MANAGEMENT OF FISHERY RESOURCES
29
entrants to the fishery, thus reducing the stock again until the returns
to the individual fishermen are back to their previous level.
B. Limitation of the amount of Jishing
Proper management must therefore include some control over the
amount of fishing (the fishing mortality), through direct limitation of
total catch or total effort, supported where necessary and practicable
by measures such as mesh regulation to control the sizes of fish caught.
Some of the practical problems depend on whether the amount of
fishing is measured as input (fishing effort, e.g. number of hours fishing
by a standard vessel, etc.) or as output (catch), but the more important
question as far as many of the economic results are concerned is whether
the total amount of fishing is set as a simple overall quota, and when
this is reached all fishing stops, or whether individual quotas are set for
each group of fishermen.
If only an overall quota is set, then everyone will scramble to
obtain the maximum share for themselves. This scramble, clearly
predictable on theoretical grounds, has occurred in all the major stocks
regulated by a simple quota ; for example, the Antarctic whaling (until
the nations concerned agreed how to share the quota), or the Pacific
halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis Schmidt) (quotas have generally been
set in terms of catch, but the same results may be expected if there is a
simple effort quota, e.g. fishing continues until the effort totals 1000
days fishing). As a result of the increasing resources invested, and the
corresponding reduction of the length of the season, the cost of exerting
a unit of fishing effort rose roughly in proportion t o the reduction in
total effort, leaving the total cost of capture about the same. Regulation by means of a simple unallocated quota cannot, in the long run,
achieve any substantial reduction of cost, and the benefit of regulation
and the reduction of effort will be limited to any increase in catch,
though this may be substantial for some stocks (e.g. whales ; Gulland,
1966a).
If the total quota is allocated to groups of fishermen within which
competition is reduced or eliminated, then the dissipation of the potential benefits of regulation by excessive costs should not occur. Each
group of fishermen can organize its activities so as to take its share of
the catch a t the least cost, or perhaps take advantage of the benefits of
regulation in other ways, e.g. one country might wish for social reasons
t o ensure a living for the maximum number of fishermen. As regulation
becomes effective and the stocks build up, the difference between the
value of the catch and the cost of catching it will increase, possibly very
greatly, making the right to a share of the catch increasingly valuable.
29
entrants to the fishery, thus reducing the stock again until the returns
to the individual fishermen are back to their previous level.
B. Limitation of the amount of Jishing
Proper management must therefore include some control over the
amount of fishing (the fishing mortality), through direct limitation of
total catch or total effort, supported where necessary and practicable
by measures such as mesh regulation to control the sizes of fish caught.
Some of the practical problems depend on whether the amount of
fishing is measured as input (fishing effort, e.g. number of hours fishing
by a standard vessel, etc.) or as output (catch), but the more important
question as far as many of the economic results are concerned is whether
the total amount of fishing is set as a simple overall quota, and when
this is reached all fishing stops, or whether individual quotas are set for
each group of fishermen.
If only an overall quota is set, then everyone will scramble to
obtain the maximum share for themselves. This scramble, clearly
predictable on theoretical grounds, has occurred in all the major stocks
regulated by a simple quota ; for example, the Antarctic whaling (until
the nations concerned agreed how to share the quota), or the Pacific
halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis Schmidt) (quotas have generally been
set in terms of catch, but the same results may be expected if there is a
simple effort quota, e.g. fishing continues until the effort totals 1000
days fishing). As a result of the increasing resources invested, and the
corresponding reduction of the length of the season, the cost of exerting
a unit of fishing effort rose roughly in proportion t o the reduction in
total effort, leaving the total cost of capture about the same. Regulation by means of a simple unallocated quota cannot, in the long run,
achieve any substantial reduction of cost, and the benefit of regulation
and the reduction of effort will be limited to any increase in catch,
though this may be substantial for some stocks (e.g. whales ; Gulland,
1966a).
If the total quota is allocated to groups of fishermen within which
competition is reduced or eliminated, then the dissipation of the potential benefits of regulation by excessive costs should not occur. Each
group of fishermen can organize its activities so as to take its share of
the catch a t the least cost, or perhaps take advantage of the benefits of
regulation in other ways, e.g. one country might wish for social reasons
t o ensure a living for the maximum number of fishermen. As regulation
becomes effective and the stocks build up, the difference between the
value of the catch and the cost of catching it will increase, possibly very
greatly, making the right to a share of the catch increasingly valuable.