224
9
however, the CEO has enjoyed an annual salary of 401,000 US dollars.
Situated in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania are three of GR’s oldest and
biggest plantations covering around 74,000 ha. In addition, GR owns East Africa’s
largest sawmill, Sao Hill, which is also situated in the Southern Highlands. The company and part of the plantations produce timber and the rest are planted to sequester carbon and generate carbon credits. These plantations have been registered under
the voluntary carbon standard (VCS) selling credits on the voluntary market.
In total, land has been allocated from six different villages, two villages for each
plantation. The villages have not had much to say in this process, as most of the land
was negotiated in 1997 before the Village Land Act of 1999, which means that at the
time the government and not the village council managed the land. This has led to
some of the villages losing more than 33% of their land, which was set as the limit in
the Village Land Act (URT 1999) for how much a village can give away to an investor. For example, one of the villages, Uchindile, lost almost 60% of its land to Green
Resources (Refseth 2010).
The company has received leasehold for the land for 99 years from the government. According to the Village Land Act, villages cannot lease land directly to investors. The land needs first to be converted to general land, which is managed by the
government. This means that when the period for leasehold is out the land is returned
to the government and not to the village. In return for giving away land, villages are
promised employment, development of infrastructure and support to community
projects. In addition, GR has promised 10% of the total revenue from selling carbon
credits to the villages (Refseth 2010).
Reports have shown that the benefits from GR projects to the local communities
have not been fulfilled as promised (Refseth 2010; Point Carbon and Perspectives
2008; Karumbidza and Menne 2011). Refseth (2010) found for instance that of the
promises made in 1997 about one third had been honoured in 2009. At the same
time, most workers were only paid 2500 TZS per day (about one US dollar), which is
the Tanzanian minimum wage for agricultural work, while the local union claimed
that such plantation work should be classified as industrial work, which had a minimum wage of 3000 TZS per day. In addition, work clothes received from the company were not sufficient, most people were employed on short temporary contracts
and salary payments often came much too late.
The only roads that had been constructed were roads in the plantation itself,
which were not directly benefiting the villages. Despite promises of access to safe
water, no efforts to supply water to the villages had been made. Lastly, support to
community projects had been slow and barely existed (Refseth 2010). In sum, one
main problem with the approach used by GR is that local benefits are not transparently stated in written contracts. Hence, benefits do not become rights that communities hold, but are merely subject to charity from the company.
The claimed climate change mitigation effect from these plantations is also questionable, since vegetation is cleared before the seedlings of pine and eucalyptus are
planted. In addition, parts of the plantations in Tanzania have been set on fire by
local people several times, which could be seen as a form of resistance against the
project. It is obviously also a problem when carbon sold on a market to mitigate
Chapter 9 · Population Growth, Markets and Sustainable Land-Use in Africa
9
however, the CEO has enjoyed an annual salary of 401,000 US dollars.
Situated in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania are three of GR’s oldest and
biggest plantations covering around 74,000 ha. In addition, GR owns East Africa’s
largest sawmill, Sao Hill, which is also situated in the Southern Highlands. The company and part of the plantations produce timber and the rest are planted to sequester carbon and generate carbon credits. These plantations have been registered under
the voluntary carbon standard (VCS) selling credits on the voluntary market.
In total, land has been allocated from six different villages, two villages for each
plantation. The villages have not had much to say in this process, as most of the land
was negotiated in 1997 before the Village Land Act of 1999, which means that at the
time the government and not the village council managed the land. This has led to
some of the villages losing more than 33% of their land, which was set as the limit in
the Village Land Act (URT 1999) for how much a village can give away to an investor. For example, one of the villages, Uchindile, lost almost 60% of its land to Green
Resources (Refseth 2010).
The company has received leasehold for the land for 99 years from the government. According to the Village Land Act, villages cannot lease land directly to investors. The land needs first to be converted to general land, which is managed by the
government. This means that when the period for leasehold is out the land is returned
to the government and not to the village. In return for giving away land, villages are
promised employment, development of infrastructure and support to community
projects. In addition, GR has promised 10% of the total revenue from selling carbon
credits to the villages (Refseth 2010).
Reports have shown that the benefits from GR projects to the local communities
have not been fulfilled as promised (Refseth 2010; Point Carbon and Perspectives
2008; Karumbidza and Menne 2011). Refseth (2010) found for instance that of the
promises made in 1997 about one third had been honoured in 2009. At the same
time, most workers were only paid 2500 TZS per day (about one US dollar), which is
the Tanzanian minimum wage for agricultural work, while the local union claimed
that such plantation work should be classified as industrial work, which had a minimum wage of 3000 TZS per day. In addition, work clothes received from the company were not sufficient, most people were employed on short temporary contracts
and salary payments often came much too late.
The only roads that had been constructed were roads in the plantation itself,
which were not directly benefiting the villages. Despite promises of access to safe
water, no efforts to supply water to the villages had been made. Lastly, support to
community projects had been slow and barely existed (Refseth 2010). In sum, one
main problem with the approach used by GR is that local benefits are not transparently stated in written contracts. Hence, benefits do not become rights that communities hold, but are merely subject to charity from the company.
The claimed climate change mitigation effect from these plantations is also questionable, since vegetation is cleared before the seedlings of pine and eucalyptus are
planted. In addition, parts of the plantations in Tanzania have been set on fire by
local people several times, which could be seen as a form of resistance against the
project. It is obviously also a problem when carbon sold on a market to mitigate
Chapter 9 · Population Growth, Markets and Sustainable Land-Use in Africa