52
S. Jentoft
traditional livelihood, such as small-scale fi shing in the case of the indigenous Sami
of Norway (Jentoft and Karlsen 1997 ) .
Second Order
A comprehensive concept of justice should include institutions and the ways in
which they restrict, enable and guide human behavior. In the interactive governance
framework (Kooiman 2003 ), the design and maintenance of institutions are at the
second order of governance. With meta-order principles and norms, and the actions
taken by the governors ( fi rst order), they co-determine the way governance works.
Limits to, and opportunities for, governability are often of an institutional nature.
Efforts to improve governability therefore require institutional reform of some sort,
either of institutions that are inherent to the system-to-be-governed, those that make
up the governing system, or those that regulate or facilitate their interaction.
Schattschneider’s ( 1960 ) idea that “organization is bias” provides a relevant
perspective for discussing social justice at this order. He argues that some issues and
interests inevitably fall beyond organizational boundaries. There is thus a risk that
justice will be ill served if some issues, interests and stakeholders who should
have been inside the organization are excluded, and conversely if some who are
inside should yield to others who are currently excluded. Still, moving boundaries
so that issues, interests or stakeholders previously left out are integrated does not
necessarily solve justice problems. There will always be someone whose interest
falls outside the domain of the organization and who could therefore claim that they
are being discriminated against. In other words, the closer the boundaries of the
organization move towards an outsider, the easier it is for him or her to raise a
justice claim. For a governing system, determining where boundaries are, i.e. on the
issue of how inclusive it shall be, involves what interactive governance associates
with a “hard choice” (Kooiman et al. 2005 ) .
The question we must therefore ask is, how can a particular organizational bias
be justi fi ed? Since there would be limits to how inclusive co-governing institutions
can be, determining exactly where the limit should be drawn in order for decisionmaking procedures to be just is an institutional design issue in need of a principle.
In the case of Norway, for example, the fi sheries governing system that includes
various stakeholder groups in a co-management process has been criticized for biasing in favor of some interests, while leaving others out. Historically, the Norwegian
Fishers’ Association, which does not represent more than 60% of all fi shers, has
been granted a privileged position in negotiations with the state, of being the one
representative of not only all fi shers, but the entire fi shing industry. It is traditionally
also the main industry advisor to government, and has been allowed to determine
quota allocations between fi sher groups. It has, however, been argued (from a justice perspective) that this privilege is discriminatory to other stakeholders, particularly those who have no organization to voice their interests. The Sami fi shers have
traditionally not had such an organization, and have therefore missed the clout to
S. Jentoft
traditional livelihood, such as small-scale fi shing in the case of the indigenous Sami
of Norway (Jentoft and Karlsen 1997 ) .
Second Order
A comprehensive concept of justice should include institutions and the ways in
which they restrict, enable and guide human behavior. In the interactive governance
framework (Kooiman 2003 ), the design and maintenance of institutions are at the
second order of governance. With meta-order principles and norms, and the actions
taken by the governors ( fi rst order), they co-determine the way governance works.
Limits to, and opportunities for, governability are often of an institutional nature.
Efforts to improve governability therefore require institutional reform of some sort,
either of institutions that are inherent to the system-to-be-governed, those that make
up the governing system, or those that regulate or facilitate their interaction.
Schattschneider’s ( 1960 ) idea that “organization is bias” provides a relevant
perspective for discussing social justice at this order. He argues that some issues and
interests inevitably fall beyond organizational boundaries. There is thus a risk that
justice will be ill served if some issues, interests and stakeholders who should
have been inside the organization are excluded, and conversely if some who are
inside should yield to others who are currently excluded. Still, moving boundaries
so that issues, interests or stakeholders previously left out are integrated does not
necessarily solve justice problems. There will always be someone whose interest
falls outside the domain of the organization and who could therefore claim that they
are being discriminated against. In other words, the closer the boundaries of the
organization move towards an outsider, the easier it is for him or her to raise a
justice claim. For a governing system, determining where boundaries are, i.e. on the
issue of how inclusive it shall be, involves what interactive governance associates
with a “hard choice” (Kooiman et al. 2005 ) .
The question we must therefore ask is, how can a particular organizational bias
be justi fi ed? Since there would be limits to how inclusive co-governing institutions
can be, determining exactly where the limit should be drawn in order for decisionmaking procedures to be just is an institutional design issue in need of a principle.
In the case of Norway, for example, the fi sheries governing system that includes
various stakeholder groups in a co-management process has been criticized for biasing in favor of some interests, while leaving others out. Historically, the Norwegian
Fishers’ Association, which does not represent more than 60% of all fi shers, has
been granted a privileged position in negotiations with the state, of being the one
representative of not only all fi shers, but the entire fi shing industry. It is traditionally
also the main industry advisor to government, and has been allowed to determine
quota allocations between fi sher groups. It has, however, been argued (from a justice perspective) that this privilege is discriminatory to other stakeholders, particularly those who have no organization to voice their interests. The Sami fi shers have
traditionally not had such an organization, and have therefore missed the clout to