52 Laura Sembritzki
or mushrooms. To enforce the restrictions and prohibitions in the Oblast’,
the executive committee relied on a decree of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and the Council of the People’s Commissars from 1931 16
that permitted local or regional administration to impose fines, up to and
including forced labor, on certain actions under certain conditions, such as
combating natural disaster, epidemics and animal diseases. The conditions
that were met in the Chelyabinsk Oblast’ was to ensure public health regarding open water and water sources. 17
This decree was released to prevent the all too common phenomenon of
bypassing the prosecution by adding fines and penalties to local administrative measures in 1931. The results of overlaps of criminal and administrative responsibilities were addressed by the decree. The decree allowed local
authorities, when empowered by central organs, to impose administrative
sanctions. 18 In relying on this decree, the village councils were permitted to
impose penalties directly without including further authorities. To the given
range of possible enforceable fines and penalties described by the Postanovlenie
from 1931, the regional executive committee decided to implement the highest sentences possible to impose on violations. Thus, villagers who entered
the forbidden zones faced the threat of being fined by local authorities up
to 100 rubles and corrective work up to a month depending on the seriousness of the offence. Village councils were allowed to impose fines of up to
5 rubles, and after 1958, to 10 rubles as well as corrective work of up to five
days. In case of repeated and more serious offences, a commission subordinated to the Raion executive committee decided on the penalty. 19
However, due to the lack of alternatives and despite this guarding of
the forbidden zones, villagers continued to enter into the forbidden zones
to collect berries and mushrooms, for cutting timber, and harvesting hay.
Moreover, the administrative commission hesitated in enforcing the fines
and penalties and usually left it at a warning. However, many violations were
even not reported to the commission by the village councils. Thus, violations
– even repeated ones – against the restrictions often had no administrative
consequences. The effect was, as reported by the sanitary physician L.M.
Pavlova to the head of the regional executive committee, that the river water
was even used as drinking water despite all efforts to stop the any use of it. 20
The Urgency of Radiation Expertise
The penetrability of radioactivity across the borders of the forbidden zones
especially highlighted the urgency for a more adapted public health approach
to radioactive releases in the environment. The lack of nuclear knowledge
became apparent in the disaster relief management. The initial disaster
response of well digging and prohibitions that relied solely on the prevention
of the further usage of the contaminated source did not match the nature of
radioactivity: the radioactive particles, which were released in the environment, were not only spreading, but also passed into soil, pastures, agricultural
or mushrooms. To enforce the restrictions and prohibitions in the Oblast’,
the executive committee relied on a decree of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and the Council of the People’s Commissars from 1931 16
that permitted local or regional administration to impose fines, up to and
including forced labor, on certain actions under certain conditions, such as
combating natural disaster, epidemics and animal diseases. The conditions
that were met in the Chelyabinsk Oblast’ was to ensure public health regarding open water and water sources. 17
This decree was released to prevent the all too common phenomenon of
bypassing the prosecution by adding fines and penalties to local administrative measures in 1931. The results of overlaps of criminal and administrative responsibilities were addressed by the decree. The decree allowed local
authorities, when empowered by central organs, to impose administrative
sanctions. 18 In relying on this decree, the village councils were permitted to
impose penalties directly without including further authorities. To the given
range of possible enforceable fines and penalties described by the Postanovlenie
from 1931, the regional executive committee decided to implement the highest sentences possible to impose on violations. Thus, villagers who entered
the forbidden zones faced the threat of being fined by local authorities up
to 100 rubles and corrective work up to a month depending on the seriousness of the offence. Village councils were allowed to impose fines of up to
5 rubles, and after 1958, to 10 rubles as well as corrective work of up to five
days. In case of repeated and more serious offences, a commission subordinated to the Raion executive committee decided on the penalty. 19
However, due to the lack of alternatives and despite this guarding of
the forbidden zones, villagers continued to enter into the forbidden zones
to collect berries and mushrooms, for cutting timber, and harvesting hay.
Moreover, the administrative commission hesitated in enforcing the fines
and penalties and usually left it at a warning. However, many violations were
even not reported to the commission by the village councils. Thus, violations
– even repeated ones – against the restrictions often had no administrative
consequences. The effect was, as reported by the sanitary physician L.M.
Pavlova to the head of the regional executive committee, that the river water
was even used as drinking water despite all efforts to stop the any use of it. 20
The Urgency of Radiation Expertise
The penetrability of radioactivity across the borders of the forbidden zones
especially highlighted the urgency for a more adapted public health approach
to radioactive releases in the environment. The lack of nuclear knowledge
became apparent in the disaster relief management. The initial disaster
response of well digging and prohibitions that relied solely on the prevention
of the further usage of the contaminated source did not match the nature of
radioactivity: the radioactive particles, which were released in the environment, were not only spreading, but also passed into soil, pastures, agricultural