336
as cashgate in 2013 have contributed to donors withdrawing from Malawi or using
alternative channels for their support other than the public sector (WB 2018). The
input subsidy program has also been criticized for leakage and insufficient targeting
of the poorest categories of small-scale farmers (Chinsinga and Poulton 2014).
However, the input subsidy program is an area in which the GoM has been able to
implement policy that has given results in productivity gains in agriculture (Haug
and Wold 2017). The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) in Malawi is formulated
with the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) as its main implementation
vehicle, including areas such as productivity, value addition, resilience and trade
(MAIWD 2016, 2018). A revised seed policy was launched in May 2018 after having been contested regarding a lack of recognition of the importance of the informal
seed system (Nation 2016). The revised seed policy aims to ensure effective seed
regulations, high seed quality, internationally acceptable seed certification and
growth in the domestic seed industry (MAIWD 2018b). The policy promotes a conducive environment for the private seed sector, but maintains legal space for Quality
Declared Seed (QDS) and an integrated seed system (MAIWD 2018b).
Malawi also has policies and plans for climate change and resilience such as the
National Resilience Plan: Breaking the cycle of food insecurity in Malawi (GoM
2016). The availability and affordability of food is core in many of the Malawian
policies after serious hunger has repeatedly afflicted the country for decades. Food
prices in Malawi have a history of being volatile, for example, low at harvest time
and then rising with a peak in the hunger period before the next season’s harvest. Ad
hoc decisions on the use of export bans to control food prices have contributed to
uncertainty and a lack of predictability in relation to investment in farming (WB
2018). Malawi’s history of strategically managing grain reserves has proved disastrous, an example being the drought of 2001 during which the grain reserves were
gone just when they were needed for price stabilization, and prices hiked to five
times their seasonal average (HLPE 2012). In Malawi, input subsidies have historically been the largest social security program, but in 2016/2017 following two seasons of bad harvest and a substantial reduction in the input subsidy program, in-kind
food assistance became the largest safety net program, supporting 6.7 million people (Duchoslav and Kenamu 2018). Whether to subsidize farm inputs or provide
direct food/cash relief, and to what degree, or how to find the right balance between
these two measures has been an ongoing discussion between donors to Malawi over
the last two decades (Haug and Wold 2017).
The fourth category of drivers are sociocultural drivers, including culture, religion, social traditions and gender inequality. Female-headed households tend to be
poorer than male-headed households, with lower agricultural productivity, fewer
assets and less access to services (WB 2018). Malawi scores poorly on various gender inequality indices, and the country is ranked number 148 out of 160 countries
by UNDP (2018). About half of the Malawian population lives below the poverty
line, with a slight increase in poverty from 50.7% in 2010/2011 to 51.5% in
2016/2017 (WB 2018). However, ultra-poverty decreased in the same period from
24.5% to 20.1% (NSO 2017). The decrease in ultra-poverty is explained by an
expansion in the coverage of social safety nets such as the Food Security Response
R. Haug and O. T. Westengen
as cashgate in 2013 have contributed to donors withdrawing from Malawi or using
alternative channels for their support other than the public sector (WB 2018). The
input subsidy program has also been criticized for leakage and insufficient targeting
of the poorest categories of small-scale farmers (Chinsinga and Poulton 2014).
However, the input subsidy program is an area in which the GoM has been able to
implement policy that has given results in productivity gains in agriculture (Haug
and Wold 2017). The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) in Malawi is formulated
with the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) as its main implementation
vehicle, including areas such as productivity, value addition, resilience and trade
(MAIWD 2016, 2018). A revised seed policy was launched in May 2018 after having been contested regarding a lack of recognition of the importance of the informal
seed system (Nation 2016). The revised seed policy aims to ensure effective seed
regulations, high seed quality, internationally acceptable seed certification and
growth in the domestic seed industry (MAIWD 2018b). The policy promotes a conducive environment for the private seed sector, but maintains legal space for Quality
Declared Seed (QDS) and an integrated seed system (MAIWD 2018b).
Malawi also has policies and plans for climate change and resilience such as the
National Resilience Plan: Breaking the cycle of food insecurity in Malawi (GoM
2016). The availability and affordability of food is core in many of the Malawian
policies after serious hunger has repeatedly afflicted the country for decades. Food
prices in Malawi have a history of being volatile, for example, low at harvest time
and then rising with a peak in the hunger period before the next season’s harvest. Ad
hoc decisions on the use of export bans to control food prices have contributed to
uncertainty and a lack of predictability in relation to investment in farming (WB
2018). Malawi’s history of strategically managing grain reserves has proved disastrous, an example being the drought of 2001 during which the grain reserves were
gone just when they were needed for price stabilization, and prices hiked to five
times their seasonal average (HLPE 2012). In Malawi, input subsidies have historically been the largest social security program, but in 2016/2017 following two seasons of bad harvest and a substantial reduction in the input subsidy program, in-kind
food assistance became the largest safety net program, supporting 6.7 million people (Duchoslav and Kenamu 2018). Whether to subsidize farm inputs or provide
direct food/cash relief, and to what degree, or how to find the right balance between
these two measures has been an ongoing discussion between donors to Malawi over
the last two decades (Haug and Wold 2017).
The fourth category of drivers are sociocultural drivers, including culture, religion, social traditions and gender inequality. Female-headed households tend to be
poorer than male-headed households, with lower agricultural productivity, fewer
assets and less access to services (WB 2018). Malawi scores poorly on various gender inequality indices, and the country is ranked number 148 out of 160 countries
by UNDP (2018). About half of the Malawian population lives below the poverty
line, with a slight increase in poverty from 50.7% in 2010/2011 to 51.5% in
2016/2017 (WB 2018). However, ultra-poverty decreased in the same period from
24.5% to 20.1% (NSO 2017). The decrease in ultra-poverty is explained by an
expansion in the coverage of social safety nets such as the Food Security Response
R. Haug and O. T. Westengen