. The desire to transfer the patterns found in Moscow laboratories to
the situation in the Second Therapy led to misunderstandings and conflicts.
“Even such a prominent scientist as Tareev,” recalled Gusʹkova,
who, it would seem, should have taught us, the young ones, and guided
us on the right path (for this very purpose he was invited to the Urals),
was unable to understand all the novelties of the observed phenomena
who arbitrarily gave one of her employees a labor ballot that allowed them
to work only in “clean” conditions, was summoned to her boss. There she
was told that “we don’t need doctors like that, who interfere with production” 50 and then lost her factory pass. The authors of the analyzed memories
do not deny that they often had to compromise but always emphasize that
they were on the side of the patients. Firm moral and ethical principles and
professionalism are the subject of special attention in the texts of the protagonists. “More than 50 years passed, and I still remember our first occupational
patients, whose lives we could not save,” recalled Emanova. She continued
that, “of the five shift supervisors of the 25th plant, only one, who received a
total of more than 1000 X-rays, lived to 2001. It is not only the destiny of our
patients, but ours too, because we literally put our souls into each of them,
felt sorry for them, even arranged their personal affairs.” 51
The main specialized diseases that physicians faced during the construction and beginning of operation of the nuclear plant were acute and chronic
radiation diseases, as well as various diseases caused by the accumulation of
radiation in the body, such as plutonium pneumosclerosis. Gusʹkova revealed,
with regard to the first years of operation of the plant, that the most dangerous radiochemical plant (plant B) in the period of 1949–1953 diagnosed
more than 1500 cases of chronic and 11 cases of acute radiation diseases. 52
According to the doctor of the Second Therapy, N.A. Koshurnikova, there
was no chronic radiation sickness before the establishment of the atomic
industry in the USSR, and it was not known about at the American nuclear
enterprises, because workers were not allowed to stay for a long time in
the conditions of increased radiation. 53 This “purely Soviet acquisition” was
related to the specifics of the Soviet nuclear project, which was carried out
in an extremely short period of time, using mobilization technologies and
forced labor. A clear clinical picture of the effects of radiation on humans did
not yet exist, and a diagnosis proved difficult and often provoked controversy
among experts. The diagnosis of plutonium pneumosclerosis could not be
sustained until the number of deaths had reached four. South Ural physicians
successfully managed to convince their colleagues from Moscow that the
disease had nothing to do with tuberculosis. 54
Angelina Gusʹkova notes that in order to solve complex medical problems
in atomic cities, they often invited “scientists, founders, and hoped that this
task would not present a great deal of difficulty for them.” However, the
approaches of radiographers and radiologists, who dealt with local exposures,
were not suitable for physicians at a closed plant, as the exposure there was
total. The desire to transfer the patterns found in Moscow laboratories to
the situation in the Second Therapy led to misunderstandings and conflicts.
“Even such a prominent scientist as Tareev,” recalled Gusʹkova,
who, it would seem, should have taught us, the young ones, and guided
us on the right path (for this very purpose he was invited to the Urals),
was unable to understand all the novelties of the observed phenomena