194
8
uprising was brutally suppressed by the Malian army using fighter planes and public
executions.
After a coup d’état in 1968, the new military government continued its anti-pastoral policy. Pastoralists in northern Mali had little influence on national or local
policy, and in practice, the region was governed by a military governor throughout
the whole period until a new Tuareg rebellion started in 1990. Many Tuareg experienced this as a period of military occupation (Poulton and Ag Youssouf 1998).
The Tuareg rebellion that took place during 1990–96 resulted in several thousand deaths and a quarter of a million refugees in the neighbouring countries. This
is a conflict that advocates of the environmental security school explain through
desertification and ensuing scarcity of natural resources. For example, Kahl (2006:
234) claims that in northern Mali, the combination of ‘population pressures, poor
land use practices, and a fragile ecology ... made soil erosion, desertification, and
freshwater scarcity serious problems.’
Kahl also claims that what he calls ‘demographic and environmental stress’ were
important causes of the Tuareg rebellion, without presenting any documentation to
back up these claims. It seems that such advocates of the environmental security
school have neither studied Sahel’s political history nor are familiar with climate or
environmental research on the Sahel.
As we have seen, there has been a recovery of both woody and herbaceous vegetation in the Sahel, including in northern Mali, since the drought of the 1980s. The
drought played a role in the rebellion of the 1990s, but not in the way the narrative
about the correlation between climate change and conflict assumes. Firstly, the
droughts led to many Tuareg moving to Algeria and Libya who became politically
radicalized, especially by Gaddafi’s ideology, which was a mix of Islam and socialism. Many of the Tuareg that went to Libya also ended up as professional soldiers in
Gaddafi’s army and gained practical experience in warfare in Lebanon and Chad. It
was these soldiers that started planning a new uprising in Mali in the 1970s (Lecocq
2004).
Secondly, the droughts led to Mali receiving large amounts of emergency aid.
Much of this relief aid intended for northern Mali was allegedly embezzled by corrupt government officials and politicians. In the wealthier parts of Bamako, numerous ‘drought palaces’ were built in the 1970s and 1980s. These are large houses that
many assume were financed by embezzled emergency relief funds (Bourgeot 1990).
The rumours of such corruption further stoked the anger of many Tuareg at the
Malian authorities (Klute 1995).
There is also increasing competition between Tuareg and settled Songhay farmers over land along the Niger River in northern Mali. The Tuareg, who are primarily
pastoralists, are dependent on access to the rich and nutritious burgu (Echinochloa
stagnina) pastures along the river as an important resource in the dry season, while
the Songhay grow rice along the river. These two land-uses represent a constant
source of small conflicts, a minority of which are violent. However, these types of
conflicts had nothing to do with the rebellion, which was started by people with
roots in Kidal deep in the Sahara a long way from the river. In fact, the uprising in
Chapter 8 · Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflicts in the Sahel
8
uprising was brutally suppressed by the Malian army using fighter planes and public
executions.
After a coup d’état in 1968, the new military government continued its anti-pastoral policy. Pastoralists in northern Mali had little influence on national or local
policy, and in practice, the region was governed by a military governor throughout
the whole period until a new Tuareg rebellion started in 1990. Many Tuareg experienced this as a period of military occupation (Poulton and Ag Youssouf 1998).
The Tuareg rebellion that took place during 1990–96 resulted in several thousand deaths and a quarter of a million refugees in the neighbouring countries. This
is a conflict that advocates of the environmental security school explain through
desertification and ensuing scarcity of natural resources. For example, Kahl (2006:
234) claims that in northern Mali, the combination of ‘population pressures, poor
land use practices, and a fragile ecology ... made soil erosion, desertification, and
freshwater scarcity serious problems.’
Kahl also claims that what he calls ‘demographic and environmental stress’ were
important causes of the Tuareg rebellion, without presenting any documentation to
back up these claims. It seems that such advocates of the environmental security
school have neither studied Sahel’s political history nor are familiar with climate or
environmental research on the Sahel.
As we have seen, there has been a recovery of both woody and herbaceous vegetation in the Sahel, including in northern Mali, since the drought of the 1980s. The
drought played a role in the rebellion of the 1990s, but not in the way the narrative
about the correlation between climate change and conflict assumes. Firstly, the
droughts led to many Tuareg moving to Algeria and Libya who became politically
radicalized, especially by Gaddafi’s ideology, which was a mix of Islam and socialism. Many of the Tuareg that went to Libya also ended up as professional soldiers in
Gaddafi’s army and gained practical experience in warfare in Lebanon and Chad. It
was these soldiers that started planning a new uprising in Mali in the 1970s (Lecocq
2004).
Secondly, the droughts led to Mali receiving large amounts of emergency aid.
Much of this relief aid intended for northern Mali was allegedly embezzled by corrupt government officials and politicians. In the wealthier parts of Bamako, numerous ‘drought palaces’ were built in the 1970s and 1980s. These are large houses that
many assume were financed by embezzled emergency relief funds (Bourgeot 1990).
The rumours of such corruption further stoked the anger of many Tuareg at the
Malian authorities (Klute 1995).
There is also increasing competition between Tuareg and settled Songhay farmers over land along the Niger River in northern Mali. The Tuareg, who are primarily
pastoralists, are dependent on access to the rich and nutritious burgu (Echinochloa
stagnina) pastures along the river as an important resource in the dry season, while
the Songhay grow rice along the river. These two land-uses represent a constant
source of small conflicts, a minority of which are violent. However, these types of
conflicts had nothing to do with the rebellion, which was started by people with
roots in Kidal deep in the Sahara a long way from the river. In fact, the uprising in
Chapter 8 · Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflicts in the Sahel