54
S. Jentoft
meaningful and effective participation in decision-making processes by stakeholders.
As Dahl ( 1989 ) argues, not only the substance of decisions matters, but also the procedure through which one arrives at them.
This is also in line with Sen’s criticism of Rawls’s “Theory of Justice” ( 1971 ) .
Sen argues that Rawls ( 1971 ) is too preoccupied with the institutional dimensions
of justice (i.e. second order in interactive governance language) and not with those
that apply to process ( fi rst order). It is also important to consider what happens to,
and matters for people in their day-to-day lives, regardless of the principles that are
written into the institutions that affect them. Furthermore, it is worth remembering
that, regardless of outcome, people must have ownership of decisions. It is for this
reason that, “Democracy has to be judged not just by their institutions that formally
exist but by the extent to which different voices from diverse sections of the people
can actually be heard” (Sen 2009 , xii). In a similar vein, Dahl therefore says, “the
democratic process is in itself a form of justice.” This would also be the reason why
stakeholders in fi sheries governance are supposed to be involved in the decisionmaking process, why they should not be reduced to passive receivers of rules and
regulations by some higher authority, and why the subsidiarity principle mentioned
earlier in this chapter is also sound from a justice perspective. Even though the content of the rule and the outcome it produces are exactly the same, people can be
expected to respect decisions and abide by rules if they are of their own as opposed
to being imposed on them.
Thus, fi sheries governance must not only allow for distributive justice, but also
for procedural justice. Procedural justice is linked to governability through the legitimacy it provides. As Perusse Daigle et al. ( 1996 , 19) state with regard to procedural
justice and participation in fi sheries resource allocation: “Providing individuals
with an opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns regarding allocations leads
them to believe they have been treated fairly… and increases satisfaction with decision makers.” The move towards participatory, co-governance modes has for this
reason gained momentum in fi sheries in recent years (Wilson et al. 2003 ) . Ways of
involving stakeholders in regulatory decision-making, from consultation to devolvement of management tasks, are now being introduced in many countries in both the
north and south. It is for instance part of the EU common fi sheries governance
reform. Thus, interactive governance is more than a normative theory; it is an empirical phenomenon that should be investigated from a critical perspective. How does
it really work according to generally accepted standards of what constitutes just
governing?
Notably, the trend towards interactive governance in fi sheries is not likely to be
explained by a sudden appreciation of social justice as an important value.
Alternatively, given the diversity, complexity and dynamics of fi sheries systems-to-be
governed, there may be the assessment that the governability challenge is beyond
the limits of what governments can do on their own. Another, and perhaps the most
likely driver, is the expectation that stakeholder participation will improve compliance, which is an urgent problem in fi sheries worldwide and a major reason why so
many fi sh stocks are in peril. It is assumed that participation increases the legitimacy of governing systems and hence the willingness of stakeholders to follow the
S. Jentoft
meaningful and effective participation in decision-making processes by stakeholders.
As Dahl ( 1989 ) argues, not only the substance of decisions matters, but also the procedure through which one arrives at them.
This is also in line with Sen’s criticism of Rawls’s “Theory of Justice” ( 1971 ) .
Sen argues that Rawls ( 1971 ) is too preoccupied with the institutional dimensions
of justice (i.e. second order in interactive governance language) and not with those
that apply to process ( fi rst order). It is also important to consider what happens to,
and matters for people in their day-to-day lives, regardless of the principles that are
written into the institutions that affect them. Furthermore, it is worth remembering
that, regardless of outcome, people must have ownership of decisions. It is for this
reason that, “Democracy has to be judged not just by their institutions that formally
exist but by the extent to which different voices from diverse sections of the people
can actually be heard” (Sen 2009 , xii). In a similar vein, Dahl therefore says, “the
democratic process is in itself a form of justice.” This would also be the reason why
stakeholders in fi sheries governance are supposed to be involved in the decisionmaking process, why they should not be reduced to passive receivers of rules and
regulations by some higher authority, and why the subsidiarity principle mentioned
earlier in this chapter is also sound from a justice perspective. Even though the content of the rule and the outcome it produces are exactly the same, people can be
expected to respect decisions and abide by rules if they are of their own as opposed
to being imposed on them.
Thus, fi sheries governance must not only allow for distributive justice, but also
for procedural justice. Procedural justice is linked to governability through the legitimacy it provides. As Perusse Daigle et al. ( 1996 , 19) state with regard to procedural
justice and participation in fi sheries resource allocation: “Providing individuals
with an opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns regarding allocations leads
them to believe they have been treated fairly… and increases satisfaction with decision makers.” The move towards participatory, co-governance modes has for this
reason gained momentum in fi sheries in recent years (Wilson et al. 2003 ) . Ways of
involving stakeholders in regulatory decision-making, from consultation to devolvement of management tasks, are now being introduced in many countries in both the
north and south. It is for instance part of the EU common fi sheries governance
reform. Thus, interactive governance is more than a normative theory; it is an empirical phenomenon that should be investigated from a critical perspective. How does
it really work according to generally accepted standards of what constitutes just
governing?
Notably, the trend towards interactive governance in fi sheries is not likely to be
explained by a sudden appreciation of social justice as an important value.
Alternatively, given the diversity, complexity and dynamics of fi sheries systems-to-be
governed, there may be the assessment that the governability challenge is beyond
the limits of what governments can do on their own. Another, and perhaps the most
likely driver, is the expectation that stakeholder participation will improve compliance, which is an urgent problem in fi sheries worldwide and a major reason why so
many fi sh stocks are in peril. It is assumed that participation increases the legitimacy of governing systems and hence the willingness of stakeholders to follow the