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therapy and manipulation, reflect nonparticipation. Under this level of control, power
holders merely ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the intended participants without evidence of
empowerment to influence the process (Arnstein 1969).
This study established that the fishers and some community structures were consulted and knew about decisions to plan and implement the project in their area.
Rungs 3, 4, and 5 (informing, consultation, and placation) manifest some degree of
tokenism. These three rungs illustrate improved participation as beneficiaries are
not only informed but also voice their opinions. However, this does not mean that
their opinions will be taken on board. The three top most levels of control reflect
characteristics of citizen power, where participants can influence decisions which
affect their day-to-day welfare. Contextualising this framework assists in avoiding
homogenous interventions for stakeholders, which Cleaver (1999) also discusses in
her paper on paradoxes of participation (Brown 2002). Plans that carefully consider
aspects of community sustainability, participation, and empowerment result in highimpact development initiatives (Brown 2002).
The involvement of local communities varies, as influenced by institutions and
power. For example, those who seem to benefit or participate are deemed powerful
and suppress the powerless. Therefore, instead of the less powerful communities
benefiting, the interventions are captured by the local elites. Other social institutional factors like gender have also been found to influence development
(Haraldsdottir 2002; Chiwaula et al. 2018). In fishing communities, the local elites
are those who own fishing equipment, as well as the BVC. Individuals who own
equipment exploit those without to work for them. However, other studies on fishing
communities of Malawi report that it is actually the fishing crew who dictates the
sharing of the proceeds compared to the owners of the fishing equipment (Hara and
Jul-Larsen 2003). The BVC, at times, undermines the participation of community
stakeholders in the fish value chain by dominating decision-making. Such tendencies affect inclusive development interventions within fishing communities, which
reflects how power dictates who participates.
Participation in development initiatives has also been conceptualised on the basis
of improving effectiveness in resource use and empowerment of the beneficiaries
(Cleaver 1999). In essence, participation without power to effect necessary changes
is not new in development interventions and is often called the ‘empty ritual of participation’. Participation without power paints a picture that all stakeholders were
consulted and they agree to the decisions made (Arnstein 1969).
3 The Community Scorecard
Since the data (Kayamba-Phiri 2018) showed no evidence of a feedback meeting
between the SEED Fish implementers and the community, we decided to use the
community scorecard to resolve the conflict by first evaluating the project, without
placing emphasis on the conflict itself, to facilitate discussions of both the positive
and negative aspects of the project.
Of ‘White Elephant’ in Fisheries: A Conflict Resolution Model Around the Usage…
therapy and manipulation, reflect nonparticipation. Under this level of control, power
holders merely ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the intended participants without evidence of
empowerment to influence the process (Arnstein 1969).
This study established that the fishers and some community structures were consulted and knew about decisions to plan and implement the project in their area.
Rungs 3, 4, and 5 (informing, consultation, and placation) manifest some degree of
tokenism. These three rungs illustrate improved participation as beneficiaries are
not only informed but also voice their opinions. However, this does not mean that
their opinions will be taken on board. The three top most levels of control reflect
characteristics of citizen power, where participants can influence decisions which
affect their day-to-day welfare. Contextualising this framework assists in avoiding
homogenous interventions for stakeholders, which Cleaver (1999) also discusses in
her paper on paradoxes of participation (Brown 2002). Plans that carefully consider
aspects of community sustainability, participation, and empowerment result in highimpact development initiatives (Brown 2002).
The involvement of local communities varies, as influenced by institutions and
power. For example, those who seem to benefit or participate are deemed powerful
and suppress the powerless. Therefore, instead of the less powerful communities
benefiting, the interventions are captured by the local elites. Other social institutional factors like gender have also been found to influence development
(Haraldsdottir 2002; Chiwaula et al. 2018). In fishing communities, the local elites
are those who own fishing equipment, as well as the BVC. Individuals who own
equipment exploit those without to work for them. However, other studies on fishing
communities of Malawi report that it is actually the fishing crew who dictates the
sharing of the proceeds compared to the owners of the fishing equipment (Hara and
Jul-Larsen 2003). The BVC, at times, undermines the participation of community
stakeholders in the fish value chain by dominating decision-making. Such tendencies affect inclusive development interventions within fishing communities, which
reflects how power dictates who participates.
Participation in development initiatives has also been conceptualised on the basis
of improving effectiveness in resource use and empowerment of the beneficiaries
(Cleaver 1999). In essence, participation without power to effect necessary changes
is not new in development interventions and is often called the ‘empty ritual of participation’. Participation without power paints a picture that all stakeholders were
consulted and they agree to the decisions made (Arnstein 1969).
3 The Community Scorecard
Since the data (Kayamba-Phiri 2018) showed no evidence of a feedback meeting
between the SEED Fish implementers and the community, we decided to use the
community scorecard to resolve the conflict by first evaluating the project, without
placing emphasis on the conflict itself, to facilitate discussions of both the positive
and negative aspects of the project.
Of ‘White Elephant’ in Fisheries: A Conflict Resolution Model Around the Usage…