of the Italian investors engaged in LSLAs in SSA (and analysed in this study) refers
to the Italian system of certification (Sect. 4.4.2).
Voluntary schemes are therefore the only instrument currently used to verify the
compliance of Italian investors with sustainability criteria (Sect. 4.2). This creates a
hybrid governance system that includes Member-States, NGOs/civil society, private
companies and business groups (Zezza 2013). Unfortunately, as shown in our study,
the biofuel investors and companies that engage in LSLAs in SSA rarely join such
schemes (Sect. 4.4.2). This is particularly true for investments in their start-up phase
or those that already failed. Indeed, many of the Italian investments studied in this
chapter did not reach the phase of production, and some of them have failed. In these
cases, the investors may not have joined an EU-approved scheme due to the simple
fact that there is no produce to be certified, opting to adopt or join SCL schemes at a
later stage. In fact, certification is only required for export to EU, and in this sense it
does not necessarily need to occur until the exports are to start.
Moreover, as many SCL schemes are often geared towards large-scale agroindustry, the cost structure of certification may be out of reach for small- and
medium-sized companies (FAO 2013). Multinational corporations are in fact far
more likely to adopt SCL schemes, as they also tend to face a higher reputation risk
(Bracco 2015). It is also interesting to note that the EU requirements are not applied
for non-biofuel end uses. This means that when the acquisition is made for ‘flexible’
crops (i.e. feedstocks that can be used for both energy and non-energy purposes such
as palm oil), the investor does not need to adopt the EU-approved certification
schemes if the exports are for non-energy uses.
Furthermore, the delegation system set by the EU to ensure the compliance with
the EU RED sustainability criteria (Sect. 4.2) requires a high level of trust for the
processes adopted by Member-States and voluntary initiatives. This system expects,
in a way, that the approved voluntary initiatives are able to strictly regulate, monitor
and ensure the compliance of investors with the underlying sustainability criteria.
However, it has often been reported that these voluntary schemes are sometimes
unable to effectively monitor and ensure the compliance of their members (German
and Schoneveld 2012). For instance, in several cases NGOs and civil society have
indicated that the RSPO’s mechanism for complaints is unable to guarantee the
preservation of the rights of local communities (FPP 2011; Farm Land Grab 2014a,
2014b).
4.5.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Three main recommendations can be drawn from the analysis conducted in this
chapter. First, the SCL schemes adopted by Italian investors operating in SSA are
insufficient to ensure that the LSLAs are managed in a responsible and fair way. In
particular, the schemes adopted by Italian investors fail in meaningfully covering a
range of issues connected with LSLAs in SSA, such as land use and land tenure
change, gender equity, food security, intergenerational equity and access to land and
4 Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Corporate Social. . .
153
to the Italian system of certification (Sect. 4.4.2).
Voluntary schemes are therefore the only instrument currently used to verify the
compliance of Italian investors with sustainability criteria (Sect. 4.2). This creates a
hybrid governance system that includes Member-States, NGOs/civil society, private
companies and business groups (Zezza 2013). Unfortunately, as shown in our study,
the biofuel investors and companies that engage in LSLAs in SSA rarely join such
schemes (Sect. 4.4.2). This is particularly true for investments in their start-up phase
or those that already failed. Indeed, many of the Italian investments studied in this
chapter did not reach the phase of production, and some of them have failed. In these
cases, the investors may not have joined an EU-approved scheme due to the simple
fact that there is no produce to be certified, opting to adopt or join SCL schemes at a
later stage. In fact, certification is only required for export to EU, and in this sense it
does not necessarily need to occur until the exports are to start.
Moreover, as many SCL schemes are often geared towards large-scale agroindustry, the cost structure of certification may be out of reach for small- and
medium-sized companies (FAO 2013). Multinational corporations are in fact far
more likely to adopt SCL schemes, as they also tend to face a higher reputation risk
(Bracco 2015). It is also interesting to note that the EU requirements are not applied
for non-biofuel end uses. This means that when the acquisition is made for ‘flexible’
crops (i.e. feedstocks that can be used for both energy and non-energy purposes such
as palm oil), the investor does not need to adopt the EU-approved certification
schemes if the exports are for non-energy uses.
Furthermore, the delegation system set by the EU to ensure the compliance with
the EU RED sustainability criteria (Sect. 4.2) requires a high level of trust for the
processes adopted by Member-States and voluntary initiatives. This system expects,
in a way, that the approved voluntary initiatives are able to strictly regulate, monitor
and ensure the compliance of investors with the underlying sustainability criteria.
However, it has often been reported that these voluntary schemes are sometimes
unable to effectively monitor and ensure the compliance of their members (German
and Schoneveld 2012). For instance, in several cases NGOs and civil society have
indicated that the RSPO’s mechanism for complaints is unable to guarantee the
preservation of the rights of local communities (FPP 2011; Farm Land Grab 2014a,
2014b).
4.5.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Three main recommendations can be drawn from the analysis conducted in this
chapter. First, the SCL schemes adopted by Italian investors operating in SSA are
insufficient to ensure that the LSLAs are managed in a responsible and fair way. In
particular, the schemes adopted by Italian investors fail in meaningfully covering a
range of issues connected with LSLAs in SSA, such as land use and land tenure
change, gender equity, food security, intergenerational equity and access to land and
4 Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Corporate Social. . .
153