consultant who inspected the area in December 2014, had already warned Samarco
against “static liquefaction” (Phillips 2018), telling them that the situation may get
out of control (Phillips 2018). Internal documents cautioning that a maximal potential loss due to a liquefaction pause could result in up to 20 deaths, have serious
impacts on land, water resources, and biodiversity over 20 years; and cost over
3 billion dollars (Phillips 2018) show that the company was fully aware of the risks.
Nonetheless, the devices supposed to measure liquid pressure were not properly
waited and the company did not have any warning siren (Phillips 2018). José
Adércio Sampaio, supervisor of a taskforce of federal prosecutors, stated in his
summary of the criminal case: “They prioritized profits and left safety in second
place” (Phillips 2018). So, after all not only human failure but also human greed
facilitated the disaster.
2.3.2.4 Economic and Legal Consequences of the Disaster
Right after the accident, Samarco’s mining operations were stalled and have not been
taken up until today. Furthermore, Samarco had 30 M reals (£5.2 M) of its capital
frozen by a judge in Mariana to remedy damage done in the region (The Guardian
2015). It initially agreed one billion real (£174M) of compensation and prevention
measures with state attorneys, but according to estimations by Carlos Pinto –
heading a team of environmental prosecutors for the State of Minas Gerais who
investigated the tragedy – the charges will be much heavier.
In October 2016, Brazilian Federal Prosecutors filed charges against 21 people for
“qualified homicide with eventual intent
3
” (Gonzalez 2016; Kiernan 2016; Nogueira
and Blount 2016) in connection with the disaster. Charges were filed, inter alia,
against former and current top executives of Vale S.A. and BHP Billiton Ltd.
including the former Samarco Chief Executive Ricardo Vescovi, Vale’s Iron-Ore
Director Peter Poppinga, eight Vale and BHP representatives at Samarco, and an
engineer from VogBR for his report assuring the dam’s safety (Kiernan 2016;
Gonzalez 2016). According to the prosecutors, the accused, who include
16 Brazilians, two Americans, a Briton, a French citizen, a South African, and an
Australian, may face sentences of up to 54 years. Eduardo Santos de Oliveira, one of
the prosecutors, said about those who died in the disaster: “These people were
murdered” (Nogueira and Blount 2016).
Additionally, a separate civil lawsuit by public prosecutors for damages in the
amount of USD 48 billion was initiated in 2016. In January 2017, the public
prosecutors and the three companies (Samarco, Vale, and BHP Billiton) signed a
$680 M preliminary contract for restoration work (Phillips 2018).
Beyond that, 3000 investors have signed up to participate in a class action against
miner BHP over the Samarco dam disaster of 2015 for continuously violating
3 Also known as “dolus eventualis,” i.e., committing murder without direct intent to kill but
knowingly and deliberately accepting the risk of death
26
O. Schwarz-Herion and A. Omran
against “static liquefaction” (Phillips 2018), telling them that the situation may get
out of control (Phillips 2018). Internal documents cautioning that a maximal potential loss due to a liquefaction pause could result in up to 20 deaths, have serious
impacts on land, water resources, and biodiversity over 20 years; and cost over
3 billion dollars (Phillips 2018) show that the company was fully aware of the risks.
Nonetheless, the devices supposed to measure liquid pressure were not properly
waited and the company did not have any warning siren (Phillips 2018). José
Adércio Sampaio, supervisor of a taskforce of federal prosecutors, stated in his
summary of the criminal case: “They prioritized profits and left safety in second
place” (Phillips 2018). So, after all not only human failure but also human greed
facilitated the disaster.
2.3.2.4 Economic and Legal Consequences of the Disaster
Right after the accident, Samarco’s mining operations were stalled and have not been
taken up until today. Furthermore, Samarco had 30 M reals (£5.2 M) of its capital
frozen by a judge in Mariana to remedy damage done in the region (The Guardian
2015). It initially agreed one billion real (£174M) of compensation and prevention
measures with state attorneys, but according to estimations by Carlos Pinto –
heading a team of environmental prosecutors for the State of Minas Gerais who
investigated the tragedy – the charges will be much heavier.
In October 2016, Brazilian Federal Prosecutors filed charges against 21 people for
“qualified homicide with eventual intent
3
” (Gonzalez 2016; Kiernan 2016; Nogueira
and Blount 2016) in connection with the disaster. Charges were filed, inter alia,
against former and current top executives of Vale S.A. and BHP Billiton Ltd.
including the former Samarco Chief Executive Ricardo Vescovi, Vale’s Iron-Ore
Director Peter Poppinga, eight Vale and BHP representatives at Samarco, and an
engineer from VogBR for his report assuring the dam’s safety (Kiernan 2016;
Gonzalez 2016). According to the prosecutors, the accused, who include
16 Brazilians, two Americans, a Briton, a French citizen, a South African, and an
Australian, may face sentences of up to 54 years. Eduardo Santos de Oliveira, one of
the prosecutors, said about those who died in the disaster: “These people were
murdered” (Nogueira and Blount 2016).
Additionally, a separate civil lawsuit by public prosecutors for damages in the
amount of USD 48 billion was initiated in 2016. In January 2017, the public
prosecutors and the three companies (Samarco, Vale, and BHP Billiton) signed a
$680 M preliminary contract for restoration work (Phillips 2018).
Beyond that, 3000 investors have signed up to participate in a class action against
miner BHP over the Samarco dam disaster of 2015 for continuously violating
3 Also known as “dolus eventualis,” i.e., committing murder without direct intent to kill but
knowingly and deliberately accepting the risk of death
26
O. Schwarz-Herion and A. Omran