disclosure obligations and engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct. According
to the statement of claim, filed in the Federal Court of Australia, problems at the
Fundão tailings dam in Brazil were encountered since 2009, and BHP who was
aware of the “dam failure risk” at least since August 27, 2014, should immediately
have informed the Australian Securities Exchange of this risk and the “consequential
financial risk” (Gray 2018). Nevertheless, none of these negative consequences of
the November 2015 Samarco dam disaster have finally compelled Samarco’s 50%
owner Vale to improve its poor safety precautions: On January 25, 2019, the
Brumadinho dam, equally located in Minas Gerais, Brazil, broke, triggering an
unprecedented ecological disaster that killed nearly 300 people (The Guardian
2019).
2.4 Conclusion and Proposed Solutions
The two case studies in Mexico and Brazil showed that in both cases, human failure
and in the second case additionally human greed caused the disaster and that
prevention is better than cure in mining operations. In the Buenavista del Cobre
disaster case, it has been irresponsible of the company to use unfinished installations. Regarding the Samarco dam disaster, it was unforgivable that Samarco – after
having repeatedly been briefed on the risks and possible disastrous consequences
including the concise maximum number of potential fatalities along with measures
to mitigate the risks – failed to install a warning siren along with a functioning
emergency system which would have been obligatory under the given circumstances, even if the lawmaker in Brazil obviously failed to oblige mining companies
to have alarm and warning systems (Phillips 2018).
At first glance, the reputational loss due to this dramatic incident, unpleasant legal
procedures, as well as the liabilities created by these disasters may be sufficient to
serve as a deterrent example to other companies. Nevertheless, the fact that these
disasters happened although these companies had already been repeatedly fined for
legal violations of environmental laws and human rights shows that the state has to
take more decisive action to ensure appropriate measures for safety and environmental protection in the mining sector. Therefore, the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial powers in both countries should be more rigorous in their actions toward
those mining operators who repeatedly violate legal regulations to achieve a deterrent effect in the long term. Currently, however, some state actors in Mexico and
Brazil do not seem to act in a responsible manner.
In the Buenavista del Cobre disaster case, the government’s failure to comply
with environmental laws and safety regulations as well as the Attorney General’s
default to open a criminal investigation shows apparent weaknesses in parts of the
executive power in Mexico. It is also highly problematic that the Mexican government defends the closure of the trust fund by claiming that the restoration and
reimbursement plans had been entirely fulfilled, while the affected communities
2 Mining Environmental Disasters in North and South America: The. . .
27
to the statement of claim, filed in the Federal Court of Australia, problems at the
Fundão tailings dam in Brazil were encountered since 2009, and BHP who was
aware of the “dam failure risk” at least since August 27, 2014, should immediately
have informed the Australian Securities Exchange of this risk and the “consequential
financial risk” (Gray 2018). Nevertheless, none of these negative consequences of
the November 2015 Samarco dam disaster have finally compelled Samarco’s 50%
owner Vale to improve its poor safety precautions: On January 25, 2019, the
Brumadinho dam, equally located in Minas Gerais, Brazil, broke, triggering an
unprecedented ecological disaster that killed nearly 300 people (The Guardian
2019).
2.4 Conclusion and Proposed Solutions
The two case studies in Mexico and Brazil showed that in both cases, human failure
and in the second case additionally human greed caused the disaster and that
prevention is better than cure in mining operations. In the Buenavista del Cobre
disaster case, it has been irresponsible of the company to use unfinished installations. Regarding the Samarco dam disaster, it was unforgivable that Samarco – after
having repeatedly been briefed on the risks and possible disastrous consequences
including the concise maximum number of potential fatalities along with measures
to mitigate the risks – failed to install a warning siren along with a functioning
emergency system which would have been obligatory under the given circumstances, even if the lawmaker in Brazil obviously failed to oblige mining companies
to have alarm and warning systems (Phillips 2018).
At first glance, the reputational loss due to this dramatic incident, unpleasant legal
procedures, as well as the liabilities created by these disasters may be sufficient to
serve as a deterrent example to other companies. Nevertheless, the fact that these
disasters happened although these companies had already been repeatedly fined for
legal violations of environmental laws and human rights shows that the state has to
take more decisive action to ensure appropriate measures for safety and environmental protection in the mining sector. Therefore, the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial powers in both countries should be more rigorous in their actions toward
those mining operators who repeatedly violate legal regulations to achieve a deterrent effect in the long term. Currently, however, some state actors in Mexico and
Brazil do not seem to act in a responsible manner.
In the Buenavista del Cobre disaster case, the government’s failure to comply
with environmental laws and safety regulations as well as the Attorney General’s
default to open a criminal investigation shows apparent weaknesses in parts of the
executive power in Mexico. It is also highly problematic that the Mexican government defends the closure of the trust fund by claiming that the restoration and
reimbursement plans had been entirely fulfilled, while the affected communities
2 Mining Environmental Disasters in North and South America: The. . .
27