surrounding ecological restoration. Elliot attacked
the claim that ecological restoration is able to
restore the natural state of a damaged environment.
He argued that ecological restoration is incapable
of restoring a particularly important value found in
nature, its naturalness. The problem was that ecological restoration treated natural value as something that could easily be recreated or replaced.
According to Elliot, “nature is not replaceable
without depreciation in one aspect of its value
which has to do with its genesis, its history”
[66]. In other words, he emphasized that the reason
why people value nature is that it is “natural to a
high degree” and this value of naturalness is
closely related to the area’s origin and its history
[66]. This led Elliot to argue that restored nature
was, in fact, faking nature. The emphasis Elliot
placed on naturalness has significance for environmental policy. Elliot was particularly concerned,
along with many other environmentalists, that
environmentally destructive activities could be
legitimized by the promise of later restoration.
Elliot called this line of thinking the “restoration
thesis” and illustrated that it is not only naïve in
practice but dangerously undermines conservationist principles. Faking Nature sparked a vibrant
exchange between philosophy and ecology over
the important discussion of the normative relationship between the human and nonhuman world [65,
67].
The obvious ethical implication of ecological
restoration is the issue of death. An important
“side effect” of ecological restoration is that it
often involves actions that directly or indirectly
cause the death of organisms. For instance, the
introduction of a predator species into an ecosystem will indirectly result in deaths of the species
that are its prey. Another example is if an invasive
species is removed to protect the endangered
indigenous species. The ethical implications
often become more troublesome when the death
includes a sentient species [67]. This issue also
raises difficult questions related to trade-offs. Is
there a straightforward way of resolving the tradeoff between an invasive species of goat introduced
by humans and an endangered species of plant
that the goat eats? Does the value of rarity play a
role in these decisions or the value of
biodiversity? Should a rare plant trump the existence of a common plant? Should sentience be
held to highest regard? Is it problematic to remove
a perfectly good and thriving exotic species just
because they are not indigenous to the area? [67]
Intergenerational Justice
The issue of intergenerational justice addresses
the challenging large time lags involved in climate
change. A common political strategy has been to
defer the impacts of climate change into the
future, to future generations. However, this strategy “strongly implies that the current generation
is taking advantage of its privileged temporal
position with respect to its successors in indulging
in political inertia” [81]. This raises several
intergenerational justice issues (see Gosseries
and Meyer [151]; Meyer and Roser [152]; Nolt
[153]).
But who are future generations? Philosopher
John Nolt [153] has defined a future person “as
one [at a given time] who is not alive then but will
be later.” Persons who could actually never exist
are not future persons. Importantly, future people
are individuals despite the collective terminology
that is often used to describe them. Nolt has
argued that there are several features in our
policymaking that do not take future people seriously. A classic example would be economic
policymaking using economic tools such as social
discount rates. For instance, the notion of acceptable risk – which establishes spending priorities –
is usually calculated by considering how much
people who are alive now are willing to pay to
reduce risk by a certain amount. However, this
model completely ignores the preferences of
future people and focuses on less relevant factors
like the “willingness to pay” of current people.
The problem with simplistic economic metrics is
that they often rely on preference satisfaction
which does not sufficiently represent welfare.
Nolt argues that considered preferences would
be better suited, as they are more objective and
better supported by rational considerations, and
are therefore better informed. Most people would
“value such conditions as health, longevity, safety,
wealth adequate to needs, opportunities for learning, and freedom from oppression” [153].
Air Pollution and Climate Change: Sustainability, Restoration, and Ethical Implications
315
the claim that ecological restoration is able to
restore the natural state of a damaged environment.
He argued that ecological restoration is incapable
of restoring a particularly important value found in
nature, its naturalness. The problem was that ecological restoration treated natural value as something that could easily be recreated or replaced.
According to Elliot, “nature is not replaceable
without depreciation in one aspect of its value
which has to do with its genesis, its history”
[66]. In other words, he emphasized that the reason
why people value nature is that it is “natural to a
high degree” and this value of naturalness is
closely related to the area’s origin and its history
[66]. This led Elliot to argue that restored nature
was, in fact, faking nature. The emphasis Elliot
placed on naturalness has significance for environmental policy. Elliot was particularly concerned,
along with many other environmentalists, that
environmentally destructive activities could be
legitimized by the promise of later restoration.
Elliot called this line of thinking the “restoration
thesis” and illustrated that it is not only naïve in
practice but dangerously undermines conservationist principles. Faking Nature sparked a vibrant
exchange between philosophy and ecology over
the important discussion of the normative relationship between the human and nonhuman world [65,
67].
The obvious ethical implication of ecological
restoration is the issue of death. An important
“side effect” of ecological restoration is that it
often involves actions that directly or indirectly
cause the death of organisms. For instance, the
introduction of a predator species into an ecosystem will indirectly result in deaths of the species
that are its prey. Another example is if an invasive
species is removed to protect the endangered
indigenous species. The ethical implications
often become more troublesome when the death
includes a sentient species [67]. This issue also
raises difficult questions related to trade-offs. Is
there a straightforward way of resolving the tradeoff between an invasive species of goat introduced
by humans and an endangered species of plant
that the goat eats? Does the value of rarity play a
role in these decisions or the value of
biodiversity? Should a rare plant trump the existence of a common plant? Should sentience be
held to highest regard? Is it problematic to remove
a perfectly good and thriving exotic species just
because they are not indigenous to the area? [67]
Intergenerational Justice
The issue of intergenerational justice addresses
the challenging large time lags involved in climate
change. A common political strategy has been to
defer the impacts of climate change into the
future, to future generations. However, this strategy “strongly implies that the current generation
is taking advantage of its privileged temporal
position with respect to its successors in indulging
in political inertia” [81]. This raises several
intergenerational justice issues (see Gosseries
and Meyer [151]; Meyer and Roser [152]; Nolt
[153]).
But who are future generations? Philosopher
John Nolt [153] has defined a future person “as
one [at a given time] who is not alive then but will
be later.” Persons who could actually never exist
are not future persons. Importantly, future people
are individuals despite the collective terminology
that is often used to describe them. Nolt has
argued that there are several features in our
policymaking that do not take future people seriously. A classic example would be economic
policymaking using economic tools such as social
discount rates. For instance, the notion of acceptable risk – which establishes spending priorities –
is usually calculated by considering how much
people who are alive now are willing to pay to
reduce risk by a certain amount. However, this
model completely ignores the preferences of
future people and focuses on less relevant factors
like the “willingness to pay” of current people.
The problem with simplistic economic metrics is
that they often rely on preference satisfaction
which does not sufficiently represent welfare.
Nolt argues that considered preferences would
be better suited, as they are more objective and
better supported by rational considerations, and
are therefore better informed. Most people would
“value such conditions as health, longevity, safety,
wealth adequate to needs, opportunities for learning, and freedom from oppression” [153].
Air Pollution and Climate Change: Sustainability, Restoration, and Ethical Implications
315