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15 Risk-Informed Decision Making
Further down in our exploration, the demand for zero risk may be sincere but ill
informed. This is when risk education becomes of the utmost important. The main
topics for discussion may be, for example, zero risk does not exist; tolerance and
acceptability; ALARA/ BACT definitions; and, of course, planned actions.
In some cases political motivations may also come into play. Opposing groups
will oftentimes appeal to the community health awareness and base their approach
on risks. Experts may be recruited to support this endeavor. In any case, attacking the
legitimacy and sincerity of opposing groups is a poor approach, although it seems to
have gained momentum in recent years, thanks to the relative impunity enjoyed by
social media and the bad examples offered by politicians of all flavors and in many
countries. One can disagree, but questioning the integrity of an opposing group or
the right of the opposing group to use legitimate political strategies to promote their
views is not a fair practice and will very likely backfire.
Finally, the demand for zero risk may be the result of distress stemming from
outrage, anger, and distrust. That generally occurs together with negative judgments
of the project promoter who becomes the enemy, e.g., the “ugly miner” focused on
profits, arrogant, and dishonest. At that point risks are no longer the central issue. The
root cause of hostile behavior may be a serious communication problem. Mending
it is a labor of patience and tact: the goal is to understand what “broke the bridge”,
certainly not to try to convince that risks are bearable.
In (Oboni and Oboni 2016) we stated:
The effects of today’s risk mitigation programs will only slowly become visible.
That is because the world-portfolio will contain mitigated and unmitigated (legacy) dams.
During that time the public will perceive at best a status-quo.
We have read that the the owner of the Corrego do Feijao dam has reportedly
been accused by Brazilian authorities of “not having learned anything from the prior
failure.” We are not in the position to discuss this point in detail due to lack of data.
However, no one can expect a drastic change in the behavior of a large portfolio of
dams, even if significant measures are taken. That is because, again, the root cause
of the failures lies in decisions made decades ago, at the dams’ inception, when the
state of the art was different. Prioritizing actions on such a portfolio requires QRAs
and is certainly not feasible with FMEAs and probability impact graphs.
The time factor is crucial in any risk communication, especially towards closure
or during remediation, as was made apparent during the public hearings of several
projects we have followed from a risk assessment point of view. In this respect, it
may be worthwhile using more direct statements—for example, the expected number
of accidents of a certain type over the life of the operation—rather than using the
probability of failure.
15 Risk-Informed Decision Making
Further down in our exploration, the demand for zero risk may be sincere but ill
informed. This is when risk education becomes of the utmost important. The main
topics for discussion may be, for example, zero risk does not exist; tolerance and
acceptability; ALARA/ BACT definitions; and, of course, planned actions.
In some cases political motivations may also come into play. Opposing groups
will oftentimes appeal to the community health awareness and base their approach
on risks. Experts may be recruited to support this endeavor. In any case, attacking the
legitimacy and sincerity of opposing groups is a poor approach, although it seems to
have gained momentum in recent years, thanks to the relative impunity enjoyed by
social media and the bad examples offered by politicians of all flavors and in many
countries. One can disagree, but questioning the integrity of an opposing group or
the right of the opposing group to use legitimate political strategies to promote their
views is not a fair practice and will very likely backfire.
Finally, the demand for zero risk may be the result of distress stemming from
outrage, anger, and distrust. That generally occurs together with negative judgments
of the project promoter who becomes the enemy, e.g., the “ugly miner” focused on
profits, arrogant, and dishonest. At that point risks are no longer the central issue. The
root cause of hostile behavior may be a serious communication problem. Mending
it is a labor of patience and tact: the goal is to understand what “broke the bridge”,
certainly not to try to convince that risks are bearable.
In (Oboni and Oboni 2016) we stated:
The effects of today’s risk mitigation programs will only slowly become visible.
That is because the world-portfolio will contain mitigated and unmitigated (legacy) dams.
During that time the public will perceive at best a status-quo.
We have read that the the owner of the Corrego do Feijao dam has reportedly
been accused by Brazilian authorities of “not having learned anything from the prior
failure.” We are not in the position to discuss this point in detail due to lack of data.
However, no one can expect a drastic change in the behavior of a large portfolio of
dams, even if significant measures are taken. That is because, again, the root cause
of the failures lies in decisions made decades ago, at the dams’ inception, when the
state of the art was different. Prioritizing actions on such a portfolio requires QRAs
and is certainly not feasible with FMEAs and probability impact graphs.
The time factor is crucial in any risk communication, especially towards closure
or during remediation, as was made apparent during the public hearings of several
projects we have followed from a risk assessment point of view. In this respect, it
may be worthwhile using more direct statements—for example, the expected number
of accidents of a certain type over the life of the operation—rather than using the
probability of failure.