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8 System Definition
It was a feast of magic revival, obscurantism, denial of bad habits. All of those efforts
just to hide one simple fact: unless we take the time and effort to properly define our
systems, we cannot perform any serious analysis on them!
We humans talked then about systemic risk, non-functioning models, Black Swans
(legitimate ones and silly ones), fragility, complexity, etc. The parallel is striking: if
we do not know the anatomy and physiology of the human body, any surgery or drug
will have a very poor rate of success, and can even make matters worse.
So, getting back to risk assessments:
• Is it true that our systems are complex? Yes.
• Are they fragile because of their complexity and other reasons? Yes.
• Do rare, extreme events occur? Yes.
• Do we have systemic risks in our systems? Yes.
• Is it true we can hide our head in the sand, say there is nothing we humans can do
to evaluate the above, and merrily keep making the same mistakes? YES.
• Is it reasonable, socially acceptable, good for Humanity to do so? NO.
If you want to have fun for a moment, you can set up the same list of questions,
replacing “system” with “human body” and “events” by “diseases”. Enjoy!
By fostering a systematic analysis of system’s anatomy and physiology, you will
avoid most, if not all, of those pitfalls. That preliminary effort brings rationality,
clarity and transparency to your endeavours. It makes risk studies scalable, flexible,
adaptable to new conditions. It yields a holistic understanding of the risk landscape
surrounding your operations/projects.
8.2.2 How to Dissect Your Tailings Dam System
The system (Fig. 8.1), not the dam, or, worse, a cross section of a dam, is the object
of the required risk assessments. Looking at “the dam” by itself is already a major
fallacy.
In fact, the system includes all pertinent inter-dependencies (physical, geographical, logical, informational) necessary to its operation or a clear delimitation of
selected boundaries assumptions (Table 8.1).
Accordingly, the boundaries of the system define what is in the system, with
respect to what is outside of the system. In fact, the system definition helps characterising threats-to and threats-from among system’s elements. Finally, the definition
of the project “context” in compliance with ISO 31000 (Sect. 14.1), including all
8 System Definition
It was a feast of magic revival, obscurantism, denial of bad habits. All of those efforts
just to hide one simple fact: unless we take the time and effort to properly define our
systems, we cannot perform any serious analysis on them!
We humans talked then about systemic risk, non-functioning models, Black Swans
(legitimate ones and silly ones), fragility, complexity, etc. The parallel is striking: if
we do not know the anatomy and physiology of the human body, any surgery or drug
will have a very poor rate of success, and can even make matters worse.
So, getting back to risk assessments:
• Is it true that our systems are complex? Yes.
• Are they fragile because of their complexity and other reasons? Yes.
• Do rare, extreme events occur? Yes.
• Do we have systemic risks in our systems? Yes.
• Is it true we can hide our head in the sand, say there is nothing we humans can do
to evaluate the above, and merrily keep making the same mistakes? YES.
• Is it reasonable, socially acceptable, good for Humanity to do so? NO.
If you want to have fun for a moment, you can set up the same list of questions,
replacing “system” with “human body” and “events” by “diseases”. Enjoy!
By fostering a systematic analysis of system’s anatomy and physiology, you will
avoid most, if not all, of those pitfalls. That preliminary effort brings rationality,
clarity and transparency to your endeavours. It makes risk studies scalable, flexible,
adaptable to new conditions. It yields a holistic understanding of the risk landscape
surrounding your operations/projects.
8.2.2 How to Dissect Your Tailings Dam System
The system (Fig. 8.1), not the dam, or, worse, a cross section of a dam, is the object
of the required risk assessments. Looking at “the dam” by itself is already a major
fallacy.
In fact, the system includes all pertinent inter-dependencies (physical, geographical, logical, informational) necessary to its operation or a clear delimitation of
selected boundaries assumptions (Table 8.1).
Accordingly, the boundaries of the system define what is in the system, with
respect to what is outside of the system. In fact, the system definition helps characterising threats-to and threats-from among system’s elements. Finally, the definition
of the project “context” in compliance with ISO 31000 (Sect. 14.1), including all