709
truths, the “appearances of samsara and nirvana” (both), continue to inflict upon
“the expanse of suchness,” engendering real pain, authentic suffering, in “ourselves
and others,” and it thus becomes essential that we break through dualisms to enact
ameliorative “benefit”.
12
Described in the context of Nagarjuna, Douglas Berger
writes that “interdependent causality in turn is only possible because things, phenomena, lack any fixed nature and so are open (sunya) to being transformed”.
13
This
is a position far exceeding the “noble silence” that Chandrakirti suggested was the
“ultimate” response to subject/object contradictions.
14
For Jean-Paul Sartre, grappling with a summary of such dualities throughout the
conclusion of his monumental Being and Nothingness, he writes of “detotalized
totality,” “the transcendent efficacy of consciousness,” which, “owing to the repercussions of an act in the world… is neither pure exteriority nor immanence.” These
assertions are preludes to that “existential psychoanalysis” that may posit “the being
by whom values exist,” the unrecoverable self by choice, “transcendent value which
haunts it,” and “a being-which-is-not-what-it-is and which-is-what-it-is-not…”.
15
Such epistemological rhetoric would, were we to abide by it, undercut the conservation biology reflex which is to restore. The conservation impetus is guided entirely
by a belief system which relies on authentic inflections and sincere flash points
oriented toward a re-wilding, a re-establishment of credibility in the face of a failing
species. It is a rueful, pointedly uncertain impulse that harkens back to the earliest
metaphysics of protection, the first preserves, national parks, and present, desperate
efforts to save what’s left. That it also courts the existential emptiness evinces a
fascinating and important bifurcation point within consciousness that pits the imagination against itself. The only remedy to this paradox is choice, and that represents
the possibility of virtue and volitional change (Fig. 78.4).
78.2 A Context for Choice
The conservation contexts, as we have endeavored to explore throughout this work,
is not without total moral disarray. Consider the “mainland island”
16
efforts in New
Zealand and New Caledonia, or the case of Redonda Island, some 50 kilometers off
12 ibid., p. 89.
13 “3. Against Worldly and Ultimate Substantialism,” “Nagarjuna (c. 150–c.250), Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/nagarjun/. Accessed January 8, 2020.
14 op.cit., Padmakara Group, p. 51.
15 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness – An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, Translated
and with an introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, Philosophical Library, New York 1956,
pp. 623–627.
16 See Forum article, “Role of predator-proof fences in restoring New Zealand’s biodiversity: a
response to Scofield et al.,” 2011, John Innes, William G. Lee, Bruce Burns, Colin Campbell-Hunt,
Corinne Watts, Hilary Phipps and Theo Stephens, Published on-line: 28 May 2012, https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/259571855_Role_of_predatorproof_fences_in_restoring_New_
Zealand%27s_biodiversity_A_response_to_Scofield_et_al_2011. Accessed January 8, 2020
78.2 A Context for Choice
truths, the “appearances of samsara and nirvana” (both), continue to inflict upon
“the expanse of suchness,” engendering real pain, authentic suffering, in “ourselves
and others,” and it thus becomes essential that we break through dualisms to enact
ameliorative “benefit”.
12
Described in the context of Nagarjuna, Douglas Berger
writes that “interdependent causality in turn is only possible because things, phenomena, lack any fixed nature and so are open (sunya) to being transformed”.
13
This
is a position far exceeding the “noble silence” that Chandrakirti suggested was the
“ultimate” response to subject/object contradictions.
14
For Jean-Paul Sartre, grappling with a summary of such dualities throughout the
conclusion of his monumental Being and Nothingness, he writes of “detotalized
totality,” “the transcendent efficacy of consciousness,” which, “owing to the repercussions of an act in the world… is neither pure exteriority nor immanence.” These
assertions are preludes to that “existential psychoanalysis” that may posit “the being
by whom values exist,” the unrecoverable self by choice, “transcendent value which
haunts it,” and “a being-which-is-not-what-it-is and which-is-what-it-is-not…”.
15
Such epistemological rhetoric would, were we to abide by it, undercut the conservation biology reflex which is to restore. The conservation impetus is guided entirely
by a belief system which relies on authentic inflections and sincere flash points
oriented toward a re-wilding, a re-establishment of credibility in the face of a failing
species. It is a rueful, pointedly uncertain impulse that harkens back to the earliest
metaphysics of protection, the first preserves, national parks, and present, desperate
efforts to save what’s left. That it also courts the existential emptiness evinces a
fascinating and important bifurcation point within consciousness that pits the imagination against itself. The only remedy to this paradox is choice, and that represents
the possibility of virtue and volitional change (Fig. 78.4).
78.2 A Context for Choice
The conservation contexts, as we have endeavored to explore throughout this work,
is not without total moral disarray. Consider the “mainland island”
16
efforts in New
Zealand and New Caledonia, or the case of Redonda Island, some 50 kilometers off
12 ibid., p. 89.
13 “3. Against Worldly and Ultimate Substantialism,” “Nagarjuna (c. 150–c.250), Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/nagarjun/. Accessed January 8, 2020.
14 op.cit., Padmakara Group, p. 51.
15 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness – An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, Translated
and with an introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, Philosophical Library, New York 1956,
pp. 623–627.
16 See Forum article, “Role of predator-proof fences in restoring New Zealand’s biodiversity: a
response to Scofield et al.,” 2011, John Innes, William G. Lee, Bruce Burns, Colin Campbell-Hunt,
Corinne Watts, Hilary Phipps and Theo Stephens, Published on-line: 28 May 2012, https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/259571855_Role_of_predatorproof_fences_in_restoring_New_
Zealand%27s_biodiversity_A_response_to_Scofield_et_al_2011. Accessed January 8, 2020
78.2 A Context for Choice