787
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
M. C. Tobias, J. G. Morrison, On the Nature of Ecological Paradox,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64526-7_90
Chapter 90
The Individual and the Circumference
90.1 The Map of Exiles
While we are wont to employ the word apperception (Descartes’ “apercevoir,”
Kant’s transcendental apperception), consciousness cannot appreciably or more
than intuitively be self-reflective, despite the monumental imagery it presents to
the bias of so many biological years. That easily persuaded picture of Self supposes an identity, a closed series of identity-dependent groups, and all the arrangements perpetuating the propositions upholding the ego of a species, the
differentiation of selves, and the irrefutable defense of one’s own mind. Its starkest
contrasts and illumination are evinced at the moment of our exercise of unconditional love. That is the instant of true self-recognition by recognizing the lives of
Others (Fig. 90.1).
To inch toward an assertation of the Other, of the fact one’s mind is not possessed
at all, in other words, to fully renounce the involvement of Self from Self for a reason (to better grasp the natural world?), begs the fallacy of thinking about oneself,
and thereby facilitating the connection to Others. It is the indulgence of a sphere that
would lose the ability voluntarily to posit a circumference. To be freed, cleansed of
co-habitation is to release the inferno of perpetual insistence on the origin of insistence from dependent origination or palingenesis; to co-habit with nothingness in a
coyly spirited effort to re-ignite the conversation. Such hopes are unconcerned by
the delusion of certainty. Just as Jean-Paul Sartre had written, “Quality is nothing
other than the being of the this when it is considered apart from the external relation
with the world or with other thises”
1
(Fig. 90.2).
Not only awkwardly declared and translated, but, consistent with much of
Sartre’s inscrutably tied-in-knots nausea, a complicated thought, pitting qualia
1 Second on “Transcendence,” Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology,
Translated and with an Introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, Philosophical Library, New York, 1956,
p.186.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
M. C. Tobias, J. G. Morrison, On the Nature of Ecological Paradox,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64526-7_90
Chapter 90
The Individual and the Circumference
90.1 The Map of Exiles
While we are wont to employ the word apperception (Descartes’ “apercevoir,”
Kant’s transcendental apperception), consciousness cannot appreciably or more
than intuitively be self-reflective, despite the monumental imagery it presents to
the bias of so many biological years. That easily persuaded picture of Self supposes an identity, a closed series of identity-dependent groups, and all the arrangements perpetuating the propositions upholding the ego of a species, the
differentiation of selves, and the irrefutable defense of one’s own mind. Its starkest
contrasts and illumination are evinced at the moment of our exercise of unconditional love. That is the instant of true self-recognition by recognizing the lives of
Others (Fig. 90.1).
To inch toward an assertation of the Other, of the fact one’s mind is not possessed
at all, in other words, to fully renounce the involvement of Self from Self for a reason (to better grasp the natural world?), begs the fallacy of thinking about oneself,
and thereby facilitating the connection to Others. It is the indulgence of a sphere that
would lose the ability voluntarily to posit a circumference. To be freed, cleansed of
co-habitation is to release the inferno of perpetual insistence on the origin of insistence from dependent origination or palingenesis; to co-habit with nothingness in a
coyly spirited effort to re-ignite the conversation. Such hopes are unconcerned by
the delusion of certainty. Just as Jean-Paul Sartre had written, “Quality is nothing
other than the being of the this when it is considered apart from the external relation
with the world or with other thises”
1
(Fig. 90.2).
Not only awkwardly declared and translated, but, consistent with much of
Sartre’s inscrutably tied-in-knots nausea, a complicated thought, pitting qualia
1 Second on “Transcendence,” Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology,
Translated and with an Introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, Philosophical Library, New York, 1956,
p.186.