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Quantum Biology to Quantum Consciousness
Obviously, the existence of this phenomenon cannot be denied as we all experience it as sentient
humans. The author of this chapter frmly subscribes to the point of view that not only is consciousness a valid topic for scientifc research but, in fact, it is also one of the most important unsolved
scientifc problems of our time. The problem of consciousness has defed conventional approaches,
which view the brain as a classical computer, with neurons and synapses playing the roles of bit
states. Specifcally, the following enigmatic features remain unexplained: (1) the ‘hard problem’
of the nature of conscious experience, for example addressing the experience of ‘qualia’, our inner
life; (2) the binding of disparate brain processes into unifed concepts, objects and sense of self; (3)
transition from preconscious processes to consciousness itself; (4) free will, or non-algorithmic (e.g.
intuitive) processes; (5) the subjective fow of time; and (6) non-locality, i.e. paranormal connections
between humans and also between humans and non-human species across large spatial and temporal domains (e.g. precognition, telepathy). Conventional neuronal-level computational approaches
suggest conscious experience ‘emerges’ at a critical level of computational complexity. Binding is
proposed to be accounted for by temporal synchrony (e.g. coherent 40-Hz oscillations) but, with no
sense of the nature of conscious experience, temporal synchrony is merely correlative rather than
explanatory. Perhaps the most potentially tractable problem is the transition from preconscious processes to consciousness itself. It is generally agreed upon that the vast majority of brain processes
are non-conscious and that consciousness is the tip of an iceberg of brain activity. However, no specifc brain area houses consciousness; neural activity in a given area may be non-conscious at one
moment and correspond with consciousness at another. The classical approach suggests a critical
level of computational complexity results in the transition via the emergence of consciousness, but
again no threshold, biological correlate nor testable prediction has been put forth. Free will, subjective time fow and non-locality have not been seriously addressed by conventional approaches.
Another shortcoming of conventional approaches is that neurons and synapses are considered as
simple switches, whereas real biological cells are far more complex. For example, single-cell organisms such as paramecium swim, avoid obstacles and predators, learn, and fnd food and mates, all
without possessing a single synapse. These cognitive functions can potentially be accomplished by
the cell’s cytoskeletal structures, primarily MTs.
Perhaps the frst attempt to describe the brain using the terminology of quantum physics was
made by Ricciardi and Umezawa (1967). Based on experimental observations of brain activity, they
proposed that the brain could be conceived of as a spatially distributed system placed into particular quantum states by stimuli from the external environment. Thus, information can be thought of
as being coded into the brain in the form of metastable excited states representative of short-term
memory. This code would then be later on transferred to the ground state of the system by in the
manner of Bose–Einstein condensation, which would account for learning and long-term memory.
This model proposes that brain functions are manifestations of spontaneous symmetry breaking
in the dynamics of the brain and regulated by long-range correlations. The model put forth by
Ricciardi and Umezawa (1967) relating macroscopic quantum states to brain function, specifcally
memory, was later extended by these authors who proposed that the brain is a mixed physical system. In this model, the brain is considered to consist of two distinct interacting parts, the frst part
where the classical electrochemical interactions of the neurons of the brain occur, and the second
being the macroscopic quantum state responsible for the creation and maintenance of memory.
R. Penrose (1989, 1994) hypothesised that quantum effects play a fundamental role in human
consciousness by enabling the brain to perform non-computable computations. In his explanation
of how the new physics can explain the mind and consciousness, he examined the division between
classical and quantum physics, specifcally the measurement problem, and related the collapse of
the wave function to conscious events using the notion of objective reduction. This led to the suggestion that MTs within neurons provide the brain with structures capable of orchestrating the collapse of the wave function via quantum computations. This combination has become known as the
Penrose–Hameroff orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR) theory (Hameroff, 1998; Hameroff
and Penrose, 2014). The basic idea on which Orch OR rests is that MTs within the brain’s neurons
Quantum Biology to Quantum Consciousness
Obviously, the existence of this phenomenon cannot be denied as we all experience it as sentient
humans. The author of this chapter frmly subscribes to the point of view that not only is consciousness a valid topic for scientifc research but, in fact, it is also one of the most important unsolved
scientifc problems of our time. The problem of consciousness has defed conventional approaches,
which view the brain as a classical computer, with neurons and synapses playing the roles of bit
states. Specifcally, the following enigmatic features remain unexplained: (1) the ‘hard problem’
of the nature of conscious experience, for example addressing the experience of ‘qualia’, our inner
life; (2) the binding of disparate brain processes into unifed concepts, objects and sense of self; (3)
transition from preconscious processes to consciousness itself; (4) free will, or non-algorithmic (e.g.
intuitive) processes; (5) the subjective fow of time; and (6) non-locality, i.e. paranormal connections
between humans and also between humans and non-human species across large spatial and temporal domains (e.g. precognition, telepathy). Conventional neuronal-level computational approaches
suggest conscious experience ‘emerges’ at a critical level of computational complexity. Binding is
proposed to be accounted for by temporal synchrony (e.g. coherent 40-Hz oscillations) but, with no
sense of the nature of conscious experience, temporal synchrony is merely correlative rather than
explanatory. Perhaps the most potentially tractable problem is the transition from preconscious processes to consciousness itself. It is generally agreed upon that the vast majority of brain processes
are non-conscious and that consciousness is the tip of an iceberg of brain activity. However, no specifc brain area houses consciousness; neural activity in a given area may be non-conscious at one
moment and correspond with consciousness at another. The classical approach suggests a critical
level of computational complexity results in the transition via the emergence of consciousness, but
again no threshold, biological correlate nor testable prediction has been put forth. Free will, subjective time fow and non-locality have not been seriously addressed by conventional approaches.
Another shortcoming of conventional approaches is that neurons and synapses are considered as
simple switches, whereas real biological cells are far more complex. For example, single-cell organisms such as paramecium swim, avoid obstacles and predators, learn, and fnd food and mates, all
without possessing a single synapse. These cognitive functions can potentially be accomplished by
the cell’s cytoskeletal structures, primarily MTs.
Perhaps the frst attempt to describe the brain using the terminology of quantum physics was
made by Ricciardi and Umezawa (1967). Based on experimental observations of brain activity, they
proposed that the brain could be conceived of as a spatially distributed system placed into particular quantum states by stimuli from the external environment. Thus, information can be thought of
as being coded into the brain in the form of metastable excited states representative of short-term
memory. This code would then be later on transferred to the ground state of the system by in the
manner of Bose–Einstein condensation, which would account for learning and long-term memory.
This model proposes that brain functions are manifestations of spontaneous symmetry breaking
in the dynamics of the brain and regulated by long-range correlations. The model put forth by
Ricciardi and Umezawa (1967) relating macroscopic quantum states to brain function, specifcally
memory, was later extended by these authors who proposed that the brain is a mixed physical system. In this model, the brain is considered to consist of two distinct interacting parts, the frst part
where the classical electrochemical interactions of the neurons of the brain occur, and the second
being the macroscopic quantum state responsible for the creation and maintenance of memory.
R. Penrose (1989, 1994) hypothesised that quantum effects play a fundamental role in human
consciousness by enabling the brain to perform non-computable computations. In his explanation
of how the new physics can explain the mind and consciousness, he examined the division between
classical and quantum physics, specifcally the measurement problem, and related the collapse of
the wave function to conscious events using the notion of objective reduction. This led to the suggestion that MTs within neurons provide the brain with structures capable of orchestrating the collapse of the wave function via quantum computations. This combination has become known as the
Penrose–Hameroff orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR) theory (Hameroff, 1998; Hameroff
and Penrose, 2014). The basic idea on which Orch OR rests is that MTs within the brain’s neurons