vi
a larger failure of science and science administration to adequately assess the risks
involved in deepwater oil and gas production and to organize a research program of
sufficient rigor and scope to have answers – or at least a plausibly narrow set of
outcomes – that would guide such a response. The science necessary for informed
decision-making regarding oil spills is well documented in the “wish lists” of government agencies (ICCOPR 2015), but the industry, various federal and state administrations, and government agencies were unable to muster the political will and
resources to close these gaps.
Much changed in the funding and direction of oil spill-related research following
DWH. Through a $500 million grant from BP (British Petroleum, for whom the
Macondo well was being drilled), the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative was established. This ambitious 10-year program has produced an enormous body of research
spanning the physical, geological, chemical, engineering, biological, and human
health sciences. Additionally, significant funding spent by the Natural Resources
Damage Assessment (NRDA), the Gulf Restoration Council, and the National
Academy of Sciences Gulf Research Program (GRP) is also contributing to the
wealth of new science informing oil spill risk reduction, preparedness, and assessment. The scope of the research programs supported by these funds has been both
broad and deep, with many of the fundamental uncertainties of what, how, and why
of oil spill science being addressed. As with any science portfolio, the GoMRIfunded research spanned the theoretical to applied science continuum and that of
high risk-high reward to incremental.
This volume synthesizes a considerable portion of GoMRI-sponsored research
and that commissioned by government, industry, and other entities. Many of the
chapter authors are members of the Center for Integrated Modeling and Analysis of
Gulf Ecosystems (C-IMAGE) and a number of other GoMRI-funded science centers (ADDOMEx, ECOGIG, RECOVER). Additional authorship includes researchers working for the federal government, in academia, and in private industry. The
goal of this book is to synthesize what has been learned from these research investments and to identify additional or as yet unanswered research questions going
forward. Given the considerable wealth of new information generated during the 9
plus years after DWH, it is contingent on researchers and regulators to put this information into practical application. The challenge will be for the industry and regulators to assimilate and use this information to devise more risk-averse oil and gas
exploration and exploitation strategies and to implement more agile, targeted, and
effective response strategies in the event of future accidents. One of the particular
barriers for more complete integration of new science into the current industrial
regulatory frameworks supporting oil and gas production will be that much of the
new, relevant research has been generated by academics not traditionally affiliated
with industry or government. The aversion to research “not invented here” by those
outside the historical institutional relationships supporting the industry is thus a
concern. However, while academic scientists may not understand the history or
details of industrial applications, science conducted by independent researchers has
Foreword and Dedication
a larger failure of science and science administration to adequately assess the risks
involved in deepwater oil and gas production and to organize a research program of
sufficient rigor and scope to have answers – or at least a plausibly narrow set of
outcomes – that would guide such a response. The science necessary for informed
decision-making regarding oil spills is well documented in the “wish lists” of government agencies (ICCOPR 2015), but the industry, various federal and state administrations, and government agencies were unable to muster the political will and
resources to close these gaps.
Much changed in the funding and direction of oil spill-related research following
DWH. Through a $500 million grant from BP (British Petroleum, for whom the
Macondo well was being drilled), the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative was established. This ambitious 10-year program has produced an enormous body of research
spanning the physical, geological, chemical, engineering, biological, and human
health sciences. Additionally, significant funding spent by the Natural Resources
Damage Assessment (NRDA), the Gulf Restoration Council, and the National
Academy of Sciences Gulf Research Program (GRP) is also contributing to the
wealth of new science informing oil spill risk reduction, preparedness, and assessment. The scope of the research programs supported by these funds has been both
broad and deep, with many of the fundamental uncertainties of what, how, and why
of oil spill science being addressed. As with any science portfolio, the GoMRIfunded research spanned the theoretical to applied science continuum and that of
high risk-high reward to incremental.
This volume synthesizes a considerable portion of GoMRI-sponsored research
and that commissioned by government, industry, and other entities. Many of the
chapter authors are members of the Center for Integrated Modeling and Analysis of
Gulf Ecosystems (C-IMAGE) and a number of other GoMRI-funded science centers (ADDOMEx, ECOGIG, RECOVER). Additional authorship includes researchers working for the federal government, in academia, and in private industry. The
goal of this book is to synthesize what has been learned from these research investments and to identify additional or as yet unanswered research questions going
forward. Given the considerable wealth of new information generated during the 9
plus years after DWH, it is contingent on researchers and regulators to put this information into practical application. The challenge will be for the industry and regulators to assimilate and use this information to devise more risk-averse oil and gas
exploration and exploitation strategies and to implement more agile, targeted, and
effective response strategies in the event of future accidents. One of the particular
barriers for more complete integration of new science into the current industrial
regulatory frameworks supporting oil and gas production will be that much of the
new, relevant research has been generated by academics not traditionally affiliated
with industry or government. The aversion to research “not invented here” by those
outside the historical institutional relationships supporting the industry is thus a
concern. However, while academic scientists may not understand the history or
details of industrial applications, science conducted by independent researchers has
Foreword and Dedication