8
QERALD L. YOUNQ
community” as different from human community. An ecological community may be either, the phrase applies to both. Darling (1963) later
reverses himself and claims that “there is no such subject as human
ecology; there is ecology only, which must accept man as part of the
field of reference”.
The ambivalence of the biological ecologist toward human ecology is
well illustrated by Darling, one of the few to take even tentative steps
between the two. He (1967) substantiates his earlier claim that “there is
only one ecology’’ but admits that “ecologists have resisted the notion
of human ecology” and recognizes certain unique properties of human
communities that resist traditional ecological analysis, such characteristics as the uniqueness of human political organization and “subjective values of widely varying character”.
Cain (1967) makes an important related point in noting that “however
different man may be from other animals in some regards, he shares
with them continuous and intimate relations with the physical environment . . . there is a field of ecology of man, at least in the [same] sense of
the ecology of any other organism”. Sears (1954) emphasized that
“human ecology is not so much a specialty as a scientific activity which
must draw upon a wide range of the specialties”. He notes that the
merits of the label “human ecology’’ are in the encouragement offered to
interdisciplinary awareness.
The major limitation with Darling’s comments (and to some extent
with the others) is that the focus remains essentially on the biotic
community and human ecology is defined principally as the study of
man’s impact on that community. This is acceptable only as a fragment,
very small, of a complete definition of human ecology. Such a view
remains biological ecology with consideration of man aa one of the
factors affecting the biological world. Man is, of course, the dominant
factor, but the concern of such a focus is still the plant and animal world
and not man. It is certainly not a misplaced focus in biological ecology
but also it is definitely not the core of human ecology as is implied by so
many biologists.
The above notion can, however, be incorporated into a more general,
more acceptable definition of human ecology. An important by-product
of work by bio-ecologists is that they have provided a framework on
which a multi-level approach to human ecology can be constructed. The
nucleus of a three-fold definition becomes apparent; human ecology may
be defined (1) from a bio-ecological standpoint as the study of man as
the ecological dominant in plant and animal communities and systems;
(2) from a bio-ecological standpoint as simply another animal affecting
and being affected by his physical environment; and (3) as a human
being, somehow different from animal life in general, interacting with
QERALD L. YOUNQ
community” as different from human community. An ecological community may be either, the phrase applies to both. Darling (1963) later
reverses himself and claims that “there is no such subject as human
ecology; there is ecology only, which must accept man as part of the
field of reference”.
The ambivalence of the biological ecologist toward human ecology is
well illustrated by Darling, one of the few to take even tentative steps
between the two. He (1967) substantiates his earlier claim that “there is
only one ecology’’ but admits that “ecologists have resisted the notion
of human ecology” and recognizes certain unique properties of human
communities that resist traditional ecological analysis, such characteristics as the uniqueness of human political organization and “subjective values of widely varying character”.
Cain (1967) makes an important related point in noting that “however
different man may be from other animals in some regards, he shares
with them continuous and intimate relations with the physical environment . . . there is a field of ecology of man, at least in the [same] sense of
the ecology of any other organism”. Sears (1954) emphasized that
“human ecology is not so much a specialty as a scientific activity which
must draw upon a wide range of the specialties”. He notes that the
merits of the label “human ecology’’ are in the encouragement offered to
interdisciplinary awareness.
The major limitation with Darling’s comments (and to some extent
with the others) is that the focus remains essentially on the biotic
community and human ecology is defined principally as the study of
man’s impact on that community. This is acceptable only as a fragment,
very small, of a complete definition of human ecology. Such a view
remains biological ecology with consideration of man aa one of the
factors affecting the biological world. Man is, of course, the dominant
factor, but the concern of such a focus is still the plant and animal world
and not man. It is certainly not a misplaced focus in biological ecology
but also it is definitely not the core of human ecology as is implied by so
many biologists.
The above notion can, however, be incorporated into a more general,
more acceptable definition of human ecology. An important by-product
of work by bio-ecologists is that they have provided a framework on
which a multi-level approach to human ecology can be constructed. The
nucleus of a three-fold definition becomes apparent; human ecology may
be defined (1) from a bio-ecological standpoint as the study of man as
the ecological dominant in plant and animal communities and systems;
(2) from a bio-ecological standpoint as simply another animal affecting
and being affected by his physical environment; and (3) as a human
being, somehow different from animal life in general, interacting with