209
effects are significant and increasing. The number of employees at foreign affiliated firms of
transnational companies multiplied fourfold
between 1982 and 2007 (81.6 million people in
2007) while their turnover increased eleven fold
over the same time period to above 31 billion dollars (White and Baraldi 2012). In theory affiliated
companies have to accommodate to the law of the
country chosen for the seat, but due to the
economic strength of the companies, the modification of the law of the receiving country in
accordance with the request of multinational
companies is not rare as economic benefits and
upswing are hoped.
The situation is made even more complex by
that even nation-states are not uniform regarding
the social structure. Both the natural environment
and the society are greatly influenced by the democratic or dictatorial form of the state power and
also by the distribution of material goods in the
country. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) consider that institutes have special roles. Institutes
guaranteeing the security of private property, the
objectiveness of the law and public services, providing identical conditions for citizens to enable
people choosing their own course and can freely
enter into contracts are called receiving institutes.
In the opinion of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
receiving institutes are beneficial for the economic development of the given country while
exploiting institute networks make the situation
of only individuals or certain social groups
better.
Sometimes the development of economic
institutes diverges from that of political institutes.
A fine example is China where the leaders of
political institutes realise exploitation with dictatorial measures. Economic institutes, however,
made measures towards receiving institutes
encouraging productivity increase and the intensification of trade. (The authors note that the
remarkably fast growth of the economy of China
global market conditions helped significantly.
According to Gyuris (2017), the profit rate of
investments dropped significantly worldwide by
the end of the 1970s thus China with its diverse
natural and cheap human resources and large
buyer’s market became attractive for investors as
a new target area. Huge capital flew into the enormous country in the process of which “overseas
Chinese” had a major role.) According to
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) if the political
institute system remains exploiting the currently
spectacular increase (they relied on data from
around 2010) will slowly lose momentum. Only
future will tell whether it will be so or not.
Nevertheless, the fact is that the financial crisis of
2008 cut back Chinese export by 16% and
although the country could achieve temporary
improvement with an economic stimulus package using its vast currency reserve, but it was
revealed soon that the former growth rate cannot
be sustained. The growth rate of GDP has
decreased continuously since 2010 but it is still
relatively fast. Export, however, has decreased in
absolute values as well since 2015. China also
suffers from numerous internal problems: deepening regional inequalities (rich coast, poor central areas), ageing society, environmental and
natural limits, etc. (Gyuris 2017). The above also
indicate that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
attribute too significant role to institutes.
Development in each country depends on numerous other factors as well. In the development of
Botswana, for example, mentioned as a positive
example by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) diamond had a major role.
Let us see, however, the relation of autocratic
systems to the natural environment and the situation of environmental protection in these states.
Increasing production is in the interest of a limited social group in power as they provide themselves and increasing share out of it and human
greediness is endless. Environmental protection
is considered a hindrance to production. They
exploit natural resources without limitation, frequently overloading the natural environment.
Corruption among state officials further increases
this effect. This is one reason of intensive clearance of natural rainforests in poor tropical countries. The population living in extreme poverty is
forced to overuse the natural environment purely
to survive. Forcibly suppressing all oppositional
movements is typical for autocratic systems, and
environmental protection campaigns are considered as such. As a result, changing the overuse of
5.2 Global and National Institutes Controlling the Operation of the Society
effects are significant and increasing. The number of employees at foreign affiliated firms of
transnational companies multiplied fourfold
between 1982 and 2007 (81.6 million people in
2007) while their turnover increased eleven fold
over the same time period to above 31 billion dollars (White and Baraldi 2012). In theory affiliated
companies have to accommodate to the law of the
country chosen for the seat, but due to the
economic strength of the companies, the modification of the law of the receiving country in
accordance with the request of multinational
companies is not rare as economic benefits and
upswing are hoped.
The situation is made even more complex by
that even nation-states are not uniform regarding
the social structure. Both the natural environment
and the society are greatly influenced by the democratic or dictatorial form of the state power and
also by the distribution of material goods in the
country. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) consider that institutes have special roles. Institutes
guaranteeing the security of private property, the
objectiveness of the law and public services, providing identical conditions for citizens to enable
people choosing their own course and can freely
enter into contracts are called receiving institutes.
In the opinion of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
receiving institutes are beneficial for the economic development of the given country while
exploiting institute networks make the situation
of only individuals or certain social groups
better.
Sometimes the development of economic
institutes diverges from that of political institutes.
A fine example is China where the leaders of
political institutes realise exploitation with dictatorial measures. Economic institutes, however,
made measures towards receiving institutes
encouraging productivity increase and the intensification of trade. (The authors note that the
remarkably fast growth of the economy of China
global market conditions helped significantly.
According to Gyuris (2017), the profit rate of
investments dropped significantly worldwide by
the end of the 1970s thus China with its diverse
natural and cheap human resources and large
buyer’s market became attractive for investors as
a new target area. Huge capital flew into the enormous country in the process of which “overseas
Chinese” had a major role.) According to
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) if the political
institute system remains exploiting the currently
spectacular increase (they relied on data from
around 2010) will slowly lose momentum. Only
future will tell whether it will be so or not.
Nevertheless, the fact is that the financial crisis of
2008 cut back Chinese export by 16% and
although the country could achieve temporary
improvement with an economic stimulus package using its vast currency reserve, but it was
revealed soon that the former growth rate cannot
be sustained. The growth rate of GDP has
decreased continuously since 2010 but it is still
relatively fast. Export, however, has decreased in
absolute values as well since 2015. China also
suffers from numerous internal problems: deepening regional inequalities (rich coast, poor central areas), ageing society, environmental and
natural limits, etc. (Gyuris 2017). The above also
indicate that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
attribute too significant role to institutes.
Development in each country depends on numerous other factors as well. In the development of
Botswana, for example, mentioned as a positive
example by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) diamond had a major role.
Let us see, however, the relation of autocratic
systems to the natural environment and the situation of environmental protection in these states.
Increasing production is in the interest of a limited social group in power as they provide themselves and increasing share out of it and human
greediness is endless. Environmental protection
is considered a hindrance to production. They
exploit natural resources without limitation, frequently overloading the natural environment.
Corruption among state officials further increases
this effect. This is one reason of intensive clearance of natural rainforests in poor tropical countries. The population living in extreme poverty is
forced to overuse the natural environment purely
to survive. Forcibly suppressing all oppositional
movements is typical for autocratic systems, and
environmental protection campaigns are considered as such. As a result, changing the overuse of
5.2 Global and National Institutes Controlling the Operation of the Society