Air Quality as a Common Resource
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of the resource (i.e. air quality). For instance, major cities like Los Angeles
have reduced their exceptionally high levels of air pollution, although they
still have very high pollution levels (Pollack, et al., 2013). Other places have
also made progress but require more extensive and active investments to
reach similar outcomes (e.g. the Central San Joaquin Valley of California,
including areas such as Bakersfield, Fresno, Visalia, and Merced; Air Quality
Information, 2012), or new and different types of public good investments
(e.g. the transnational air quality issues between China and neighboring
countries).
Overuse of common pool resources can, and does, happen, but it is not inevitable. Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990, 2010; Ostrom et al., 1994) documented
key features of cultural and governmental systems that can maintain stable
common pool resources. Ostrom and colleagues developed a “socialecological systems framework” to describe these features, much of which
focuses on local- scale, collective self- governance and is summarized as eight
design principles for sustainable common pool resource management:
1. Clear group boundaries are defined, including who is included and
who is excluded and therefore unentitled.
2. Rules governing the use of common goods are matched to local needs
and conditions.
3. Most or all of the people (or entities) affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules.
4. Community members have the right to make the rules, and this right is
respected by outside/ higher- level authorities.
5. There is an effective monitoring system for monitoring members’
behavior and enforcing rules, which is carried out by community
members (or is accountable to them).
6. Rule violations are punished with graduated sanctions.
7. Disputes are addressed with low- cost and easy- to- access resolution
mechanisms.
8. Responsibility for governing the common resource is organized in
nested tiers, from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected
system.
Additionally, some of Ostrom’s later work (Dietz, et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2010;
Arrow et al., 2012) stresses that an effective design needs adaptive governance – an ability for the system of rules to evolve and adapt over time as
needed. In particular, these systems may need to adapt to reflect changes in
social, economic, and technological contexts. This can include, for example,
people discovering “loopholes” (ways to evade the existing governance
system and personally overexploit the common resource). Much of Ostrom’s
work involved studying renewable common pool resources that were well
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1 4 1
of the resource (i.e. air quality). For instance, major cities like Los Angeles
have reduced their exceptionally high levels of air pollution, although they
still have very high pollution levels (Pollack, et al., 2013). Other places have
also made progress but require more extensive and active investments to
reach similar outcomes (e.g. the Central San Joaquin Valley of California,
including areas such as Bakersfield, Fresno, Visalia, and Merced; Air Quality
Information, 2012), or new and different types of public good investments
(e.g. the transnational air quality issues between China and neighboring
countries).
Overuse of common pool resources can, and does, happen, but it is not inevitable. Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990, 2010; Ostrom et al., 1994) documented
key features of cultural and governmental systems that can maintain stable
common pool resources. Ostrom and colleagues developed a “socialecological systems framework” to describe these features, much of which
focuses on local- scale, collective self- governance and is summarized as eight
design principles for sustainable common pool resource management:
1. Clear group boundaries are defined, including who is included and
who is excluded and therefore unentitled.
2. Rules governing the use of common goods are matched to local needs
and conditions.
3. Most or all of the people (or entities) affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules.
4. Community members have the right to make the rules, and this right is
respected by outside/ higher- level authorities.
5. There is an effective monitoring system for monitoring members’
behavior and enforcing rules, which is carried out by community
members (or is accountable to them).
6. Rule violations are punished with graduated sanctions.
7. Disputes are addressed with low- cost and easy- to- access resolution
mechanisms.
8. Responsibility for governing the common resource is organized in
nested tiers, from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected
system.
Additionally, some of Ostrom’s later work (Dietz, et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2010;
Arrow et al., 2012) stresses that an effective design needs adaptive governance – an ability for the system of rules to evolve and adapt over time as
needed. In particular, these systems may need to adapt to reflect changes in
social, economic, and technological contexts. This can include, for example,
people discovering “loopholes” (ways to evade the existing governance
system and personally overexploit the common resource). Much of Ostrom’s
work involved studying renewable common pool resources that were well