74
GERALD L. YOUNG
through which a localized population provides its daily requirements”.
Long (1958) provides a definition based on functionalism: “the local
community whether viewed as a polity, an economy, or a society
presents itself as an order in which expectations are met and functions
performed”.
A concept of community is, of course, hardly new. Plato recognized it
as “a having in common (koinonia) of pleasure and pain”. Aristotle
began his Politics with a reference to community: “Since we see that
every polis is some kind of community and that every community is
established for some good . . .” His concern extended to at least some
idea of necessary limitations of size if satisfactory communal existence
was to be achieved. He rejected Plato’s ideal population size of 5040 as
being too large and further criticized Plato’s concept of community as
containing too much unity, preferring unity in diversity. Cicero and
S t Augustine both developed some notion of community, as did
Aquinas, Althusius, and such “natural law thinkers” as Grotius, Hobbes,
and Locke, and Rousseau. The place of community thought in the
history of political and legal philosophy is developed in a beautifully
written essay by Friedrich (1959).
The concept, though very old, is, at least according to Warren (1956),
far from dead: “the community is not dying out as an effective locality
group. Rather, it is changing structure and function to accommodate
modern developments.” He goes on to suggest that “change is in the
direction of greater specialization of function on the community level, a
part of the overall process of social differentiation and increased
specialization which our times embody”.
G. ECOSYSTEM A N D SYSTEMS A N A L Y S I S
The ecosystem is now generally recognized as the fundamental unit in
ecological analysis, though as Van Dyne (1966) notes, it is not yet
“clearly defined nor do all ecologists view it equally”. His comment, on
biological and natural resource ecosystems, is even more applicable to
the situation in the study of human ecosystems (Darling, 1969). The
accent on the ecosystem suggested by Margalef (1968) is representative
of the current thinking:
Ecology, I claim, is the study of systems at a level in which individuals
or whole organisms may be considered elements of interaction, either
among themselves, or with a loosely organized environmental matrix.
Systems at this level are named ecosystems and ecology, of course, is
the biology of ecosystems.
Such a, conclusion is now generally accepted in the biological disciplines;
as Evans (1956) stated, “the ecosystem thus stands as the basic unit of
GERALD L. YOUNG
through which a localized population provides its daily requirements”.
Long (1958) provides a definition based on functionalism: “the local
community whether viewed as a polity, an economy, or a society
presents itself as an order in which expectations are met and functions
performed”.
A concept of community is, of course, hardly new. Plato recognized it
as “a having in common (koinonia) of pleasure and pain”. Aristotle
began his Politics with a reference to community: “Since we see that
every polis is some kind of community and that every community is
established for some good . . .” His concern extended to at least some
idea of necessary limitations of size if satisfactory communal existence
was to be achieved. He rejected Plato’s ideal population size of 5040 as
being too large and further criticized Plato’s concept of community as
containing too much unity, preferring unity in diversity. Cicero and
S t Augustine both developed some notion of community, as did
Aquinas, Althusius, and such “natural law thinkers” as Grotius, Hobbes,
and Locke, and Rousseau. The place of community thought in the
history of political and legal philosophy is developed in a beautifully
written essay by Friedrich (1959).
The concept, though very old, is, at least according to Warren (1956),
far from dead: “the community is not dying out as an effective locality
group. Rather, it is changing structure and function to accommodate
modern developments.” He goes on to suggest that “change is in the
direction of greater specialization of function on the community level, a
part of the overall process of social differentiation and increased
specialization which our times embody”.
G. ECOSYSTEM A N D SYSTEMS A N A L Y S I S
The ecosystem is now generally recognized as the fundamental unit in
ecological analysis, though as Van Dyne (1966) notes, it is not yet
“clearly defined nor do all ecologists view it equally”. His comment, on
biological and natural resource ecosystems, is even more applicable to
the situation in the study of human ecosystems (Darling, 1969). The
accent on the ecosystem suggested by Margalef (1968) is representative
of the current thinking:
Ecology, I claim, is the study of systems at a level in which individuals
or whole organisms may be considered elements of interaction, either
among themselves, or with a loosely organized environmental matrix.
Systems at this level are named ecosystems and ecology, of course, is
the biology of ecosystems.
Such a, conclusion is now generally accepted in the biological disciplines;
as Evans (1956) stated, “the ecosystem thus stands as the basic unit of