30 Stefan Guth
staff of the MAEK replied that there was always a trade-off to be made
between safety concerns and technological breakthroughs – after all, “the
first automobile had also been risky.” 83 This is not to say that the designers
and operators of the BN-350 took security lightly – rather, they adopted
what they considered conservative operating parameters and conducted
extensive equipment tests before the reactor became operational. But their
task was complicated by the fact that at the time, for lack of experience,
neither domestic nor international safety standards existed for large-scale
sodium-cooled FBRs. 84
Despite precautions, the BN-350 experienced numerous incidents and
several near-catastrophes over the course of its operation, for various reasons. Shortly after start-up, critical components failed due to shoddy
workmanship and low-quality materials. In particular, leaks in the steam
generators provoked repeated sodium-water fires that threatened to disrupt
the reactor’s cooling system. Other problems were caused by the fact that
knowledge of the physical and chemical processes at work in FBRs was
still limited at the time. Fuel rod claddings embrittled prematurely under
the conditions of intense irradiation, and radioactive decay within the rods
released gases that caused the rods to swell – a phenomenon that had not
been fully understood when the reactor was designed, and which, in the initial phase of operation, caused fuel rods to leak and become jammed in the
reactor core. 85 Several years into operation, depleted fuel elements became
stuck in a transportation mechanism without sufficient cooling, and a major
accident was only narrowly avoided. 86 Finally, critical safety features lacked
redundancy, including reactor control and power supply systems. In 1984,
the reactor’s power provision failed, and with the only backup system out
of order, it was a fortunate stroke of serendipity that the electricity supply
could be restored in time. 87 At the PGMK, uranium processing posed its
own set of safety problems, including spills of radioactive pulp and sporadic
releases of toxic gases. 88 Still, these dangers paled in comparison to the risks
associated with the combine’s large-scale production of chemical agents and
fertilizers, which involved handling large quantities of highly explosive substances. 89 The same held true for local petrochemistry, and in particular the
city’s plastics plant. 90
Shevchenko’s large-scale technologies therefore entailed a significant number of risks before the possible natural causes of technological accidents were
even considered. 91 It is no wonder then that the potential for envirotechnical
disasters – disasters resulting from an interaction of natural and technological
factors – was initially ignored. 92 Eventually, however, Soviet technologists in
Mangyshlak found themselves confronted with the insight that nature did
not necessarily behave within the bandwidth of parameters and scenarios that
their artifacts had been designed to accommodate. Nature, they realized, was
prone to interfering with them in beyond-design-basis events.
Fluctuations of the Caspian Sea’s water level were a first case in point. From
1929 through 1977, it had been falling constantly, leading Soviet constructive
staff of the MAEK replied that there was always a trade-off to be made
between safety concerns and technological breakthroughs – after all, “the
first automobile had also been risky.” 83 This is not to say that the designers
and operators of the BN-350 took security lightly – rather, they adopted
what they considered conservative operating parameters and conducted
extensive equipment tests before the reactor became operational. But their
task was complicated by the fact that at the time, for lack of experience,
neither domestic nor international safety standards existed for large-scale
sodium-cooled FBRs. 84
Despite precautions, the BN-350 experienced numerous incidents and
several near-catastrophes over the course of its operation, for various reasons. Shortly after start-up, critical components failed due to shoddy
workmanship and low-quality materials. In particular, leaks in the steam
generators provoked repeated sodium-water fires that threatened to disrupt
the reactor’s cooling system. Other problems were caused by the fact that
knowledge of the physical and chemical processes at work in FBRs was
still limited at the time. Fuel rod claddings embrittled prematurely under
the conditions of intense irradiation, and radioactive decay within the rods
released gases that caused the rods to swell – a phenomenon that had not
been fully understood when the reactor was designed, and which, in the initial phase of operation, caused fuel rods to leak and become jammed in the
reactor core. 85 Several years into operation, depleted fuel elements became
stuck in a transportation mechanism without sufficient cooling, and a major
accident was only narrowly avoided. 86 Finally, critical safety features lacked
redundancy, including reactor control and power supply systems. In 1984,
the reactor’s power provision failed, and with the only backup system out
of order, it was a fortunate stroke of serendipity that the electricity supply
could be restored in time. 87 At the PGMK, uranium processing posed its
own set of safety problems, including spills of radioactive pulp and sporadic
releases of toxic gases. 88 Still, these dangers paled in comparison to the risks
associated with the combine’s large-scale production of chemical agents and
fertilizers, which involved handling large quantities of highly explosive substances. 89 The same held true for local petrochemistry, and in particular the
city’s plastics plant. 90
Shevchenko’s large-scale technologies therefore entailed a significant number of risks before the possible natural causes of technological accidents were
even considered. 91 It is no wonder then that the potential for envirotechnical
disasters – disasters resulting from an interaction of natural and technological
factors – was initially ignored. 92 Eventually, however, Soviet technologists in
Mangyshlak found themselves confronted with the insight that nature did
not necessarily behave within the bandwidth of parameters and scenarios that
their artifacts had been designed to accommodate. Nature, they realized, was
prone to interfering with them in beyond-design-basis events.
Fluctuations of the Caspian Sea’s water level were a first case in point. From
1929 through 1977, it had been falling constantly, leading Soviet constructive