Radiation Expertise 51
Ten years later the third major accident occurred in 1967. The drying up
of lake Karachai contaminated 2,700 square kilometers in the region heavily.
The lake was instead used to store nuclear waste after ceasing to dump the
nuclear waste in the local river system. Since then about 120 million Curie
were accumulated. 10
In Chelyabinsk, the regional authorities were confronted with the
environmental and human consequences of massive artificial radioactive
contamination. The extent and severity of the contamination were unprecedented, and thus, no example of how to deal with an evolving nuclear
catastrophe was available. 11 However, the authorities did not respond to the
unfolding disaster before the first reports of illness among the Techa residents in the early 1950s. Initially, they responded with the creation of forbidden zones, well digging, and the prohibition of any water use by the
residents. Eventually, given the magnitude of the exposure, relocations of
whole villages along the river Techa were carried out. In light of the 1957
accident, authorities reacted similarly: evacuations, relocations, forbidden
zones, and prohibitions. Information clarifying the reason of those measures
was withheld. 12 Adding to that, to maintain the secrecy of the Soviet nuclear
program, the massive release – both the scheduled and the inadvertent of
radioactivity in the environment – was to be kept secret by the authorities
at all costs. Warning signs were to be installed on the boundaries of the
forbidden zones to inform the villagers about the prohibitions. The enforcement of the prohibition, that is to say the use of the river water, hunting,
hay harvesting, and livestock farming, was left to the executive committees
of the oblasts Chelyabinsk and Kurgansk. Guards were selected by the village councils to hinder villagers from entering the forbidden zones, but this
measure turned out to be insufficient in preventing villagers to continue
their traditional way of life. However, many violations were reported to
Moscow. After all, the reasons for the prohibitions, restrictions, and possible
dangers remained strictly classified. 13
Nevertheless, more importantly, only insufficient alternatives were provided to go along with the prohibitions. Without any other option, villagers
continued to follow their traditional way of life. To ensure their livelihood,
they used the river water, harvested hay, and collected firewood in the forbidden zones. Thus, the prohibitions did not meet the reality of the people
on whom they intended to have an impact. Customs and everyday practices
as well as needs were not considered in the measures taken. Indeed, this not
only affected the rural inhabitants. Villagers offered goods with high concentrations of radioactive particles for sale on regional markets. 14
To enforce these restrictions, a special police unit, subordinated to the secret
city of Chelyabinsk-40, was introduced to guard the boarders of the “forbidden zones” in January 1956 by the Council of Ministers USSR. 15 However,
there were no existing regulations on which basis the militia № 42 could
have enforced the restrictions and prohibitions since criminal or administrative law did not cover actions like hunting, swimming, and picking berries
Ten years later the third major accident occurred in 1967. The drying up
of lake Karachai contaminated 2,700 square kilometers in the region heavily.
The lake was instead used to store nuclear waste after ceasing to dump the
nuclear waste in the local river system. Since then about 120 million Curie
were accumulated. 10
In Chelyabinsk, the regional authorities were confronted with the
environmental and human consequences of massive artificial radioactive
contamination. The extent and severity of the contamination were unprecedented, and thus, no example of how to deal with an evolving nuclear
catastrophe was available. 11 However, the authorities did not respond to the
unfolding disaster before the first reports of illness among the Techa residents in the early 1950s. Initially, they responded with the creation of forbidden zones, well digging, and the prohibition of any water use by the
residents. Eventually, given the magnitude of the exposure, relocations of
whole villages along the river Techa were carried out. In light of the 1957
accident, authorities reacted similarly: evacuations, relocations, forbidden
zones, and prohibitions. Information clarifying the reason of those measures
was withheld. 12 Adding to that, to maintain the secrecy of the Soviet nuclear
program, the massive release – both the scheduled and the inadvertent of
radioactivity in the environment – was to be kept secret by the authorities
at all costs. Warning signs were to be installed on the boundaries of the
forbidden zones to inform the villagers about the prohibitions. The enforcement of the prohibition, that is to say the use of the river water, hunting,
hay harvesting, and livestock farming, was left to the executive committees
of the oblasts Chelyabinsk and Kurgansk. Guards were selected by the village councils to hinder villagers from entering the forbidden zones, but this
measure turned out to be insufficient in preventing villagers to continue
their traditional way of life. However, many violations were reported to
Moscow. After all, the reasons for the prohibitions, restrictions, and possible
dangers remained strictly classified. 13
Nevertheless, more importantly, only insufficient alternatives were provided to go along with the prohibitions. Without any other option, villagers
continued to follow their traditional way of life. To ensure their livelihood,
they used the river water, harvested hay, and collected firewood in the forbidden zones. Thus, the prohibitions did not meet the reality of the people
on whom they intended to have an impact. Customs and everyday practices
as well as needs were not considered in the measures taken. Indeed, this not
only affected the rural inhabitants. Villagers offered goods with high concentrations of radioactive particles for sale on regional markets. 14
To enforce these restrictions, a special police unit, subordinated to the secret
city of Chelyabinsk-40, was introduced to guard the boarders of the “forbidden zones” in January 1956 by the Council of Ministers USSR. 15 However,
there were no existing regulations on which basis the militia № 42 could
have enforced the restrictions and prohibitions since criminal or administrative law did not cover actions like hunting, swimming, and picking berries