16.4 . Results
371
U
I
i - !- - - - .
. . . . . ]
l 1"-3 _
0
I
0.00
forcement. If punishment increases, payoff to the defecting strategy declines. This reduces the benefits of cheating, and hence deters cooperators
from becoming defectors. Similarly, if the cost of enforcement declines (or
even becomes negative), more fishermen will choose to become enforcers,
and thus will eliminate the defectors faster than before .
Figure 16.10 shows the stock size (S) associated with each for the five scenarios. It is clear that equilibrium with only defectors-a non-cooperative
12.00
Time
24.00
18.00
6.00
0.00
371
U
I
i - !- - - - .
. . . . . ]
l 1"-3 _
0
I
0.00
forcement. If punishment increases, payoff to the defecting strategy declines. This reduces the benefits of cheating, and hence deters cooperators
from becoming defectors. Similarly, if the cost of enforcement declines (or
even becomes negative), more fishermen will choose to become enforcers,
and thus will eliminate the defectors faster than before .
Figure 16.10 shows the stock size (S) associated with each for the five scenarios. It is clear that equilibrium with only defectors-a non-cooperative
12.00
Time
24.00
18.00
6.00
0.00