372
C. L. Strapazzon and C. B. Wandscheer
Considering the Brazilian model of planning development within the 4-years
PPAs, one might easily say that it is in striking contrast with the SDGs Agenda.
Even though by one hand such model is clearly responsive to particular elected governments purposes, nonetheless, on the other it is clear such PPAs are not suitable
mechanisms to implement national interests. Neither progressive implementation
involving all units of the federation in the long run is assured, nor risks of setbacks
are identified or repealed. What is worth mentioning is that such short term of planning is not a creation of Brazilian Constitution. Rather, it is a political choice of
governments and Congress, revealing their preference for a philosophy of discontinuity. The Brazilian Constitution does not impose any temporal model to planning
development. Quite on the contrary, it only determines that a Complementary Law
sets forth the time of such plans, its multiannuality, as well as the National Congress
participation. In no way it limits development to a view of 4 years, nor does it require
the governmental individualization of PPAs.
That is to say the law which enacts the Pluriannual Plan could perfectly be a general
law for 15 years long, as well as it might be engaging all parts of the federation,
as required by the SDG Agenda. Carefully observed, not only development and
budget in its broad sense, but also economic and urban development, production
and consumption; protection of the environment, social security and health are all
matters upon which either Union, States, Federal District as well as municipalities
have the power to legislate concurrently.
15 This would be an original mechanism,
something not experimented so far. Certainly original, but no sort of conflicts with
the Constitution would arise from this.
5 Conclusions
Among others, the Brazilian Constitution has brought to the forefront two issues
that divide political and academic arena throughout the past 50 years: the duty to
ensure national development with multi-annual federal and regional plans grounded,
at once, upon harmonious and convergent policies
16 ; besides that, regardless of any
specific content of development plans, all of them ought to respect and promote the
minimum core of constitutional rights and principles.
At a first glance, there are no substantive contrasts between Agenda 2030 and the
Brazilian Constitution. The substantive features of development as set forth in both
documents are quite harmonious.
15 The authority to Union, States, the Federal District and municipalities to legislating concurrently
upon development and budget stem from Art. 24, II and IX jointly with Art. 30, I and II of the Charter.
The above mentioned authority to all those parts of the Federation to legislate concurrently upon
economic and urban development, production and consumption; protection of the environment,
social security and health is underpinned on Art. 24, I, V, VI, VIII, XII, jointly with Art. 30, I and
II of the Constitution.
16 See Article III, Art. 165, Art. 170, Art. 174§1.
C. L. Strapazzon and C. B. Wandscheer
Considering the Brazilian model of planning development within the 4-years
PPAs, one might easily say that it is in striking contrast with the SDGs Agenda.
Even though by one hand such model is clearly responsive to particular elected governments purposes, nonetheless, on the other it is clear such PPAs are not suitable
mechanisms to implement national interests. Neither progressive implementation
involving all units of the federation in the long run is assured, nor risks of setbacks
are identified or repealed. What is worth mentioning is that such short term of planning is not a creation of Brazilian Constitution. Rather, it is a political choice of
governments and Congress, revealing their preference for a philosophy of discontinuity. The Brazilian Constitution does not impose any temporal model to planning
development. Quite on the contrary, it only determines that a Complementary Law
sets forth the time of such plans, its multiannuality, as well as the National Congress
participation. In no way it limits development to a view of 4 years, nor does it require
the governmental individualization of PPAs.
That is to say the law which enacts the Pluriannual Plan could perfectly be a general
law for 15 years long, as well as it might be engaging all parts of the federation,
as required by the SDG Agenda. Carefully observed, not only development and
budget in its broad sense, but also economic and urban development, production
and consumption; protection of the environment, social security and health are all
matters upon which either Union, States, Federal District as well as municipalities
have the power to legislate concurrently.
15 This would be an original mechanism,
something not experimented so far. Certainly original, but no sort of conflicts with
the Constitution would arise from this.
5 Conclusions
Among others, the Brazilian Constitution has brought to the forefront two issues
that divide political and academic arena throughout the past 50 years: the duty to
ensure national development with multi-annual federal and regional plans grounded,
at once, upon harmonious and convergent policies
16 ; besides that, regardless of any
specific content of development plans, all of them ought to respect and promote the
minimum core of constitutional rights and principles.
At a first glance, there are no substantive contrasts between Agenda 2030 and the
Brazilian Constitution. The substantive features of development as set forth in both
documents are quite harmonious.
15 The authority to Union, States, the Federal District and municipalities to legislating concurrently
upon development and budget stem from Art. 24, II and IX jointly with Art. 30, I and II of the Charter.
The above mentioned authority to all those parts of the Federation to legislate concurrently upon
economic and urban development, production and consumption; protection of the environment,
social security and health is underpinned on Art. 24, I, V, VI, VIII, XII, jointly with Art. 30, I and
II of the Constitution.
16 See Article III, Art. 165, Art. 170, Art. 174§1.