Fc
366
16. Management of the Commons
DFc
Fc
Weighted Average payoff
DFd
Fd
N
Weighted Average payoff
DFe
Fd
Fe
Enforcers
N
FIGURE 16.4
That is, the fractional growth rate of each strategy DF/O is proportional to
the amo unt by which that strategy's payoff % exceeds the average payo ff
in the fishery 0(0 at each time period. The growth rates of each strategy,
and the numbers of fishermen belonging to the groups of enforcers, cooperators and defectors, are calculated in the modul e of Figure 16.4. The underlying decision rule implies that, for the social structure in the fishing
community to reach a stable equilibrium, each strategy must earn equal
payoffs.
16.4. Results
To exami ne the model be havior, and to address the questions at the en d of
section 16.2, we must specify seve ral exogenous parameters that give us
initial conditions for the fishery. Table 1 derails the initial conditions and
parameter values for five different scenarios.
366
16. Management of the Commons
DFc
Fc
Weighted Average payoff
DFd
Fd
N
Weighted Average payoff
DFe
Fd
Fe
Enforcers
N
FIGURE 16.4
That is, the fractional growth rate of each strategy DF/O is proportional to
the amo unt by which that strategy's payoff % exceeds the average payo ff
in the fishery 0(0 at each time period. The growth rates of each strategy,
and the numbers of fishermen belonging to the groups of enforcers, cooperators and defectors, are calculated in the modul e of Figure 16.4. The underlying decision rule implies that, for the social structure in the fishing
community to reach a stable equilibrium, each strategy must earn equal
payoffs.
16.4. Results
To exami ne the model be havior, and to address the questions at the en d of
section 16.2, we must specify seve ral exogenous parameters that give us
initial conditions for the fishery. Table 1 derails the initial conditions and
parameter values for five different scenarios.