30
J. A. GULLAND AND J. E. CARROZ
For instance, it is likely that the cost of harvesting the salmon of the
Pacific coast of North America could be reduced by about threequarters by having a management policy which allowed the most
effective gears to be used. If such a policy could be introduced then the
right to catch, say, $1 000 000 worth of salmon would be worth
$750 000, the actual costs of capture, including a reasonable return on
capital, accounting for only $250 000. Clearly in such a situation tlie
problem of allocating the shares of the quota will become acute.
In national fisheries these problems are soluble, a t least in principle.
There is a central body which can enforce any decision as to how the
quota is allocated, and ensure that fishing is not carried out by those
with no quota. An attractive method that has been proposed is that
the excess allocation should be reduced by charging a very substantial
licence fee, equal to nearly the difference between value of catch and
cost of capture (e.g. $700 000 for a licence to take $1 000 000 worth o f
salmon). The money obtained from these licences can then be spent in
suitable ways: to offset all the cost of management and associated
research, to provide research into alternative stocks, for general welfare
of tlie fishermen, as well as a contribution to central government funds.
The significance of this scheme is that there is an explicit realization
that in a well-managed fishery there may be a very considerable surplus
of the value of the catch above the cost of catching it, and a definite
decision is made as to who shall get this surplus. To some extent a t
least the primary problem of fishery managemen-that fish stocks are
a commoii property resource-has been overcome. Though the stocks
do not become the property of tlie government or similar body, the
government does have a large degree of authority over the management.
It also would have a direct financial incentive in proper management
because the surplus of value over costs, and hence the price the fishermen would be prepared t o pay for licences, depends critically on the
management methods.
International fisheries present much more complex problems in the
allocation of the share of the catch, and particularly to countries
wishing to enter a fishery for the first time. Many countries are rapidly
expanding their fisheries, and would be most, unwilling to accept
allocations based directly on the catches in previous years. If the target
figures for future years are known, then at least in principle they form
in the short term an equitable and reasonable basis for allocation. At
the least when allocating a quota for, say, 1970, the likely national
shares in 1970 in the absence of any regulation or allocation are probably
a better guide to allocation than the catches in 1966. For instance, if a
country a t present taking 20% of the catch plans to double its fishing,
J. A. GULLAND AND J. E. CARROZ
For instance, it is likely that the cost of harvesting the salmon of the
Pacific coast of North America could be reduced by about threequarters by having a management policy which allowed the most
effective gears to be used. If such a policy could be introduced then the
right to catch, say, $1 000 000 worth of salmon would be worth
$750 000, the actual costs of capture, including a reasonable return on
capital, accounting for only $250 000. Clearly in such a situation tlie
problem of allocating the shares of the quota will become acute.
In national fisheries these problems are soluble, a t least in principle.
There is a central body which can enforce any decision as to how the
quota is allocated, and ensure that fishing is not carried out by those
with no quota. An attractive method that has been proposed is that
the excess allocation should be reduced by charging a very substantial
licence fee, equal to nearly the difference between value of catch and
cost of capture (e.g. $700 000 for a licence to take $1 000 000 worth o f
salmon). The money obtained from these licences can then be spent in
suitable ways: to offset all the cost of management and associated
research, to provide research into alternative stocks, for general welfare
of tlie fishermen, as well as a contribution to central government funds.
The significance of this scheme is that there is an explicit realization
that in a well-managed fishery there may be a very considerable surplus
of the value of the catch above the cost of catching it, and a definite
decision is made as to who shall get this surplus. To some extent a t
least the primary problem of fishery managemen-that fish stocks are
a commoii property resource-has been overcome. Though the stocks
do not become the property of tlie government or similar body, the
government does have a large degree of authority over the management.
It also would have a direct financial incentive in proper management
because the surplus of value over costs, and hence the price the fishermen would be prepared t o pay for licences, depends critically on the
management methods.
International fisheries present much more complex problems in the
allocation of the share of the catch, and particularly to countries
wishing to enter a fishery for the first time. Many countries are rapidly
expanding their fisheries, and would be most, unwilling to accept
allocations based directly on the catches in previous years. If the target
figures for future years are known, then at least in principle they form
in the short term an equitable and reasonable basis for allocation. At
the least when allocating a quota for, say, 1970, the likely national
shares in 1970 in the absence of any regulation or allocation are probably
a better guide to allocation than the catches in 1966. For instance, if a
country a t present taking 20% of the catch plans to double its fishing,