For many, future generations might feel distant
and irrelevant to our current decisions. However,
Nolt highlights that spatiotemporal separation
should not be morally relevant when considering
future generations. Even though we might have
special relationships with the people close to us,
such as family members, friends, and colleagues,
when it comes to future generations, “it is the
absence or attenuation of such special relationships, not the spatiotemporal separation, that
makes the difference” [153]. This can be tested
by a simple thought experiment. Imagine Steve,
who is alive now, planting a bomb that will reliably explode and kill a stranger. This would be
considered wrong even though Steve did not have
any special relationship with the poor stranger.
Imagine now that Steve plants another bomb, but
one that will detonate far in the future, equally
reliably killing an innocent stranger. Both bombing incidents are equally wrong from a moral
perspective. One could extend this thought experiment to include climate change. In fact, Nolt has
argued that the present generations’ insatiable
production of greenhouse gases results in the
unjust domination of future generations
[126]. Political theorist Steve Vanderheiden has
attempted to address this by producing two moral
principles to take future generations seriously:
“the moral duty to avoid causing predictable
harm to others” and “a basic principle of equality
that refuses to discount harm simply because it
accrues in the future” [78, 153].
One of the main objections or problems with
the idea that present people have obligations to
future generations comes in the form of the nonidentity problem, raised by philosopher Derek
Parfit [180]. According to the nonidentity problem, future people’s interest and well-being cannot be affected by changes in policy. This is
because putting sustainable policies in place
(e.g., emissions reductions and the development
of sustainable technologies) in the hope that these
will lead to increased well-being for future generations will not work because these very policies
would result in producing different people in the
future than would have otherwise been generated
under the current more environmentally destructive policies. In other words, the nonidentity
problem “shows that current policy cannot be
governed by reference to harms to the interests
of future individuals, because those policies determine who those individuals will be and what
interests they will have” [181]. This arises
because new polices will inevitably affect people’s behavior, leading current people to make
different choices, leading them to meet different
people, and, further, leading to different children
being born than would have been born under
different policies. Thus, sustainable policies can
only create populations that are better off compared to other different populations that could
have existed under different policy regulations.
Derek Parfit himself and other philosophers
have, however, shown either that the nonidentity
problem is flawed or that the problem is purely
apparent. For instance, John Nolt has argued that
the nonidentity problem relies on a questionable
argument: “An action can be wrong only by making someone worse off than she would have been
otherwise” [182]. He has argued that this argument is in fact false and that it is enough for an
action to be considered as wrong if it results in
injuring or killing a person [183].
The Importance of the Justice Trilemma
The three dimensions of justice and the examples
discussed above highlight the importance of
ethics and philosophical analysis in disentangling
the swarm of moral dilemmas climate change
creates. The trilemma emphasizes the need for a
holistic analysis of climate change that incorporates not only its scientific, political, and economic dimensions but also a detailed ethical
treatment. If we truly want to find sustainable
solutions to climate change, we must incorporate
morality and ethics into the climate change
debate. As Gardiner writes, “we cannot get very
far in discussing why climate change is a problem
without invoking ethical considerations” [84]. We
have reached a point where there is a serious need
for moral accountability and responsibility. Most
importantly, ethics represents and includes in the
decision-making process, the most vulnerable, the
most disenfranchised, and the most ignored
within the human and nonhuman communities.
316
Air Pollution and Climate Change: Sustainability, Restoration, and Ethical Implications
and irrelevant to our current decisions. However,
Nolt highlights that spatiotemporal separation
should not be morally relevant when considering
future generations. Even though we might have
special relationships with the people close to us,
such as family members, friends, and colleagues,
when it comes to future generations, “it is the
absence or attenuation of such special relationships, not the spatiotemporal separation, that
makes the difference” [153]. This can be tested
by a simple thought experiment. Imagine Steve,
who is alive now, planting a bomb that will reliably explode and kill a stranger. This would be
considered wrong even though Steve did not have
any special relationship with the poor stranger.
Imagine now that Steve plants another bomb, but
one that will detonate far in the future, equally
reliably killing an innocent stranger. Both bombing incidents are equally wrong from a moral
perspective. One could extend this thought experiment to include climate change. In fact, Nolt has
argued that the present generations’ insatiable
production of greenhouse gases results in the
unjust domination of future generations
[126]. Political theorist Steve Vanderheiden has
attempted to address this by producing two moral
principles to take future generations seriously:
“the moral duty to avoid causing predictable
harm to others” and “a basic principle of equality
that refuses to discount harm simply because it
accrues in the future” [78, 153].
One of the main objections or problems with
the idea that present people have obligations to
future generations comes in the form of the nonidentity problem, raised by philosopher Derek
Parfit [180]. According to the nonidentity problem, future people’s interest and well-being cannot be affected by changes in policy. This is
because putting sustainable policies in place
(e.g., emissions reductions and the development
of sustainable technologies) in the hope that these
will lead to increased well-being for future generations will not work because these very policies
would result in producing different people in the
future than would have otherwise been generated
under the current more environmentally destructive policies. In other words, the nonidentity
problem “shows that current policy cannot be
governed by reference to harms to the interests
of future individuals, because those policies determine who those individuals will be and what
interests they will have” [181]. This arises
because new polices will inevitably affect people’s behavior, leading current people to make
different choices, leading them to meet different
people, and, further, leading to different children
being born than would have been born under
different policies. Thus, sustainable policies can
only create populations that are better off compared to other different populations that could
have existed under different policy regulations.
Derek Parfit himself and other philosophers
have, however, shown either that the nonidentity
problem is flawed or that the problem is purely
apparent. For instance, John Nolt has argued that
the nonidentity problem relies on a questionable
argument: “An action can be wrong only by making someone worse off than she would have been
otherwise” [182]. He has argued that this argument is in fact false and that it is enough for an
action to be considered as wrong if it results in
injuring or killing a person [183].
The Importance of the Justice Trilemma
The three dimensions of justice and the examples
discussed above highlight the importance of
ethics and philosophical analysis in disentangling
the swarm of moral dilemmas climate change
creates. The trilemma emphasizes the need for a
holistic analysis of climate change that incorporates not only its scientific, political, and economic dimensions but also a detailed ethical
treatment. If we truly want to find sustainable
solutions to climate change, we must incorporate
morality and ethics into the climate change
debate. As Gardiner writes, “we cannot get very
far in discussing why climate change is a problem
without invoking ethical considerations” [84]. We
have reached a point where there is a serious need
for moral accountability and responsibility. Most
importantly, ethics represents and includes in the
decision-making process, the most vulnerable, the
most disenfranchised, and the most ignored
within the human and nonhuman communities.
316
Air Pollution and Climate Change: Sustainability, Restoration, and Ethical Implications