266
Y. Sadovy de Mitcheson and B. Erisman
The problem of wastage may also be associated with the taking of ripe females.
Aggregations are an obvious focus of interest for the LRFT because of the desire by
fi shers or traders to quickly accumulate large volumes ready for export in large carrier vessels (Sadovy et al. 2003 ) . Females in many transient aggregations are found
on or close to the spawning site for at least a few days until they spawn, after which
they leave (Fig. 8.10 ). This means that most adult females taken at or around aggregation sites tend to be full of eggs. These gravid fi sh do not survive well after capture and high mortalities can occur during the holding phase that precedes export.
Where there are no cost implications for traders (because mortality costs tend to be
borne by the fi shers) there is little incentive to cease fi shing. While some traders
prefer not to accept such fi sh from fi shermen because of these high mortalities,
others actively seek aggregations to fi sh and appear unconcerned about the waste.
Three examples illustrate the problem of gluts and suggest possible solutions.
First, the silver seabream snapper fi shery in Shark Bay, Western Australia, initially
targeted only the spawning aggregations that formed from May to August.
Commercial fi shermen maximized catches during that period by using large fi sh
traps (Chap. 12.12 ), which resulted in a glut of relatively low-priced landings during
a short period fl ooding local markets. The fi shery was placed under strict management in 1987 with entry limited to 51 tradable permits. In 2004 only 23 vessels were
targeting snapper. Since 2001 these dedicated fi nfi sh boats were managed with an
annual quota. These changes have caused fi shers to think about ways of increasing
the value of their individual catch, rather than ways of catching more fi sh. Nowadays
the catch is landed throughout the year, avoiding the annual glut which occurred in
the spawning season, and resulting in much better quality fi sh being taken to market
(Gary Jackson personal communication 2010).
In the second and third examples, quite different, fi sheries show possible responses
to the problem of gluts. In Fiji several coastal species are fi shed heavily on aggregations. In some places, the price paid to the fi sher, per fi sh or weight, at such times is
lower (10–50%) for certain species when landings increase during aggregation time
(Nanise Kuridrani Fiji Fisheries unpublished data). Concerns over the long-term
implications of aggregation-fi shing led the Fijian Fisheries Department to prohibit the
capture of fi sh, destined for export, during the aggregation period. (Aisake Batibasaga
Head of Fisheries Research Fiji Fisheries). In the third example, record low prices for
the Atlantic wreckfi sh, Polyprion americanus , during spawning aggregations spurred
the creation of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system that resulted in catches
being more evenly spread throughout the year (Gauvin et al. 1994 ) .
While restrictions on sales or catches during the aggregation period may address
problems associated with price declines due to gluts of target species, successful
management will also depend heavily on both the responses of fi shers to management and on market forces. For example, in the international LRFT, fi sh supply cannot fi ll demand and so all fi sh will get good prices even when seasonally plentiful.
Moreover, as one supply area dries up, another will be opened such that the Hong
Kong trade centre for the LRFT brings in fi sh from a wide range of, and ever changing, supply countries (Sadovy et al. 2003 ) . In this case, and possibly for other international markets where demand is far higher than supply, local short-term gluts are
unlikely to affect retail prices, although they can affect prices paid locally to fi shers.
Y. Sadovy de Mitcheson and B. Erisman
The problem of wastage may also be associated with the taking of ripe females.
Aggregations are an obvious focus of interest for the LRFT because of the desire by
fi shers or traders to quickly accumulate large volumes ready for export in large carrier vessels (Sadovy et al. 2003 ) . Females in many transient aggregations are found
on or close to the spawning site for at least a few days until they spawn, after which
they leave (Fig. 8.10 ). This means that most adult females taken at or around aggregation sites tend to be full of eggs. These gravid fi sh do not survive well after capture and high mortalities can occur during the holding phase that precedes export.
Where there are no cost implications for traders (because mortality costs tend to be
borne by the fi shers) there is little incentive to cease fi shing. While some traders
prefer not to accept such fi sh from fi shermen because of these high mortalities,
others actively seek aggregations to fi sh and appear unconcerned about the waste.
Three examples illustrate the problem of gluts and suggest possible solutions.
First, the silver seabream snapper fi shery in Shark Bay, Western Australia, initially
targeted only the spawning aggregations that formed from May to August.
Commercial fi shermen maximized catches during that period by using large fi sh
traps (Chap. 12.12 ), which resulted in a glut of relatively low-priced landings during
a short period fl ooding local markets. The fi shery was placed under strict management in 1987 with entry limited to 51 tradable permits. In 2004 only 23 vessels were
targeting snapper. Since 2001 these dedicated fi nfi sh boats were managed with an
annual quota. These changes have caused fi shers to think about ways of increasing
the value of their individual catch, rather than ways of catching more fi sh. Nowadays
the catch is landed throughout the year, avoiding the annual glut which occurred in
the spawning season, and resulting in much better quality fi sh being taken to market
(Gary Jackson personal communication 2010).
In the second and third examples, quite different, fi sheries show possible responses
to the problem of gluts. In Fiji several coastal species are fi shed heavily on aggregations. In some places, the price paid to the fi sher, per fi sh or weight, at such times is
lower (10–50%) for certain species when landings increase during aggregation time
(Nanise Kuridrani Fiji Fisheries unpublished data). Concerns over the long-term
implications of aggregation-fi shing led the Fijian Fisheries Department to prohibit the
capture of fi sh, destined for export, during the aggregation period. (Aisake Batibasaga
Head of Fisheries Research Fiji Fisheries). In the third example, record low prices for
the Atlantic wreckfi sh, Polyprion americanus , during spawning aggregations spurred
the creation of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system that resulted in catches
being more evenly spread throughout the year (Gauvin et al. 1994 ) .
While restrictions on sales or catches during the aggregation period may address
problems associated with price declines due to gluts of target species, successful
management will also depend heavily on both the responses of fi shers to management and on market forces. For example, in the international LRFT, fi sh supply cannot fi ll demand and so all fi sh will get good prices even when seasonally plentiful.
Moreover, as one supply area dries up, another will be opened such that the Hong
Kong trade centre for the LRFT brings in fi sh from a wide range of, and ever changing, supply countries (Sadovy et al. 2003 ) . In this case, and possibly for other international markets where demand is far higher than supply, local short-term gluts are
unlikely to affect retail prices, although they can affect prices paid locally to fi shers.