Chapter 15
Source Localization of Ruthenium-106
Detections in Autumn 2017 Using Inverse
Modelling
Pieter De Meutter, Johan Camps, Andy Delcloo and Piet Termonia
15.1 Introduction
In late September and October 2017, Ru-103 and Ru-106 have been detected throughout the northern hemisphere by national environmental radioactivity monitoring networks and by the International Monitoring System that is being established to verify
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Ru-103 (half-life:
39.26 d) and Ru-106 (half-life: 373.6 d) are radioactive particulates that have no
natural sources and for which there is no measurable global background. Based on
the fact that only Ru-106 (and, in much lower concentrations and at fewer places,
Ru-103) but no other fission products such as iodine and cesium have been measured,
a nuclear accident can be excluded.
The Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) has published a
study on the possible source regions based on measurements exchanged via the
Ring of Five network, an informal network of experts. They have employed forward
atmospheric transport modelling over a limited domain to test which single grid box
source can best explain the observations. They found that the detected Ru-106 is
likely coming from an area between the Volga and the Urals [1].
P. De Meutter (B) · J. Camps
Belgian Nuclear Research Institute, Boeretang 200, 2400 Mol, Belgium
e-mail: pieter.de.meutter@sckcen.be
J. Camps
e-mail: johan.camps@sckcen.be
P. De Meutter · A. Delcloo · P. Termonia
Royal Meteorological Institute of Belgium, Ringlaan 3, 1180 Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: andy.delcloo@meteo.be
P. De Meutter · P. Termonia
Department of Physics and Astronomy, Ghent University, Krijgslaan 281, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
e-mail: piet.termonia@meteo.be
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
C. Mensink et al. (eds.), Air Pollution Modeling and its Application XXVI,
Springer Proceedings in Complexity,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22055-6_15
89
Source Localization of Ruthenium-106
Detections in Autumn 2017 Using Inverse
Modelling
Pieter De Meutter, Johan Camps, Andy Delcloo and Piet Termonia
15.1 Introduction
In late September and October 2017, Ru-103 and Ru-106 have been detected throughout the northern hemisphere by national environmental radioactivity monitoring networks and by the International Monitoring System that is being established to verify
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Ru-103 (half-life:
39.26 d) and Ru-106 (half-life: 373.6 d) are radioactive particulates that have no
natural sources and for which there is no measurable global background. Based on
the fact that only Ru-106 (and, in much lower concentrations and at fewer places,
Ru-103) but no other fission products such as iodine and cesium have been measured,
a nuclear accident can be excluded.
The Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) has published a
study on the possible source regions based on measurements exchanged via the
Ring of Five network, an informal network of experts. They have employed forward
atmospheric transport modelling over a limited domain to test which single grid box
source can best explain the observations. They found that the detected Ru-106 is
likely coming from an area between the Volga and the Urals [1].
P. De Meutter (B) · J. Camps
Belgian Nuclear Research Institute, Boeretang 200, 2400 Mol, Belgium
e-mail: pieter.de.meutter@sckcen.be
J. Camps
e-mail: johan.camps@sckcen.be
P. De Meutter · A. Delcloo · P. Termonia
Royal Meteorological Institute of Belgium, Ringlaan 3, 1180 Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: andy.delcloo@meteo.be
P. De Meutter · P. Termonia
Department of Physics and Astronomy, Ghent University, Krijgslaan 281, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
e-mail: piet.termonia@meteo.be
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
C. Mensink et al. (eds.), Air Pollution Modeling and its Application XXVI,
Springer Proceedings in Complexity,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22055-6_15
89