The Nuclear Landscape as a Garden 29
of origin. Women, on the other hand, often wished to reduce the double
burden of professional life and domestic chores. For instance, operation of
the uranium pulp filtration facilities, which came with an increased radiation
exposure, was mainly administered by women who aspired to a retirement
age of 45. 76 A social contract in which benefits and privileges compensated
for radiation-induced health hazards was thus in place throughout the Soviet
nuclear industry since the 1970s, anticipating the post-Chernobyl sense of
entitlement which Adriana Petryna has described in terms of “biological
citizenship.” 77
If production-related health hazards seemed calculable under normal conditions of operation, they were clearly not in times of accidents. Spills of
radioactive pulp were not uncommon at the PGMK’s hydrometallurgical
plant. At the BN-350, during the initial stage of reactor operation, engineers were exposed to excessive radioactivity as a result of leaking fuel rods
and risky repairs of breakdowns. In a well-documented case, workers crept
into a pipe of the highly irradiated primary cooling circuit of the reactor
to remove an oil spill. 78 In another incident, fuel elements got stuck in the
core and needed to be extracted manually with the help of a sledgehammer
because the automatic system refused to function. The workers involved
afterward fell ill with radiation sickness. 79 While such incidents affected only
a limited number of workers, the sacrifice of human health could quickly
become a mass phenomenon in the case of major nuclear accidents. Many of
the inhabitants of Shevchenko experienced this on their own bodies during
the Chernobyl catastrophe: more than 4 000 of them participated as so-called
liquidators in the cleanup of the accident in Ukraine and many of them suffered serious damage to their health. 80 One of the participants recalled that
when he and other prospective liquidators were enticed with the prospect of
making a car’s worth of pay in a couple of weeks at Chernobyl, they understood that this prize “needed to be earned with the most precious thing a
person owns – their health.” 81
Running the Risk of Large-Scale Technogenic
and Envirotechnical Accidents
For many inhabitants of Shevchenko, the Chernobyl disaster threw into
sharp relief for the first time the inherent risk of large-scale technogenic
catastrophes that loomed over their city’s nuclear industries. The technologists of Sredmash, contrarily, had always been calculating, taking, and
limiting risks when planning, siting, and operating their technological
artifacts. This was particularly true of the BN-350. Soviet designers had
built experimental breeders before, but this reactor was more powerful
than its predecessor by almost two orders of magnitude, and the risks
associated with this upscaling were deemed substantial. 82 Later, when
asked by a visiting foreign delegation whether they were comfortable with
operating a powerful experimental FBR this close to a major city, the
of origin. Women, on the other hand, often wished to reduce the double
burden of professional life and domestic chores. For instance, operation of
the uranium pulp filtration facilities, which came with an increased radiation
exposure, was mainly administered by women who aspired to a retirement
age of 45. 76 A social contract in which benefits and privileges compensated
for radiation-induced health hazards was thus in place throughout the Soviet
nuclear industry since the 1970s, anticipating the post-Chernobyl sense of
entitlement which Adriana Petryna has described in terms of “biological
citizenship.” 77
If production-related health hazards seemed calculable under normal conditions of operation, they were clearly not in times of accidents. Spills of
radioactive pulp were not uncommon at the PGMK’s hydrometallurgical
plant. At the BN-350, during the initial stage of reactor operation, engineers were exposed to excessive radioactivity as a result of leaking fuel rods
and risky repairs of breakdowns. In a well-documented case, workers crept
into a pipe of the highly irradiated primary cooling circuit of the reactor
to remove an oil spill. 78 In another incident, fuel elements got stuck in the
core and needed to be extracted manually with the help of a sledgehammer
because the automatic system refused to function. The workers involved
afterward fell ill with radiation sickness. 79 While such incidents affected only
a limited number of workers, the sacrifice of human health could quickly
become a mass phenomenon in the case of major nuclear accidents. Many of
the inhabitants of Shevchenko experienced this on their own bodies during
the Chernobyl catastrophe: more than 4 000 of them participated as so-called
liquidators in the cleanup of the accident in Ukraine and many of them suffered serious damage to their health. 80 One of the participants recalled that
when he and other prospective liquidators were enticed with the prospect of
making a car’s worth of pay in a couple of weeks at Chernobyl, they understood that this prize “needed to be earned with the most precious thing a
person owns – their health.” 81
Running the Risk of Large-Scale Technogenic
and Envirotechnical Accidents
For many inhabitants of Shevchenko, the Chernobyl disaster threw into
sharp relief for the first time the inherent risk of large-scale technogenic
catastrophes that loomed over their city’s nuclear industries. The technologists of Sredmash, contrarily, had always been calculating, taking, and
limiting risks when planning, siting, and operating their technological
artifacts. This was particularly true of the BN-350. Soviet designers had
built experimental breeders before, but this reactor was more powerful
than its predecessor by almost two orders of magnitude, and the risks
associated with this upscaling were deemed substantial. 82 Later, when
asked by a visiting foreign delegation whether they were comfortable with
operating a powerful experimental FBR this close to a major city, the