water resources, among others (Sect. 4.1; see also Chap. 2–3 Vol. 1, Chap. 5 Vol. 2).
In order to guarantee better performance of LSLAs, investors should adopt voluntary
initiatives that have specific social and environmental requirements including (but
not limited to) the recognition of legal and customary land rights and the protection
of areas of high conservation values (Bracco 2015; Chao et al. 2012; German and
Schoneveld 2012). This would require both the updating of the many SCL schemes
and also the broadening of the EU RED sustainability criteria to directly cover and
address all the social and environmental aspects of LSLAs.
Secondly, in the context of LSLAs, it is necessary to acknowledge the right of
local communities to FPIC, in order to assure their ‘right to access information, right
to participate in decision-making, and right to challenge such decisions’ (ILC et al.
2012). This is important because granting and enforcing the right to access information can prevent to some extent the adverse effects of LSLAs, especially in highly
corrupt political contexts. The recognition of the rights of local communities over
land and natural resources should be a pre-requisite for LSLAs before they are
signed, with contracts disclosed to ensure the full access to information about the
LSLA, including its risks and impacts (ILC et al. 2012). Effective land governance
policies can reconcile potentially conflicting interests in the context of LSLAs
(Onoja and Achike 2015). In this sense, private operators also have some incentive
to go beyond the weak property rights in many SSA countries to reduce their
investment risk. A possible way to enhance the adoption of the FPIC principle
would be to add it as an additional requirement for investors aiming to export
feedstock for the EU biofuel market.
Thirdly, CSR schemes should ensure the operationalisation of conflict resolution
mechanisms in the LSLA context. Such mechanisms must ensure that local communities have access to reliable and independent mechanisms for oversight and
grievances. As suggested above, this is particularly relevant in SSA contexts with
poor transparency and high levels of political corruption.
Finally, on a more practical note, existing land transactions databases should
(a) validate the assessment methodologies and LSLA sizes, (b) cross-check with
legal information the legality of the land deal and (c) monitor the LSLA to identify
whether the intended LSLA actually materialised. Such monitoring and verification
processes can provide updated information about the LSLA, as well as avoid
labelling LSLAs as ‘land grabs’ when unfounded. The latter can possibly have
negative impacts on foreign direct investment flows, which are important for rural
development and economic growth in some SSA countries (Ahmed et al. 2017).
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter explored the interface of SCL schemes and LSLAs in countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the context of biofuel feedstock production.
LSLAs for producing biofuel feedstock have emerged as an important policy topic
over the past few years due to the scope, rapid evolution and lack of transparency
154
M. Antonelli et al.
Précédent

- 164/363

Suivant