16.6. Questions and Tasks
373
net returns from the fishery, a decline in the level of sanctions , or an erosion of the communal property rights by allowing newcomers to enter the
fishery. An increase in the net returns from the fishery, for example, can
occur due to technological improvements, or to an increase in the price of
the resource. The opening of external markets to fish products may increase the price of the resource , causing the traditional social norm to tumble. Consequently, it is likely that the evolution of markets and technological innovations, combined with the invasion of newcomers into traditional
societies, may have played a significant role in the decline in the use of
communal resource management.
In conclusion, the model of this chapter demonstrates that cooperative
norms can be successful in managing marine resources . Social-cooperative
equilibrium can be reached with steady-state numbers of cooperators and
enforcers-without any defectors . Nevertheless, such equilibrium is vulnerable to changes in the system, assuming that communal management systems do not easily adapt to changing economic and social conditions. This
implies-given the rapidly changing social, economic and technological
conditions throughout the world-that it is difficult to sustain at least in the
long run a resource that is managed as a communal resource using cooperative norms as restraints from exploitation. However, the solution to this
difficulty is more complex than it seems . Economic theory suggests that the
best way to secure the sustainability and profitability of fishery resources is
to give private property rights to the fish stocks by assigning individual
transferable quotas (as has successfully been done in several countries e.g.
in Iceland and New Zealand). However, one must bear in mind that there
is no universal truth about suitable property rights for fishery resources.
The choice of property rights (and management methods) should not only
be based on economic theory , but also on the characteristics of each resource, and the social and cultural attributes of the fishermen using it.
16.6. Questions and Tasks
1. Change the cost of punishing to $0.2, and the price of the resource to
$1.9, and find the equilibrium harvest and population size as well as the
steady-state numbers of defectors, cooperators and enforcers . However,
before you run the model, make an educated guess.
2. How large must the initial population of enforcers and defectors be (assuming that the number of cooperators is 10) to sustain a cooperative
equilibrium with the level of punishment being $0,3?
3. Explore which factors in the model will help to sustain equilibrium of
cooperators and enforcers only.
4. Explore the impact of environmental fluctuations on the steady-state fractional shares of defectors, cooperators and enforcers. Before you do so, expand the model to include a population effect on the exploitation function.
373
net returns from the fishery, a decline in the level of sanctions , or an erosion of the communal property rights by allowing newcomers to enter the
fishery. An increase in the net returns from the fishery, for example, can
occur due to technological improvements, or to an increase in the price of
the resource. The opening of external markets to fish products may increase the price of the resource , causing the traditional social norm to tumble. Consequently, it is likely that the evolution of markets and technological innovations, combined with the invasion of newcomers into traditional
societies, may have played a significant role in the decline in the use of
communal resource management.
In conclusion, the model of this chapter demonstrates that cooperative
norms can be successful in managing marine resources . Social-cooperative
equilibrium can be reached with steady-state numbers of cooperators and
enforcers-without any defectors . Nevertheless, such equilibrium is vulnerable to changes in the system, assuming that communal management systems do not easily adapt to changing economic and social conditions. This
implies-given the rapidly changing social, economic and technological
conditions throughout the world-that it is difficult to sustain at least in the
long run a resource that is managed as a communal resource using cooperative norms as restraints from exploitation. However, the solution to this
difficulty is more complex than it seems . Economic theory suggests that the
best way to secure the sustainability and profitability of fishery resources is
to give private property rights to the fish stocks by assigning individual
transferable quotas (as has successfully been done in several countries e.g.
in Iceland and New Zealand). However, one must bear in mind that there
is no universal truth about suitable property rights for fishery resources.
The choice of property rights (and management methods) should not only
be based on economic theory , but also on the characteristics of each resource, and the social and cultural attributes of the fishermen using it.
16.6. Questions and Tasks
1. Change the cost of punishing to $0.2, and the price of the resource to
$1.9, and find the equilibrium harvest and population size as well as the
steady-state numbers of defectors, cooperators and enforcers . However,
before you run the model, make an educated guess.
2. How large must the initial population of enforcers and defectors be (assuming that the number of cooperators is 10) to sustain a cooperative
equilibrium with the level of punishment being $0,3?
3. Explore which factors in the model will help to sustain equilibrium of
cooperators and enforcers only.
4. Explore the impact of environmental fluctuations on the steady-state fractional shares of defectors, cooperators and enforcers. Before you do so, expand the model to include a population effect on the exploitation function.