v
Foreword and Dedication
Eric Brown, a British aircraft engineer, described structural engineering as “the art
of molding materials we do not really understand into shapes we cannot really analyze, so as to withstand forces we cannot really assess, in such a way that the public
does not really suspect” (quote from Broad 2010). There is much to learn from
engineering failures regarding the fragility of such structures and systems (Love
et al. 2011), no more so than those of oil rig blowouts such as Deepwater Horizon
(DWH) and Ixtoc 1, the two largest accidental blowouts in world history.
While the forensics of engineering and systems failures in the Deepwater
Horizon case are well documented (National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011; Boebert and Blossom 2016), perhaps
less well understood were the failures of regulators, legislative oversight, and science to anticipate, plan for, and understand the risks involved in such a catastrophic
failure. Quantifiable risk is the product of both the probability of events happening
and the consequences of such an event should it happen. In the case of deepwater
blowouts, the event has an exceedingly low probability of occurrence but a very
large potential consequence. A system subject to a critical single point of failure
combined with the inability to contain the ensuing blowout for 87 days points to
systematic breakdown in regulatory as well as industrial oversight systems for risk
reduction. Doubtlessly, the oil and gas industries have learned from these spectacular engineering failures and put in place what they believe to be appropriate risk
reduction measures. Similarly, additional government regulation, inspection, and
oversight have been forthcoming.
The DWH event also clearly pointed out the dearth of scientific information necessary to make informed decisions once the blowout occurred, including deciding
on appropriate response measures and calculating the impacts of that event in the
milieu that is the Gulf of Mexico. Previous research was insufficient to confidently
evaluate the risks and trade-offs of, for example, using chemical dispersants injected
into the stream of oil and gas emanating from the blown-out well. Likewise, the lack
of systematic contaminant baselines for nearly all biota and habitats in the Gulf of
Mexico made assessing the damage from that disaster more difficult than it needed
to be if such baselines had been available. The lack of specific information points to
Foreword and Dedication
Eric Brown, a British aircraft engineer, described structural engineering as “the art
of molding materials we do not really understand into shapes we cannot really analyze, so as to withstand forces we cannot really assess, in such a way that the public
does not really suspect” (quote from Broad 2010). There is much to learn from
engineering failures regarding the fragility of such structures and systems (Love
et al. 2011), no more so than those of oil rig blowouts such as Deepwater Horizon
(DWH) and Ixtoc 1, the two largest accidental blowouts in world history.
While the forensics of engineering and systems failures in the Deepwater
Horizon case are well documented (National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011; Boebert and Blossom 2016), perhaps
less well understood were the failures of regulators, legislative oversight, and science to anticipate, plan for, and understand the risks involved in such a catastrophic
failure. Quantifiable risk is the product of both the probability of events happening
and the consequences of such an event should it happen. In the case of deepwater
blowouts, the event has an exceedingly low probability of occurrence but a very
large potential consequence. A system subject to a critical single point of failure
combined with the inability to contain the ensuing blowout for 87 days points to
systematic breakdown in regulatory as well as industrial oversight systems for risk
reduction. Doubtlessly, the oil and gas industries have learned from these spectacular engineering failures and put in place what they believe to be appropriate risk
reduction measures. Similarly, additional government regulation, inspection, and
oversight have been forthcoming.
The DWH event also clearly pointed out the dearth of scientific information necessary to make informed decisions once the blowout occurred, including deciding
on appropriate response measures and calculating the impacts of that event in the
milieu that is the Gulf of Mexico. Previous research was insufficient to confidently
evaluate the risks and trade-offs of, for example, using chemical dispersants injected
into the stream of oil and gas emanating from the blown-out well. Likewise, the lack
of systematic contaminant baselines for nearly all biota and habitats in the Gulf of
Mexico made assessing the damage from that disaster more difficult than it needed
to be if such baselines had been available. The lack of specific information points to