HUMAN ECOLOGY AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPT
9
physical and modified environments in a distinctive and creative way.
A truly interdisciplinary human ecology will most likely address itself to
all three.
The need for a “human” ecology as contrasted with simply a general
biological ecology (that incidentally includes man) can really be argued
only through a detailed inquiry into the uniqueness of man: such an
inquiry is well beyond the scope of the present effort (cf. Simpson, 1966;
Wescott, 1969). Human ecologists, of whatever disciplinary persuasion,
do generally recognize Darling’s (1963) ecological “unity” but at the
same time would hold that the ecological study of man cannot depend
entirely on acceptance of the complete applicability (to man) of all basic
bio-ecological principles, at least not without modification of some kind
(see Dubos, 1965). There is not only that question, but the one of
whether or not additional concepts are needed in the ecological study of
man, concepts that go beyond those established in biological ecology,
One example will have to suffice, the problem of a definition for the
word environment. Ecologists studying sub-human populations and
communities generally define “environment” in the concrete, i.e. as
made up of those factors directly influencing the organism-the operational factors. For environmental factors to be accepted as operational,
some measurable physical exchange of matter or energy must take place
between the organism and its environment. The interaction process
must entail such physical exchange or involvement does not really take
place at the animal level, i.e. there is no functional interrelationship
between organism and environment and no ecological paradigm can be
constructed. The important thing is the necessary emphasis on the
physical nature of the exchange process.
For humans, total abstractions may be isolated as operational factors:
e.g. Bates (1962) credited Murdock for what he called the “supernatural”
environment, what Bates expanded into the “conceptual” environment,
“another phrase for the anthropologists’ culture”. Bates prefers (ecologically) the term conceptual environment to culture because it helps to
prevent losing sight of the human animal creating the culture. The
emphasis here is that the ability to “conceptualize” adds another
dimension to environment (especially to an operational definition in
terms of behavior patterns) beyond that physical exchange process that
determines animal behavior and that is the essence of bio-ecological
paradigms of operational or functional environments.
Conceptual environment, ae an abstraction, can be divided into two
parts further to illustrate the necessity of providing for such inclusions
in any human ecological definition of operational environment. I n both
cases, the conceptual environment is formed from the ideas of man. I n
the first, the ideas are the environment: supernatural beings, deities,
9
physical and modified environments in a distinctive and creative way.
A truly interdisciplinary human ecology will most likely address itself to
all three.
The need for a “human” ecology as contrasted with simply a general
biological ecology (that incidentally includes man) can really be argued
only through a detailed inquiry into the uniqueness of man: such an
inquiry is well beyond the scope of the present effort (cf. Simpson, 1966;
Wescott, 1969). Human ecologists, of whatever disciplinary persuasion,
do generally recognize Darling’s (1963) ecological “unity” but at the
same time would hold that the ecological study of man cannot depend
entirely on acceptance of the complete applicability (to man) of all basic
bio-ecological principles, at least not without modification of some kind
(see Dubos, 1965). There is not only that question, but the one of
whether or not additional concepts are needed in the ecological study of
man, concepts that go beyond those established in biological ecology,
One example will have to suffice, the problem of a definition for the
word environment. Ecologists studying sub-human populations and
communities generally define “environment” in the concrete, i.e. as
made up of those factors directly influencing the organism-the operational factors. For environmental factors to be accepted as operational,
some measurable physical exchange of matter or energy must take place
between the organism and its environment. The interaction process
must entail such physical exchange or involvement does not really take
place at the animal level, i.e. there is no functional interrelationship
between organism and environment and no ecological paradigm can be
constructed. The important thing is the necessary emphasis on the
physical nature of the exchange process.
For humans, total abstractions may be isolated as operational factors:
e.g. Bates (1962) credited Murdock for what he called the “supernatural”
environment, what Bates expanded into the “conceptual” environment,
“another phrase for the anthropologists’ culture”. Bates prefers (ecologically) the term conceptual environment to culture because it helps to
prevent losing sight of the human animal creating the culture. The
emphasis here is that the ability to “conceptualize” adds another
dimension to environment (especially to an operational definition in
terms of behavior patterns) beyond that physical exchange process that
determines animal behavior and that is the essence of bio-ecological
paradigms of operational or functional environments.
Conceptual environment, ae an abstraction, can be divided into two
parts further to illustrate the necessity of providing for such inclusions
in any human ecological definition of operational environment. I n both
cases, the conceptual environment is formed from the ideas of man. I n
the first, the ideas are the environment: supernatural beings, deities,