HUMIN ECOLOUY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
75
ecology”. A number of informative and provocative books are beginning
to appear, specifically on a systems approach to ecology. Examples are
those edited by Van Dyne (1969), Watt (1966) and Patten (1971). These
make little attempt, however, to apply the concept to human ecosystems, concentrating on biological systems (Patten) or “natural
resource ecosystems” (Watt and Van Dyne).
The ecosystem is not new; Tansley (1935) formally proposed the term
for a “living” system, one maintained through interactions of the
various parts, which “in a mature ecosystem, are in approximate
equilibrium”. Major (1969) traces the concept further back than that.
Turney-High (1968) points out that systems have always been with us;
it is no fault of nature that we are so tardy in discovering that “there is
inherent in all the phenomena which can survive in nature a built-in
plan of development . . . there is a future of possibilities for everything”.
He claims that if such an “inherent pattern of possibilities actually
comes into being there is system”, and that this system “exists in
everything”.
Evident in most statements on ecosystems are the notions of unity,
pattern, complexity, interaction, structure, and steady state. There
appears to be little divergence (between social and natural scientists), at
least at present, as to the basic definition of the ecosystem concept.
Gates (1968) notes that “the complexity of an ecosystem is enormous
for, by definition, it is the total sum of the organisms, the environment,
and the process of interaction between and within all parts of the
system”. Margalef (1963) stresses that “ecosystems have a structure, in
the sense that they are composed of different parts or elements, and
these are arranged in a definite pattern. The interrelations between the
constituent elements are the basis of the structure”. Duncan (1961)
describes the ecosystem as “a conceptual scheme . . . employed by the
scientist in his day-to-day work. Conceptions of interdependent variation, of cause and effect, or even of mere patterning of sequence, derive
from the idea that nature . . . manifests itself in collections of elements
with more than nominal properties of unity.”
One of the best attempts to integrate ecology and the ecosystem into
general systems analysis is that by Dale (1970). His definitions are clear,
and to be recommended is his simplification of the approach to systems
problem-solving into a four-fold procedure consisting of the lexical
phase (choice of entities); parsing phase (definition of relationships
between selected entities); modelling phase (specification of mechanisms
by which changes in the system take place); and the analysis phase
(solution and validation of model and model outputs by comparison
with the real system). Dale is careful to point out shortcomings in such
analysis and even comes close to stating outright that ecologists are not
75
ecology”. A number of informative and provocative books are beginning
to appear, specifically on a systems approach to ecology. Examples are
those edited by Van Dyne (1969), Watt (1966) and Patten (1971). These
make little attempt, however, to apply the concept to human ecosystems, concentrating on biological systems (Patten) or “natural
resource ecosystems” (Watt and Van Dyne).
The ecosystem is not new; Tansley (1935) formally proposed the term
for a “living” system, one maintained through interactions of the
various parts, which “in a mature ecosystem, are in approximate
equilibrium”. Major (1969) traces the concept further back than that.
Turney-High (1968) points out that systems have always been with us;
it is no fault of nature that we are so tardy in discovering that “there is
inherent in all the phenomena which can survive in nature a built-in
plan of development . . . there is a future of possibilities for everything”.
He claims that if such an “inherent pattern of possibilities actually
comes into being there is system”, and that this system “exists in
everything”.
Evident in most statements on ecosystems are the notions of unity,
pattern, complexity, interaction, structure, and steady state. There
appears to be little divergence (between social and natural scientists), at
least at present, as to the basic definition of the ecosystem concept.
Gates (1968) notes that “the complexity of an ecosystem is enormous
for, by definition, it is the total sum of the organisms, the environment,
and the process of interaction between and within all parts of the
system”. Margalef (1963) stresses that “ecosystems have a structure, in
the sense that they are composed of different parts or elements, and
these are arranged in a definite pattern. The interrelations between the
constituent elements are the basis of the structure”. Duncan (1961)
describes the ecosystem as “a conceptual scheme . . . employed by the
scientist in his day-to-day work. Conceptions of interdependent variation, of cause and effect, or even of mere patterning of sequence, derive
from the idea that nature . . . manifests itself in collections of elements
with more than nominal properties of unity.”
One of the best attempts to integrate ecology and the ecosystem into
general systems analysis is that by Dale (1970). His definitions are clear,
and to be recommended is his simplification of the approach to systems
problem-solving into a four-fold procedure consisting of the lexical
phase (choice of entities); parsing phase (definition of relationships
between selected entities); modelling phase (specification of mechanisms
by which changes in the system take place); and the analysis phase
(solution and validation of model and model outputs by comparison
with the real system). Dale is careful to point out shortcomings in such
analysis and even comes close to stating outright that ecologists are not